Abstract
A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning.
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Notes
This point is surprisingly overlooked by Neta 2009, who offers HISTORY EXAM against KN and in favour of JBKN, and uses the insufficient reason manœuvre to defend JBKN against SURGEON.
See also Brown (2011, 267): “the thought seems to be that knowledge is insufficient because of the chance of error”.
See Vollet (2023).
If ignoring the possibility that not-p amounts to having no doubt as to whether p, or being certain that p, as Beddor (2020) suggests, to rely on p implies to be certain that p. It is important to note, however, that the present argument does not need to assume that relying on p implies being certain that p.
At this stage, friends of KN might be tempted to abandon the insufficient reason manoeuvre and to embrace a shifty view of knowledge. Pragmatic encroachers, for example, say that given the cost of error in SURGEON, higher epistemic standards for knowledge are in place. They can then say that the surgeon in fact does not know the target proposition. While this move may have some plausibility in SURGEON (perhaps in that case the use of `know' is not literal, see Fantl and McGrath, 2009: 62) it is far less plausible to think that, in HISTORY EXAM, the subject does not (or cannot) know the target proposition. Assuming that would indeed lead to saying that in situations in which it is inappropriate for you to rely on p because you (justifiably) believe that you do not know that p, then you do not know that p. A (justified) belief that you do not know that p would be infallible. That is clearly an unwelcome result.
Proponents of epistemic certainty norms typically follow orthodoxy about epistemic modals and characterize epistemic certainty/uncertainty in terms of possibilities (in)compatible with the subject’s evidence (see Kratzer, 1981). Henning (2021) has recently argued against such evidentialist norms that they are not transparent, for they “impose constraints on relying on p that are, in some sense, independent of whether p”. Indeed, following philosophers such as DeRose (2009), Henning assumes that “epistemic norms should come with a secondary norm of reasonableness” requiring, on some views, to have a justified belief that one satisfies the primary norm. But if the primary norm imposes an evidential constraint (with respect to p) on a decision that is p-dependent (but which is not justified-belief-dependent), the secondary norm will impose a constraint on that decision that will be irrelevant (e. g., having a justified belief that one has a justified belief that p). In contrast, Henning argues, the transparency constraint can be respected if one combines an “Epistemic Must Norm” with a non-factualist account of epistemic modals (see, e.g., Yalcin, 2007). Let me note two things. First, it is rather contentious that the alleged “secondary norm” should be understood as a norm rather than as a mere regulation condition; and it is far from clear that regulation conditions need to be transparent in that sense (see Fassio, 2017 and Vollet, 2022). More importantly, were the advocates of the certainty norm to adopt the non-factualist account of epistemic modals favoured by Henning, it does not look like the arguments presented in the present paper would be weakened. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this issue.
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Vollet, JH. Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm. AJPH 3, 13 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00143-0