Abstract
The view I defend here is that ought cannot be logically derived from is (and vice versa). This can be justified at the level of very elementary deontic logic, as captured by the generalized logical square. This logical fact can be stated as the Hume thesis. However, the inspection of a given normative order may suggest (even with a very high degree of plausibility) that something exists (or could exist). On the other hand, such conclusions can be fallible. In order to argue that ought is derivable from is (and vice versa), one must use extralogical elements and, in particular, definitions. Such strategies are in fact employed by Searle and Conte.
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Woleński, J. (2021). Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. In: Di Lucia, P., Fittipaldi, E. (eds) Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is". Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_13
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