Knowing the Facts: A Contrastivist Account of the Referential Opacity of Knowledge Attributions*

Abstract

The view that propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts (rather than propositions) is prima facie rather appealing, especially for realistically minded philosophers, but it is difficult to square with the referential opacity of knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows that p’. For how could Lois Lane know that Superman can fly and ignore that Clark Kent can fly if knowledge is a two-place relation between an agent and a fact and the fact that Superman can fly just is the fact that Clark Kent can fly? Giorgio Volpe reviews some attempts to tackle the problem and then proposes a new solution which exploits the contrastivist claim that knowledge is a three-place relation between an agent, a fact and a contrast.

*The problem addressed in this paper, arising as it does from a distinctively realist view of the world and our knowledge of it, would likely have struck the late Eva Picardi as an internal puzzle generated by some very questionable presuppositions. The reason why this has not deterred me from selecting it for discussion in this tribute to her memory lies in the fact that she would have considered the arguments offered in these pages with the open-mindedness, insight and generosity that have led so many of us to regard her as a model of intellectual integrity and a source of philosophical inspiration.