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A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 78712, Austin, TX, USA

    R. Harrison Wagner

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  1. R. Harrison Wagner
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Wagner, R.H. A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game. Theor Decis 21, 311–335 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134100

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