Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Non-genuine MacIntosh logics

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  1. Chellas, B. F.,Modal Logic: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

    Google Scholar 

  2. Chellas, B. F. and Segerberg, K., ‘Modal logics with the MacIntosh rule’,Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994): 67–86.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J.,A Companion to Modal Logic (London: Methuen, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

  4. Lemmon, E. J., with Scott, D., ed. Segerberg, K.,The “Lemmon Notes”: An Introduction to Modal Logic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977).

    Google Scholar 

  5. Williamson, T., ‘An alternative rule of disjunction in modal logic’,Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33 (1992): 89–100.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Williamson, T., ‘Inexact knowledge’,Mind 101 (1992): 217–42.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Williamson, T., ‘Some admissible rules in non-normal modal logics’,Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1993) forthcoming.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University College, OX1 4BH, Oxford, UK

    Timothy Williamson

Authors
  1. Timothy Williamson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Williamson, T. Non-genuine MacIntosh logics. J Philos Logic 23, 87–101 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417959

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01417959

Search

Navigation