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And so indeed are perfect cheat

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[A]ll the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongIdeas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat; And therefore, however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. ...

John Locke,Essay on Human Understanding, Book III.

Abstract

Ethical discourse and fallacy theory come together in a natural way over concepts such as bias, prejudice, preconceived opinion, prototypical and stereotypical thinking, dogmatism and loyalty. By and large, these are concepts that have not been sufficiently worked up to bear the theoretical weight either of ethics or of logic. The present paper seeks to ameliorate this situation. It proposes that situations describable by any such concepts partition into (a) the rationally and morally regrettable and (b) the rationally and morally impeccable, and in any event, unavoidable. Finding (b) will come as a surprise to some theorists.

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Woods, J. And so indeed are perfect cheat. Argumentation 9, 645–668 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00737784

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