Abstract
Two main schemes explain how a system adapts to its environment. Evolutionary models are grounded on three usual processes (variation, transmission, selection) acting at the population level. Learning models are concerned with the endogenous search for a better performance at the individual level. The first ones were initially favored by biology and the second well illustrated by game theory. The article examines first how game theory went to evolution and how biology later considered learning. It shows some examples of a hybrid use of models of each type. It finally proposes a common framework for both types of models.
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Walliser, B. Learning Versus Evolution: From Biology to Game Theory. Biol Theory 6, 311–319 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-012-0071-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-012-0071-1