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This paper was written while I was an NEH Fellow (1981–82) and I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and the Office of the Academic Dean of the University of Minnesota, Morris, for support. I am also grateful to the Department of Philosophy of Stanford University, and especially to its Chair, John Perry, and to Patrick Suppes, Director of the Institute for the Mathematical Study of the Social Sciences at Stanford for the hospitality shown me during 1981–1982. I am also indebted to Perry for many hours of extremely fruitful discussions of the sorts of questions I discuss in this paper and I wish to thank him, Michael Bratman, Ernest Lepore, and Julius Moravcsik for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Wettstein, H.K. The semantic significance of the referential-attributive distinction. Philosophical Studies 44, 187–196 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354099
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354099