Abstract
With my research, I wish to contribute to the discussion of post-traumatic psychopathologies from a phenomenological perspective. The main question I pursue is to what extent PTSD can be understood as an intersubjective psychopathology and which implications this view might have. In this paper, I argue that the mode of perception allowing for intersubjective experience is vulnerable to disruptions through traumatic events. I begin with a short elaboration on what intersubjectivity entails before proceeding to illustrate how it can be impaired. Then, I focus on the concept of empathy as a mode of perception: I propose that due to a disruption of the ability to empathize an individual suffering from PTSD may cease to experience the other as another subject that offers possibilities for interaction. The traumatized individual is thus unable to establish meaningful connections with others. I offer some implications this view might entail for thinking about trauma treatment.
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Notes
The question whether one could conceive of an experiencing self without a body would lead us too far astray and shall thus not be discussed here.
This does not mean that I have sense-perception of the other’s ‘soul’ or ‘psyche’—as I have said earlier, I take the individual to be a psychophysical entity, and the other’s embodiment allows me to access their mental life as forming a unity with their lived body.
For a criticism of simulation theories of mind, (see Ratcliffe 2017a).
It is possible for me to experience the same emotion as you; empathy can enable my sympathy for your experience. This, however, is not the topic of this paper.
Empathy in the phenomenological sense does not have any moral implications. That is, having empathy is not a positive trait, as popularly assumed. The most common example to illustrate this is the torturer: having a lot of empathy for his victim will make the torturer do a better job, as it will enable him to discern his victim’s experience and thereby establish what inflicts most suffering. It is thus important to keep in mind the distinction between empathy and sympathy.
PTSD is diagnosed if symptoms prevail for over a month.
In the following, I shall also draw on phenomenological literature on depression and schizophrenia due to the similarity in symptoms, without making claims as to the conditionality of the disturbances. It is however widely agreed that a traumatising event can indeed be the cause for depression, and some authors have argued that the same holds for schizophrenia (e.g. Read et al. 2011).
Be reminded of the phenomenological concept of the habitual life world that I mentioned at the beginning of the paper, which offers a helpful framework to illustrate this.
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Wilde, L. Trauma and intersubjectivity: the phenomenology of empathy in PTSD. Med Health Care and Philos 22, 141–145 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-9854-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-9854-x