Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The plurality of concepts

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Ahn W. and Dennis M.J. (2001). Dissociation between categorization and similarity judgment: Differential effect of causal status on feature weights. In: Hahn, U. and Ramscar, M. (eds) Similarity and categorization, pp 87–107. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ahn W. and Kim N.S. (2001). The causal status effect in categorization: An overview. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation 40: 23–63

    Google Scholar 

  • Ahn W., Kim N.S., Lassaline M.E. and Dennis M.J. (2000). Causal status as a determinant of feature centrality. Cognitive Psychology 41: 361–416

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson J.R. and Betz J. (2001). A hybrid model of categorization. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 8: 629–647

    Google Scholar 

  • Bailenson J.N., Shum M.S., Atran S., Medin D.L. and Coley J.D. (2002). A bird’s eye view: Biological categorization and reasoning within and across cultures. Cognition 84: 1–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou L.W. (1983). Ad hoc categories. Memory and Cognition 11: 211–227

    Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou L.W. (1985). Ideals, central tendency and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 11: 629–649

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barsalou L.W. (1987). The instability of graded structure: Implications for the nature of concepts. In: Neisser, U. (eds) Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization, pp 101–140. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Biederman I. (1987). Recognition-by-components: A theory of human image understanding. Psychological Review 94: 115–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block N. (1997). Anti-reductionism slaps back. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 107–133

    Google Scholar 

  • Boster J.S. and Johnson J.C. (1989). Form or function: A comparison of expert and novice judgments of similarity among fish. American Anthropologist 91: 866–889

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R. (1991). Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies 61: 127–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brooks L.R. (1987). Decentralized control of categorization: The role of prior processing episodes. In: Neisser, U. (eds) Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization, pp 141–174. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Burnett R.C., Medin D.L., Ross N.O. and Blok S.V. (2005). Ideal is typical. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 59: 3–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Costello F.J. and Keane M.T. (2000). Efficient creativity: Constraint-guided conceptual combination. Cognitive Science 24: 299–349

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Craver C.F. (2004). Dissociable realization and kind splitting. Philosophy of Science 71: 960–971

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dehaene S. (1997). The number sense. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Estes W.K. (1994). Classification and cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Estes Z. (2003). Domain differences in the structure of artifactual and natural categories. Memory and Cognition 31: 199–214

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J.A. (1994). Concepts: A potboiler. Cognition 50: 95–113

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J.A. (1998). Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J.A. and Lepore E. (2002). The compositionality papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • FodorJ.A. Pylyshyn Z. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28: 3–71

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gelman S.A. (2003). The essential child. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gentner D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science 7: 155–170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gentner D. (2003). Why we’re so smart. In: Gentner, D. and Goldin-Meadow, S. (eds) Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought, pp 195–236. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Gentner D. and Namy L.L. (1999). Comparison in the development of categories. Cognitive Development 14: 487–513

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gentner D. and Markman A.B. (1997). Structure-mapping in analogy and similarity. American Psychologist 52: 45–56

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hacking I. (1991). A tradition of natural kinds. Philosophical Studies 61: 109–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hampton J.A. (1995). Similarity-based categorization: The development of prototype theory. Psychologica Belgica 35: 103–125

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirschfeld L.A. and Gelman S.A. (1994). Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson K.E. (2001). Impact of varying levels of expertise on decisions of category typicality. Memory and Cognition 29: 1036–1050

    Google Scholar 

  • Juslin P., Jones S., Olsson H. and Winman A. (2003). Cue abstraction and exemplar memory in categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29: 924–941

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keil F.C. (1989). Concepts, kinds and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Keil F.C. (1994). The birth and nurturance of concepts by domains: The origins of concepts of living things. In: Hirschfeld, L.A. and Gelman, S.A. (eds) Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture, pp. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Keil F.C., Smith W.C., Simons D.J. and Levin D.T. (1998). Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: Implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge. Cognition 65: 103–135

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 1–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Komatsu L.K. (1992). Recent views of conceptual structure. Psychological Bulletin 112: 500–526

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kunda Z., Miller D.T. and Claire T. (1990). Combining social categories: The role of causal reasoning. Cognitive Science 14: 551–577

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lakoff G. (1987). Cognitive models and prototype theory. In: Neisser, U. (eds) Concepts and conceptual development, pp 63–100. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Laurence S. and Margolis E. (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In: Margolis, E. and Laurence, S. (eds) Concepts: Core readings, pp 3–81. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynch E.B., Coley J.D. and Medin D.L. (2000). Tall is typical: Central tendency, ideal dimensions, and graded category structure among tree experts and novices. Memory and Cognition 28: 41–50

    Google Scholar 

  • Machery E. (2005). Concepts are not a natural kind. Philosophy of Science 72: 444–465

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machery E. (2006). How to split concepts: A reply to Piccinini and Scott. Philosophy of Science 73: 410–418

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malt B.C. (1989). An on-line investigation of prototype and exemplar strategies in classification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 15: 539–555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malt B.C., Sloman S.A., Gennari S., Shi M. and Wang Y. (1999). Knowing versus naming: Similarity and the linguistic categorization of artifacts. Journal of Memory and Language 40: 230–262

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markman A.B. (2001). Structural alignment, similarity and the internal structure of category representations. In: Hahn, U. and Ramscar, M. (eds) Similarity and categorization, pp 109–130. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Markman A.B. and Ross B.H. (2003). Category use and category learning. Psychological Bulletin 129: 592–613

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marr D. (1982). Vision. W. H. Freeman, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Marr D. and Nishihara H.K. (1978). Representation and recognition of the spatial organization of three-dimensional shapes. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 200: 269–294

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Medin D.L. and Atran S. (1999). Folkbiology. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Medin D.L., Lynch E.B., Coley J.D. and Atran S. (1997). Categorization and reasoning among tree experts: Do all roads lead to Rome?. Cognitive Psychology 32: 49–96

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Medin D.L., Lynch E.B. and Solomon K.O. (2000). Are there kinds of concepts?. Annual Review of Psychology 51: 121–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R.G. (1998). A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs and basic kinds: More mama, more milk, and more mouse. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 55–65

    Google Scholar 

  • Medin D.L. and Schaffer M.M. (1978). Context theory of classification learning. Psychological Review 85: 207–238

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R.G. (1999). Historical kinds and the “special sciences”. Philosophical Studies 95: 45–65

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan R.G. (2000). On clear and confused ideas: An essay about substance concepts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy G.L. (2002). The big book of concepts. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy G.L. and Medin D.L. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence. Psychological Review 92: 289–316

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nosofsky R.M. (1986). Attention, similarity and the identification–categorization relationship. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 115: 39–57

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nosofsky R.M. (1988). Exemplar-based accounts of relations between classification, recognition and typicality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 14: 700–708

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nosofsky R.M. (1991). Tests of an exemplar model for relating perceptual classification and recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 17: 3–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Opfer J.E. and Siegler R.S. (2004). Revisiting preschoolers living thing concept: A microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology. Cognitive Psychology 49: 301–332

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Osherson D.N. and Smith E.E. (1981). On the adequacy of prototype theory as a theory of concepts. Cognition 9: 35–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palmeri T.J. and Gauthier I. (2004). Visual object understanding. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 5: 291–304

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piccinini G. and Scott S. (2006). Splitting concepts. Philosophy of Science 73: 390–409

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Poggio T. and Edelman S. (1990). A network that learns to recognize three-dimensional objects. Nature 343: 263–266

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Poling D.A. and Evans E.M. (2002). Why do birds of a feather flock together?. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 20: 89–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz J.J. (2002). Furnishing the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1970). Is semantics possible? In H. Putnam (Ed.), Mind, language, and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2, pp. 139–152). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Ratneshwar S., Barsalou L.W., Pechmann C. and Moore M. (2001). Goal-derived categories: The role of personal and situational goals in category representation. Journal of Consumer Psychology 10: 147–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rehder B. (2003). A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 29: 1141–1159

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rehder B. and Burnett R.C. (2005). Feature inference and the causal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology 50: 264–314

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rips L.J. (1989). Similarity, typicality and categorization. In: Vosniadou, S. and Ortony, A. (eds) Similarity and analogical reasoning, pp 21–59. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rips L.J. (1995). The current status of research on concept combination. Mind and Language 10: 72–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rips L.J., Shoben E.J. and Smith E.E. (1973). Semantic distance and the verification of semantic relations. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 12: 1–20

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robbins P. (2002). How to blunt the sword of compositionality. Nous 36: 313–334

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosch E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In: Rosch, E. and Lloyd, B.B. (eds) Cognition and categorization, pp 27–48. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosch E. and Mervis C.B. (1975). Family resemblance: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sloman S.A., Love B.C. and Ahn W. (1998). Feature centrality and conceptual coherence. Cognitive Science 22: 189–228

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith E.E. and Medin D.L. (1981). Categories and concepts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith J.D. and Minda J.P. (2000). Thirty categorization results in search of a model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 26: 3–27

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith E.E., Shoben E.J. and Rips L.J. (1974). Structure and process in semantic memory: A featural model for semantic decisions. Psychological Review 81: 214–241

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tarr M.J. (2003). Visual object recognition: Can a single mechanism suffice?. In: Peterson, M.A. and Rhodes, G. (eds) Perception of faces, objects and scenes: Analytic and holistic processes, pp 177–211. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarr M.J. and Bülthoff H.H. (1998). Image-based object recognition in man, monkey and machine. Cognition 67: 1–20

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiskopf D.A. (2007). Concept empiricism and the vehicles of thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 156–183

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiskopf, D. A. (forthcoming a). Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

  • Weiskopf, D. A. (forthcoming b). First thoughts. Philosophical Psychology.

  • Whittlesea B.W.A., Brooks L.R. and Westcott C. (1994). After the learning is over: Factors controlling the selective application of general and particular knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 20: 259–274

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yamauchi T. and Markman A.B. (1998). Category learning by inference and classification. Journal of Memory and Language 39: 124–148

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, 4202 E. Fowler Ave., FAO 226, Tampa, FL, 33620, USA

    Daniel Aaron Weiskopf

Authors
  1. Daniel Aaron Weiskopf
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel Aaron Weiskopf.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Weiskopf, D.A. The plurality of concepts. Synthese 169, 145–173 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9340-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9340-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation