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Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation

  • W. Clark Wolf EMAIL logo

Abstract

One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom’s A Spirit of Trust is the role of genealogical explanations. Brandom sees genealogies or ‘debunking arguments’ as significant because of their ability to deprive our discursive acts (claims and actions) of the normative status they require to be genuinely discursive or conceptual. His solution to the problem of genealogy is to offer rationalizing reconstructions of others’ discursive acts, which credit them with normative status. He calls this “forgiveness” (a notion similar to Davidson’s “charity”). In this paper, I provide some additional conceptual resources to explicate Brandom’s notions of genealogy and forgiveness. These resources allow me to discriminate between two alternate and seemingly incompatible ways of responding to genealogies. One way depends on rationalizing explanations that still attempt to attribute commitments to their subjects, the other avoids making such attributions in favor of explaining commitments only in terms of norms accepted by the rationalizer. I argue that Brandom’s work sometimes promotes the latter response to genealogy but that this tendency should be eliminated from the account.


Corresponding author: W. Clark Wolf, Marquette University, 1250 W Wisconsin Ave, Milwaukee, WI, 53233, USA, E-mail:

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Published Online: 2022-03-25
Published in Print: 2022-04-26

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