Abstract
Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.
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Wallin, A. Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?. Synthese 178, 503–514 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9653-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9653-2