What exactlyis English?

conclusions

I wish now to return to the elementary characterization of languagehood in section III and its rationalization in section IV and say something by way of conclusion. The account given may or may not have a large number of fascinating and important consequences, but I shall confine myself to a couple of minor points and one not so minor.

Let us suppose that there are either an infinite number of extra-linguistic entities (which seems plausible) or an infinite number of possible expressions (inscriptibles). Then, since the Descriptive Part of a language is just a finite mapping of expressions onto entities, there will be an infinite number of languages. The point is pretty obvious anyway. A language is presumably a linguistic structure (whatever that is) thatcould be used by intelligent creatures in exchanging information and in doing logic. There is no reason at all to suppose that the number of such structures is finite.

The second minor point is derivative. There is no essential differencequa languages between the so-called natural languages and the so-called artificial languages. Consider hammers. Some hammers are actually used to drive nails. Some perish in warehouse fires before they ever have that honor. But all are equally hammers. It's the same with languages. Some are actually used, the vast majority, including the “artificial” languages defined in semantics books, are never used. But apart from differences in richness and complexity, all are equally languages.⁸

But the major point I wished to bring out in this paper is the contrast between a language and its use, or, if you like, between a language and speech behaviour. I labored the distinction in my introductory remarks and in the body of the paper I offered a sketch of a purely semantical definition of ‘language’. Insofar as the apparatus goes any distance towards bringing order out of chaos then this circumstance vindicates the distinction. We say that Alexander is able to ride Bucephalus and is able to speak Greek. Just as in the first case we distinguish between what Alexander is able to do, namely ride Bucephalus, and what he is able to ride, namely, Bucephalus, so in the second we should distinguish between what Alexander is able todo, namely, speak Greek, and what he is able tospeak, namely, Greek. Strictly speaking, of course, we have to recognize the linguistician's commonplace distinction, within use, between the ability or competence to speak (use) a language and specific exercises of that ability, or performances⁹. This is the distinction between ‘He speaks English’ and ‘He is now speaking English’.

Another example, closer to present concerns. We would have no trouble distinguishing between the ability to play the Bach Chaconne and performances of the Chaconne on the one hand, and on the other, the Chaconne itself; between what the violinist is able todo (viz., play the Chaconne) and what he is able to play (viz., the Chaconne). And once we accept the distinction we would expect to be able to describe the Chaconne —which is a sequence of sounds - independently of the behavior involved in playing it. An unedited score in fact does this. It is the violinteacher who talks about double stopping and so on.¹⁰ In the same way, it seems to me, if we accept the distinction between a language and its use we commit ourselves to discovering ways of giving a phonological-syntactical-semantical characterization of a languagewithout reference to behavior, without employing the word ‘uses’ - and this demand has exactly the same rationale as the demand that we keep psychology out of logic. Then in pure pragmatics, the word ‘uses’ comes into its own.