Abstract
In this chapter, I tackle a deficit of current modus vivendi theory, namely its neglect of institutions. Modus vivendi theorists have good reason to get beyond this position and show how the notion of modus vivendi politics can be made use of for considerations about institutional design. First, I argue that two features of modus vivendi enable critical assessments of institutional design: modus vivendi arrangements are supposed to reflect the plurality of views on disputed issues and find the acceptance of those who are subject to the arrangement in question. Second, I apply these criteria of modus vivendi to recent institutional innovations that have been implemented in order to strengthen the capacity of pluralist democracies to deal with deep disagreements: (a) the release of parliamentarians’ duty to vote in line with their parliamentary groups and the establishment of (b) ethics councils and (c) mini-publics. The requirements of modus vivendi politics enable both a critique of these institutions and the development of alternative designs. I make an exemplar case for this claim by sketching a fourth possible institutional innovation: flexible negotiating forums.
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Notes
- 1.
David McCabe’s theory (2010) is an interesting exception here. Rather than understanding modus vivendi as a political concept whose relationship to liberal content is thoroughly contingent, McCabe explores how modus vivendi can ground an “alternative defence of liberalism” (McCabe 2010, p. 8), one that differs from dominant defences of liberalism by taking seriously the concerns of non-liberal citizens (see also Sala 2018). Hence, even though a focus on the ideological openness of modus vivendi seems to be prevalent in the debate that has been evolving around the recent interest in modus vivendi, McCabe’s work shows that it is important to be aware of a variety of reasons that motivate a vindication of the concept in political theorising.
- 2.
For a discussion of the motives of parties to accept modus vivendi arrangements, see Schweitzer (2018).
- 3.
Gray uses the term “neo” in order to signify that he, while basically sympathising with the Hobbesian tradition of liberalism, distances himself from the “unnecessarily absolutist” (Gray 2000, p. 132) character of Hobbes’s view on the state. Gray opts for a reformulation of “Hobbes’s conception of politics […] in pluralist terms” (Gray 2000, p. 133). The lynchpin of this reformulation seems to be the introduction of a normative standard that distinguishes an unqualified condition of peace from a modus vivendi. “The end of politics is not the mere absence of war, but a modus vivendi among goods and evils” (Gray 2000, p. 133).
- 4.
This does not mean that every modus vivendi arrangement must have the shape of a compromise. As Fabian Wendt has argued, there can be modus vivendi arrangements that do not involve the making of a compromise (Wendt 2016, pp. 351–352).
- 5.
A substantive restriction, however, is set by the moral minimum (Sect. 3). An outcome that realises what Gray calls universal evils would not count as a modus vivendi arrangement.
- 6.
I am grateful to John Horton for critically raising this point.
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Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the conference ‘Modus Vivendi’ held at the University of Münster, 8–10 July 2015; at the 24th World Congress of Political Science in Poznan, 23–28 July 2016; and at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory in Manchester, 7–9 September 2016. I thank the participants of these events for very helpful discussions and comments. In particular, I thank John Horton for his thoughtful commentary on the panel ‘Modus Vivendi and the Problem of Inequalities of Power’ in Poznan and his very helpful written comments.
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Westphal, M. (2019). Institutions of Modus Vivendi Politics. In: Horton, J., Westphal, M., Willems, U. (eds) The Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79078-7_15
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