Abstract
Timothy Williamson has a marvelously precise account of epistemic justification in terms of knowledge and probability. I argue that the account runs aground on certain cases involving the probability values 0 and 1.
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Whitcomb, D. Williamson on justification. Philos Stud 138, 161–168 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9024-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9024-5