Abstract
This rich and wide-ranging book defends a “tripartite theory” of responsibility. The general thesis is that responsibility-responses (understood as families of sentimental reactions to others in their capacity as actors or holders of particular attitudes) fall into three overlapping categories, each of which presumes distinct agential capacities. On the basis of a close examination of various sorts of marginal agency, these capacities are said to be independent and ground what deserves to be called distinct types or “faces” of responsibility. The first face, attributability, depends on a capacity for character, answerability on a capacity for judgment, and accountability on a capacity for “regard”. This commentary questions the theory’s account of the relations among the types of responsibility, and its attempt to ground responsibility-responses in qualities of “will”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This formulation raises questions that I won’t have space to pursue here. Once it’s properly punctuated, the formulation might express a conjunctive, a disjunctive view, or a cluster view, or some combination of these. To be a responsible agent, or responsible for certain attitudes or pieces of behavior, a strong conjunctive reading requires the satisfaction of all three conditions. One is responsible full stop, or not at all. The tripartite theory might be construed as disjunctive analysis; satisfying any of the disjuncts entails that one is a responsible agent or responsible for some attitude. Contrast these readings with a cluster analysis, which would hold that being responsible involves the realization of various properties. Such an analysis might say that unless a sufficient number or variety of elements in a property-cluster is realized, one might fail to be responsible, or be only “sort of” responsible. A monistic cluster view would have it that there is only one type of responsibility, of which one can “sort of” meet the cluster of conditions. Shoemaker’s tripartite theory seems to me best viewed as a “disjunctive cluster view”. Responsibility of one of the three types is a matter of satisfying certain elements of the relevant cluster. So one might be fully responsible with respect to attributability, but only sort of (or minimally, or barely) responsible with respect to one of the other types. (My example below of the child’s response to her mother’s pain might best be seen as a case of “sort of” attributability.)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Watson, G. Three faces of responsibility? Comments on responsibility from the margins. Philos Stud 175, 989–998 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1047-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1047-1