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A Decision Theorist’s Bhagavad Gita

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Don’t let the action’s fruit be your motivation

Bhagavad Gītā

An act may [...] be identified with its possible consequences

Savage: The Foundations of Statistics

Abstract

We analyze and interpret the Bhagavad Gītā from the point of view of decision theory. Arjuna asks Krishna for help in his decision of whether to fight or not. Broadly speaking, Arjuna prefers consequentialist arguments, while Krishna stresses the warrior’s svadharma. In doing so, Krishna can be considered to suggest a “new” twist on the standard decision model, in line with reason-based theories of choice. We also argue that Krishna’s svadharmic point of view can fruitfully be seen as an example of the Rational Shortlist Method.

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Notes

  1. We use the relatively recent translation by Cherniak (2008) where you need to add 24 to the chapter, i.e., Gītā 2.47 is Gītā 26.47 in that book (on p. 189). See also the next paragraph.

  2. Of course, dharma is a very difficult term. Olivelle (2009, pp. xlv–xlix) differentiates between six meanings of dharma. It seems that the Gītā’s discussion is concerned with \(\mathrm{Dh}_{4}\): “dharma ...belonging to or within the domain of a particular category of people or a particular goal toward which it is directed” (p. xlvii).

  3. Abusing notation, if \(\max \left( A^{\prime };\succ \right) \) contains only one element, we will sometimes consider \(\max \left( A^{\prime };\succ \right) \) an element of \(A^{\prime }\), rather than a subset of \(A^{\prime }.\)

  4. In terms of the reason-based theory, \(g\left( \hbox{action }a\hbox{, state } 1\right) \) could be called an alternative as could action a [see Dietrich and List (2013, p. 106)].

  5. A set-valued definition is used by Kreps (1988, p. 12).

  6. Reason-based theory deals with motives for an agent’s preferences [see Dietrich and List (2013, p. 106)]. Roughly, consequences (for Arjuna) and actions (for Krishna) provide these motives.

  7. Reason-based theory builds on a “regularity assumption” [see Dietrich and List (2013, p. 110)]: If we have two sets of motivating reasons, then their intersection and their union also form sets of motivating reasons. Thus, with respect to the union, if consequences and actions provide motivating reasons, so do both.

  8. Dietrich and List (2013, pp. 118–1090) discuss how propositions become motivating and mention, tentatively, three possibilities: (i) abstract conceptualization, (ii) qualitative understanding, and (iii) attention. These three points are related to our story, but we prefer a temporal account that is more in line with the Gītā.

  9. Both kṣatradharma and kṣatriyadharma could be used. The Gītā employs neither of these terms, but kṣatradharma shows several times in others parts of book six.

  10. In terms of reason-based theory, we can say that the proposition “the family is destroyed” is Arjuna’s motivating reason to abstain from fighting, together with the claim that fighting is responsible.

  11. Formally, the expected utility of “not fight” would be higher than the expected utility of fight for every probability distribution on W (see, for example, Kreps 1988, pp. 31).

  12. Of course, reason-based theory fits nicely: Arjuna’s asks Krishna to provide him with additional motivating reasons.

  13. Thus, Krishna adduces the motivating reason “souls cannot be killed” , together with the claim that, therefore, “fight” cannot be blamed.

  14. Krishna points to the motivating reason “people die with or without fighting” so that, again, “fight” is not responsible.

  15. The motivational reason here is “reputation will be lost” and this loss is linked to “not fight”.

  16. Krishna points to the motivating reason “abstention from fighting cannot prevent family destruction”.

  17. Agraval (1989, p. 139) argues that Arjuna’s moral conflict is not resolved by arguments. Instead, Krishna manages to make Arjuna “look at the situation in a completely new way” by effecting “the relevant kind of radical conversion or enlightenment”.

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Authors and Affiliations

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Correspondence to Harald Wiese.

Additional information

Valuable hints have been given by participants of the research seminar of the Leipzig institute for indology and by Andre Casajus, Frank Hüttner, Katharina Lotzen, Karin Szwedek, Thomas Voss, and Ulla Wessels. I am also indebted to several anonymous referees.

Appendices

Appendix

List of Symbols

  • \(x\succsim y\): (weak) preference (x is at least as good (as preferable, as virtuous, as compatible with svadharma) as y)

  • \(x\sim y\): indifference (x is as good as y)

  • \(x\succ y\): strict preference (x is better than y)

  • A:  set of actions

  • C:  set of consequences

  • \(A\times C\): set of action-consequence tuples \(\left[ a,c\right] \)

  • \(\left. \succsim _{C}\right. \): preference on C

  • \(\left. \succsim _{A}\right. \): preference on A

  • \(\left. \succsim _{A\times C}\right. \): preference on \(A\times C\)

  • \(\succsim \) on A:  preference on A derived from \(\left. \succsim _{A\times C}\right. \)

  • \(f:A\rightarrow C\): consequence function

  • W:  set of states of the world

  • \(g:A\times W\rightarrow C:\) uncertain-consequence function

  • \(\max \left( A^{\prime };\succ \right) \): those actions from \( A^{\prime }\) that do not have a better action in \(A^{\prime }\)

  • \({\mathcal {P}}\left( A\right) \): set of nonempty subsets of A

  • \(\gamma :{\mathcal {P}}\left( A\right) \rightarrow A:\) choice function

Theorem 1

For a proof of the theorem, we assume two actions a and b where a is chosen at \(A^{\prime }\) while \(b\in A^{\prime }\) and \(a\in A^{\prime \prime } \) hold. Then, it cannot be the case that \(b\in A_{sv}\) and \(a\in A_{pa}\) (because then a would have been eliminated in the first round at \( A^{\prime }\) ). Three possibilities remain:

  • \(b\in A_{sv}\) and \(a\in A_{sv}\) . Then, both a and b survive the first round and \(f\left( a\right) \left. \succ _{C}\right. f\left( b\right) \) . In this case, \(a\in A^{\prime \prime }\) cannot lose out against b in the second round.

  • \(b\in A_{pa}\) and \(a\in A_{pa}\) . Then, there is no other action c in \(A^{\prime }\) with \(c\in A_{sv}\) (otherwise, both a and b would have been eliminated). Therefore, we have \(f\left( a\right) \left. \succ _{C}\right. f\left( b\right) \) and pursue as under the first bullet.

  • \(b\in A_{pa}\) and \(a\in A_{sv}\) . Then, b is eliminated in the first round under \(A^{\prime }\) as well as under \(A^{\prime \prime }\) (if b belongs to \(A^{\prime \prime }\)).

This concludes the proof.

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Wiese, H. A Decision Theorist’s Bhagavad Gita. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 33, 117–136 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-016-0049-7

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