Journal of the History of Philosophy

294 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:2 APRIL 1992 functions. In the last chapter Halper argues implausibly that the form (read: sensible form) is both individual and universal. The argument is convoluted and unnecessary. On what I take to be the most textually and philosophically sound reading of the entire Metaphysics--a reading which refuses to wrench the central books out of the theological context set down in Books A-E--primary being is neither universal nor individual because both are derived from primary being. Any attempt to treat the immediate subject of the central books of the Metaphysics, sensible being, as primary is I think bound to fail in representing Aristotle's position. Halper's fidelity to the text, however, helps compensate for this error as he offers many challenging and ingenious interpretations of particular passages. LLOYD P. GERSON University of Toronto Andrew Erskine. TheHellenistic Stoa: Political Thought andAction. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 199o. Pp. xi + 233. Cloth, N.P. Ancient anecdote gives the early Stoics influential connections, including the monarchs of Macedonia and Alexandria, and while other philosophers withdrew to suburban groves, they earned their name for arguing downtown in public. Zeno and his followers now receive more attention than they have in some time, but their political thought continues to suffer from neglect. One handicap is the evidence; spotty for all of Stoicism, it is especially meager here. More serious is the widespread assumption that the austerity of Stoic ethics reflects or even entails an antipathy for anything political. In a book that derives from his Oxford doctoral thesis, Andrew Erskine puts this misconception to rest. Drawing on a wide range of evidence, he explores both the ideas and the activities of the early Stoa. If he is right, the early Stoics, far from being indifferent to politics, advocated radical political views which some sought to actualize by influencing major Political events of the third and second centuries B.c. Unfortunately, though convincing on many Points, Erskine ventures repeatedly into speculation and paints a picture much more detailed than the evidence can support. The story begins with Zeno's Politeia, which many in antiquity dismissed as a juvenile exercise in Cynic iconoclasm. Emphasizing its constructive side, however, Erskine argues persuasively that it was consistent with Zeno's mature thought. He recounts how Zeno envisioned a society without temples, courts, gymnasia, coinage, or marriage, and in extended discussions of two neglected topics, he argues that slavery and private property would also be abolished. This radical ideal, he claims, remained Stoic doctrine for over a century, until worries about Roman power led Diogenes of Babylon and most later Stoics to disavow its bold proposals. But by then, he maintains, Stoicism had played a major role in three revolutionary endeavors: Athenian struggles for independence in the 28os and 26os, the "Spartan revolution" of the latter part of the century, and the Gracchi's attempts at economic reform for Roman Italy in the 13os. On the vexed question of the scope of Zeno's ideal society, Erskine follows the BOOK REVIEWS 295 majority view that all its members were wise. That, he suggests, was why Zeno eliminated the major institutions of ancient society: universal virtue would render them superfluous. This reconstruction, he concedes, makes Zeno's model "rather impracticable " (49). Worse, limiting membership to the wise would be impossible without forbidding procreation--a step Zeno did not take (D. L. 7.t~l). An alternative that Erskine neglects is that in restricting "citizenship" to the wise (D. L. 7.33), Zeno meant simply that only they would actively govern; any number of others, though excluded from political office as "inferiors," would still be members of society.~ The question is crucial : much of the book rests on the claim that Zeno's ideal society abolished all "classes"; but classes would remain if it admitted any non-sages. Erskine tries throughout to cast his protagonists in a favorable light. For him, the early Stoics were democrats who espoused egalitarian ideals and encouraged or helped implement social and economic reforms. He succeeds in showing that they might have held these views, but the evidence is too meager to show that they did...