Abstract
Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s and Woodward’s direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the NIP. My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the NIP only arises when we concern ourselves with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the NIP is dissolved.
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Notes
Parfit (1984, pp. 351–374).
If we froze sperm for later use, thereby affecting the identity of the person conceived, we would also generate the NIP.
I use the term “harm” to mean “set someone’s interests back,” which, I take it, is a fairly standard conception of harm and a conception consistent with Parfit’s use of the term in his discussion of the NIP.
Melinda Roberts, however, argues that that child could exist without the deformity, but it is just very unlikely that they will. See Roberts (1998, pp. 89–108).
See Parfit, op. cit., pp. 394–395.
See Parfit, op. cit., pp. 396.
Levy and Hanser, among others, adopt this strategy. Levy argues that the child, looking back, cannot think of her parents’ negligent procreation as wrong because of the metaphysical whiplash suffered when trying to look back from a worthwhile existence to choices that determined that existence. But, argues Levy the parents, from their perspective at the time of the act, can see that they have not taken their best course of action. See Levy (2002, pp. 357–368). But, of course, even from their forward looking perspective, the parents can predict the likely worthwhile nature of their future child’s life and claim that since their action harms no one, it is permissible (even if it’s not the best course of action available to them). Hanser argue that we are only responsible for the non-accidental results of our actions and, since many of the decision-makers in NIP cases (but not parents) only accidentally affect future identities, identity cannot be used to excuse their harmful acts. See Hanser (1990, pp. 47–70). But, we are responsible for the foreseeable results of our actions and not only the non-accidental results of our actions. Thus, if I shoot at the birds outside my window, ignoring the people standing near them, I am responsible for killing the people, even if their deaths are accidental side-effects of my intended action.
Harman (2004, pp. 89–109).
The gist of Harman’s argument is that we should not enact Risky Policies, or the like, since we can achieve similar benefits (i.e., lives worth living) while incurring fewer burdens (i.e., suffering caused by the policy). This strategy is wide because it is based on the interests of people, in general, without regard to particular identities. Obviously, we could not incur the same benefits while incurring fewer burdens to the same people.
Harman, op. cit., p. 107.
Woodward (1987, p. 802).
See Hanser, op. cit., pp. 60–61, for a similar argument.
Woodward (1986, pp. 809–810).
Parfit (1986, p. 857).
Woodward (1987, p. 807).
Parfit, op. cit., pp. 855–857.
Throughout this paper, I distinguish between nonexistence, defined as never existing, and death, whose definition I leave to others to debate.
The blind Sally example is not a special case. In many Non-Identity cases, it is changes in the timeline of conceptions and/or in the people that meet and procreate due to the implementation of policies or ingestion of drugs, etc. that cause different people to exist, and not the detrimental effects of the policy, drug, etc. E.g., it is not the fact that a policy will cause a nuclear catastrophe, or that a drug will damage future children that causes different people to exist. Rather, it’s the fact that the implementation of the policy or ingestion of a drug causes changes in the timeline of conceptions and/or causes different people to meet and conceive children that causes different people to exist. The negative effects of the policy, drug, etc., are not causally necessary for the future persons’ life goods; they are mere side-effects of the timeline changes caused by policies, drugs, etc. that are necessary for the future person’s existence.
I say “real subject” rather than “subject” to allow for possible subjects in possible worlds. These possible subjects in possible worlds may merit extreme consideration in said possible worlds, but they have no rights, interests, or actuality in the actual world. My discussion is confined to the actual world.
I am indebted to Jonathan Adler and Jeanine Diller for raising this epistemological issue.
Caspar Hare attempts to do so by arguing that this case (among other concerns) proves that we ought not confine our concerns to all and only actually entities but, as I argue, I think this conclusion creates more problems than it solves. (I also think the argument fails but the reasons it does are not relevant to this paper). See Hare (2007, pp. 498–523).
I am indebted to Jonathan Adler, Richard Greene, Elizabeth Harman, Peter Kung, and Charles Young for this set of objections and examples.
Parfit (1984, p. 360).
See Feinberg, op. cit., pp. 145–179, for a failed attempt at just that. Feinberg claims that children born with negligent handicaps are the non-victims of victimless crimes (victimless due to the NIP), who nonetheless are entitled to claim a special resentment of their procreators. But, if the crime is truly victimless, why would the resentment be appropriate? Gratitude for a life worth living would seem to be the more appropriate attitude. Hare makes a similar error by claiming that Mariette, the victim of procreative negligence, can claim that she was harmed by her mother’s disregard for her de dicto child and she is her mother’s de dicto child. This is a very odd thing for Mariette to say because had her mother showed concern for her de dicto child, things would, presumably, have been worse (or, at the very least no better) for Mariette. It seems like, of all people, Mariette should be especially grateful for her mother’s lack of concern for her de dicto child. (Hare, op. cit., pp. 522–523).
It does not, however, entail that focusing on wrongs rather than harms is not a promising wide person-affecting strategy around the Problem.
Parfit, op. cit., p. 375.
Parfit, op. cit., p. 376.
Parfit, op. cit., p. 371.
Some might wonder whether adopting one nuclear waste policy over another affects which future people exist. That might seem to undercut my claim that all future people will exist. But policy decisions that determine future identities do not determine which future people will exist. Instead, a choice between two nuclear waste policies, or the like, presents a choice between hypothetical sets of people; i.e., it makes us choose amongst hypothetically possible people (under policy a, the a people will exist; under policy b, the b people will exist). But only one set of hypothetically possible people will be future people. The other set will turn out to be merely possible people (whom we have no reason to care about).
Parfit, op. cit., p. 376.
Parfit’s written comments to me.
An argument against Parfit’s view of rational regret can be found in Woodward (1986, p. 823).
Parfit (1984, p. 373).
Parfit, op. cit., p. 365.
I am grateful to Jeff McMahan for pointing this out.
Both Feinberg and Steinbock propose a “minimal decency” standard. See Feinberg, op. cit., p. 167 and Steinbock (1986, pp. 15–20). Seana Shiffrin sets a strict liability standard. See Shiffrin (1999, pp. 117–148). John Robertson sets a “life worth living” standard (see Robertson, op. cit.). I set a Rawlsian contractualist standard (see Weinberg, op. cit.).
Shiffrin deems existence a “pure benefit” which we may not impose on anyone, including future persons, without their consent, op. cit., pp. 117–148.
This kind of conversation, and the reasoning that supports it, applies to any non-identity case. The child can use the same reasoning to conclude that she was harmed by being conceived by a 14-year old mother, or harmed by the adoption of The Risky Policy, etc. The same reasoning applies: we don’t need to exist but, since we do exist, we have many other needs and interests.
Whether existence can be good for people, in general, regardless of particular identities, is irrelevant because the NIP is confined to narrow person-affecting principles, i.e., to principles which evaluate actions on the basis of their effects on particular, identified individuals. (See Parfit, op. cit., pp. 393–397).
One might argue against using a comparative sense of what may be good or bad for someone, on the grounds that things can be good or bad for someone without the alternative being worse or better. See McMahan, J. “Problems of Population Theory,” (1981, pp. 104–105). I will not take up the merits of this claim here since if we refrain from thinking of a person’s interests in comparative terms, we will not generate the NIP because we will not be able to say that the victim of procreative negligence is better off or not worse off, all things considered, with existence and a disability than with neither existence nor a disability, etc.
I owe this example to Elizabeth Harman.
One might wish to characterize Sally’s mother’s juice drinking as moving the possible Sally simpliciter into the future persons category rather than the merely possible persons category (this characterization was suggested by Richard Greene). Possible person simpliciter is a metaphysically plausible status although I do think that it tends to be morally misleading, as argued earlier. But that has no bearing on the present point. The point here is that, morally, even as a possible person simpliciter, Sally only has interests if she will be a future person, in which case she will exist. If her mother does not drink the juice, the hypothetically possible (simpliciter) Sally will be a merely possible person with no interests. Thus, Sally’s mother’s juice drinking does not benefit Sally, the real person with real interests but the real Sally’s interests are set back by being blind. Existence is not bestowed on the possible simpliciter Sally who has no interests in existence or anything else unless she will definitely exist, i.e., be a future person. Interests begin with existence already in place (otherwise we have no subject for said interests).
What one is entitled to take credit for is different from what might induce gratitude on the part of another. Just as children may or may not feel grateful to parents for fulfilling parental obligations, they may or may not feel grateful to parents for causing them to exist, even though they have no need to exist and wouldn’t be in any way deprived if they never existed. Gratitude is a complex emotional response, which may or may not occur for innumerable reasons that need not be relevant to that for which one is or is not entitled to claim credit.
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Acknowledgments
I am extremely grateful and deeply indebted to Jonathan Adler, Jeanine Diller, Zev Gruman, Paul Hurley, Jeff McMahan, Derek Parfit, Dion Scott-Kakures, and Charles Young for their invaluably insightful comments and suggestions on numerous drafts of this paper. I thank Elizabeth Anderson, Michael Cholbi, Peter Kung, Robert Lurz, and David Velleman for extremely helpful comments and discussions. I thank Richard Greene and Elizabeth Harman for their very helpful comments at the APA session (Pacific 2007) on this paper.
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Weinberg, R. Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem. Philos Stud 137, 3–18 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9168-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9168-y