Journal of the History of Philosophy

“How can it be that the female is both functional and a failure?” (280). Sophia Connell’s response comes in the form of a careful, thorough, and philosophically sensitive interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on animal generation. By pursuing the topic of what Aristotle says about female animals and their role in reproduction, Connell casts light into many difficult corners of his theory: What does it mean to say that the male is the “hê archê [tês] kinêseos” of the generation? How should we think of the motions in the semen(s) that “construct” the embryo? Are these motions the same? According to Connell, they are not. The efficient cause of the generation (the whole process) is the male; he is the origin of that motion. The motions in the semen refer to the activated powers that shape the developing fetus; they exist in both male and female “seed.” This distinction allows Connell to explain how it is that the male is the moving cause of animal generation, and yet that there are also formative powers in the female semen. Aristotle’s form-matter distinction in the context of his biological writing turns out to be more complex than some scholars have interpreted it to be.

Connell’s interpretation contains many interesting and provocative theses, chief among them that the Generation of Animals (GA) is unified rather than falling into two conceptually incompatible parts. In making the case that the female animal is functional in Aristotle’s account of reproduction rather than contributing only inert matter, Connell makes extensive use of his explanation of inherited resemblances to ancestors, which makes no sense unless the female, as much as the male, contributes dunameis in the formation of the fetus. Similarly, the female also contributes material dunameis to the generation of an animal by being the source of just the right kinds of matter, with the right potencies. Only if we attribute a post-Newtonian view of matter to Aristotle does the inert female contribution to reproduction interpretation get off the ground. Aristotle’s discussion of inherited resemblances uses the same idea—namely, that both male and female contributions to generation contain powers and motions—that appears in Connell’s interpretation of animal reproduction. Rather than see GA 4 as suddenly veering off topic and employing a novel set of concepts, book 4 is theoretically continuous with books 1 and 2, and provides a more detailed exploration of one particular aspect of animal generation.

According to Connell, both feminist interpreters of Aristotle and more traditional scholars tend to misread the sexism in Aristotle’s account of animal generation. Feminists tend to overlook nuances of the text, and to foist implausible views on Aristotle, chiefly the idea that women contribute nothing or next to nothing to reproduction. More traditional interpreters tend to try to minimize the sexism in the text, which occludes a full interpretation of the fairly extensive role of the female animal in reproduction. In contrast, Connell is scrupulously fair to the text, and does a brilliant job of piecing together the function of the female in reproduction. Nonetheless, as she acknowledges, Aristotle describes the female as “as it were a deformed male,” explains that the existence of male and female is better because then the better (form) can be kept apart from the lesser (matter, GA, 732a2–9), and thinks that a male animal is more perfect and complete than a female. Females are, in a sense, a failure of reproduction. To illustrate how females can be both functional (a success) and a failure, Connell invokes a cake metaphor. Imagine that you are baking a cake, aiming for a very beautiful result. But imagine that the piping is a bit off and your cake does not meet the goal you have set. Connell points out that, despite its flaws, the cake could serve as a delicious birthday cake. It is both a success and...