Abstract
Drawing on resources from Heidegger, social theory, ecological psychology, and enactive cognitive science, this paper presents novel analyses of social normativity and social change. The key idea is that we humans are often stunned with the practical necessities we experience in everyday action: Often, it feels hard or even impossible for us to act differently from what “one” has to do – for instance, it just feels “wrong” to go shopping in a dressing gown. However, a philosophical analysis reveals that we only experience the world in the way we experience it because we are the beings that we are: There are subjective background conditions for bringing about meaningful experiences, background conditions which only philosophical reflection can make us aware of. These background conditions, it is suggested, are shaped and transformed by social conventions and public interpretations of the world. Thus, the point of view from which we experience the world is socially shaped – a fact most humans are ignorant about when absorbed in action. Yet apprehending this fact, and realizing that the interpretation which we ordinarily presuppose is radically contingent is the first step of becoming “authentic”. Individuals gaining this insight understand that it is to an important part up to them how the world shows up. Thus, they can modify their attitude toward the world. Likewise, it is suggested, even a whole society can become socially authentic and decide which of the contingent social conventions which constitute it as a society should be retained and which modified.
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Notes
- 1.
“BT 113” is meant to refer to page 113 of the German edition of Being and Time (BT) (Heidegger 1927). When quoting from Being and Time, this paper makes use of both English translations, that is, the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Heidegger 1962), and the translation by Joan Stambaugh (Heidegger 1996). Occasionally, this paper takes the liberty to change the translations.
- 2.
Against this background, the headline of this subsection – “the matrix of morality” – should be understood in this way: The anyone is not only concerned with rather trivial instances of conventional social normativity, such as not going shopping in a dressing gown. Rather, the anyone also shapes our outlook onto our worlds in a very deep way, including the idea that we are moral persons with free will and an inner moral compass, that there are moral reasons “out there”, and that we must follow moral rules in order to avoid having a bad conscience. Of course, there are differences between rules which might be considered to be part of “morality proper”, such as not killing other persons, and other social rules, such as not going shopping in a dressing gown. For instance, the first rule is of direct relevance for the existence of human beings, whereas the second rule is not. But even though there are these differences, it is important to acknowledge that even “morality proper” is nothing but an interpretation of our world, an interpretation which shapes our experience in at least roughly the same way as other instances of social normativity do. Or, this is at least the view this paper wishes to propose.
- 3.
One might wonder about the relation between individual and social authenticity. Especially if one holds on to a version of methodological individualism, one might expect that social authenticity is somehow dependent on individual authenticity. However, there are reasons to be skeptical that collective action is just a result of individual actions. Applied to the topic of authenticity, this paper suggests that individual and social authenticity can each be achieved independently, even though they promote each other. In more detail, the suggestion is that there can be a society which is in many regards authentic, even if its members are in many regards inauthentic. For example, the society can inauthentically embrace the idea that its members have inner true selves, and that their lives are failed if they not realize their true selves; however, the society could at the same time hold the authentic insight that moral and other social rules are contingent and could be changed. Thus, the society would be rather authentic, even though its members would be rather inauthentic, because they would just inauthentically struggle to realize their “true selves”. But of course, if a society has many members who are authentic, it is more likely that the society will become authentic (given, that the authentic members occupy power positions, etc.). It could also be the case that a particular society is largely inauthentic, even if a few of its members are authentic. Arguably, this represents the present conditions. But it is important to also acknowledge the social influence on individuals at this point: If a whole society is socially authentic and constantly questions even some its apparently most basic moral values, it more likely that its members will become individually authentic.
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Acknowledgments
For very helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, many thanks are due to an audience in Vienna, and – in addition and in particular – to Luiz Paulo Da Cas Cichoski, Zuzanna Rucinska, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Gerhard Thonhauser, Hannes Worthmann, Mark Wrathall, and Xiaoxi Wu.
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Weichold, M. (2017). Social Authenticity: Towards a Heideggerian Analysis of Social Change. In: Schmid, H., Thonhauser, G. (eds) From Conventionalism to Social Authenticity. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 10. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_12
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