Can our reasons determine what it is rational for us to believe?

Abstract

This is a discussion of Mark Schroeder’s book Reasons First. In this book, Schroeder defends the following thesis: for every believer and every time, it is the reasons that the believer has at that time that determine what it is rational for the believer to believe at that time. It is argued here that this thesis is false, since it conflicts with the plausible principle of “normative invariance”: what a believer ought to believe at a time cannot depend on what the believer actually believes at that time. Schroeder’s thesis conflicts with this principle because Schroeder accepts that what reasons a believer has at a time always depends, at least in part, on the beliefs that the believer has at the time. The conclusion to be drawn is that, if this principle of normative invariance is correct, the notions of “reasons” and “evidence” should be banished from fundamental epistemology.