Wiggins, David. "14. Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire".
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, pp. 241-266.
https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340985-017
Wiggins, D. (1981). 14. Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire. In A. Oksenberg Rorty (Ed.),
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (pp. 241-266). Berkeley: University of California Press.
https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340985-017
Wiggins, D. 1981. 14. Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire. In: Oksenberg Rorty, A. ed.
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 241-266.
https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340985-017
Wiggins, David. "14. Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire" In
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics edited by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 241-266. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340985-017
Wiggins D. 14. Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire. In: Oksenberg Rorty A (ed.)
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press; 1981. p.241-266.
https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520340985-017
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