Abstract
While the existence of human cognitive and behavioral diversity is now widely recognized, it is not yet well established how to explain this diversity. In particular, it is still unclear how to determine whether any given instance of human cognitive and behavioral diversity is due to a common psychology that is merely “triggered” differently in different bio-cultural environments, or whether it is due to deeply and fundamentally different psychologies. This paper suggests that, to answer this question, we need to employ subtle theoretical considerations of theory choice—especially the consideration of the complexity-weighted differential predictive successes of the two accounts. To make this clearer, the paper develops a novel analysis of the observed differences in human sharing dispositions.
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Notes
Though see Knobe (2019), but see also below in section V.
The focus in what follows is on cross-cultural differences in cognitive and behavioral traits. However, the arguments can be easily extended to differences across other population groups (e.g. different genders).
This distinction between “fundamental” and “evoked” difference is a relatively straightforward explication of the more traditional distinction between “transmitted” from “evoked” differences. A reason for preferring to phrase the issues in terms of “fundamental” vs. “evoked” differences, rather than “transmitted” vs. “evoked” differences, is that—as will also be made clearer momentarily—non-evoked differences need not be transmitted from a prior generation or be transmitted to a succeeding generation. They could just be the result of individuals acquiring, e.g. through individual learning, different psychological mechanisms. (At any rate, instead of “fundamental,” I also frequently use the slightly more cumbersome term “non-evoked.”) Relatedly, this terminology is not meant to suggest that a fundamental difference speaks to some sort of “essential” differences among people; rather, it is just the result of different psychological mechanisms—which themselves may have been acquired by learning or even coincidentally. While fundamental differences will be deeper than evoked differences, they may thus still be quite shallow.
Here and in what follows, it is presumed that cognitive and behavioral differences either are evoked or not. However, it is possible to extend this framework and see differences as more or less evoked (e.g. by considering how different the relevant mechanisms are). Doing this is not so relevant for present purposes, though; see also Heyes (2018). Note further that the question of the exact number of cognitive and behavioral differences that are evoked or fundamental is not central here, and will not be further pursued in this paper; what matters here is just how we can determine which differences are evoked or fundamental—not how many.
Note, though, that matters here are more complex due to the fact that providing people with similar experiences may alter their psychologies, and that providing people with similar experiences need not mean that their psychological mechanisms are triggered in the same ways, as these experiences may be differentially embedded in prior experiences. Still, the general point here stands: knowing about the nature of a cognitive and behavioral difference can help us bridge that difference.
For example, when trying to make sense of the reasons why hawks switch from hunting mice in one patch of their territory to hunting them in another, we may choose to employ a model that assumes mice are independently distributed across patches in the local area. When modeling the reasons why hawks switch prey from mice to birds as the seasons change, we may assume that the distribution of mice in the local area is auto-correlated. This is not contradictory, as these models have different goals (Potochnik, 2010; Parker, 2020).
The exception will be behavioral differences that are highly stereotyped or which are highly reflexive, and where the psychological processing may thus be minimal (see Schulz, 2018b). In that case, the level of analysis can be lower. However, this will not be central in what follows, and does not affect the substance of any of the conclusions reached in this paper.
The observed variety in sharing dispositions also has major practical implications. Given that different groups share with each other in different ways, providing aid to others has to be done in a way that respects these differences, especially when it comes to cross-cultural aid.
Another example of this sort of case has been provided by Henrich et al. (2005, p. 811): they suggest that the fact that even hyper-fair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected among the Au and Gnau is due to it being the case that, in this culture, the acceptance of a gift is taken to imply an obligation to repay this gift at a later date. If so, though, then this kind of rejection of hyper-fair offers should not be seen to display a different attitude towards resource division—it is just an aspect of the fact that, in this culture, gift giving is a much more dynamically extended affair that includes repayment of the gift later on. If this point is taken into account, the differences in the sharing dispositions between this culture and others might well disappear: holding the value of a gift fixed (which may include considering any obligations to repay the gift later), people from different cultures may display the same sharing dispositions (Kenrick & Sundieb, 2005).
So, R1 may specify that we share three strawberries with our nearest neighbor, and four tomatoes with our first cousins, while R2 may specify that we share two strawberries with our nearest neighbor, and eight potatoes with our first cousins. (Obviously, this is a purely illustrative example.)
This leaves open whether the individual rules in the different cultures—i.e. the different Ri—have individually more complexity than the common sharing mechanism (e.g. Hamilton’s rule) of the evoked account. This will clearly depend on the nature of the evoked account in question. However, what matters here is just that the fundamental account specifies a different rule for each culture—with potentially a completely different set of determinant variables.
Other theoretical virtues may matter too, but these are less well understood. Hence, the focus is on simplicity / complexity here. Considering other theoretical virtues would only strengthen the arguments of this paper.
Note also that the points made here are different from those in the debate between Knobe (2019) and Machery and Stich (Forthcoming). At stake in the latter debate is the question of how much variation there is in various behavioral and cognitive traits, with the former arguing that it is less than often supposed, and the former arguing that it is more. By contrast, the point here is just that, even if it turns out that diversity in psychological and behavioral traits is pervasive, this does not mean it is also fundamental. So, independently of how the Machery & Stich and Knobe debate is being resolved, the question of the psychic unity still needs to be answered.
Note that moral cognition may well turn out not to be one trait, but several: humans may rely on many different psychological mechanisms, each of which is tailored to a different moral domain or issue. However, this is not central here, and does not affect the conclusion reached.
Note that this is a point that Knobe (2019) recognizes, too: his claim is precisely that it is very surprising that it empirically turns out that many people think alike in many ways. While the latter part of this claim is being denied by Machery and Stich (Forthcoming), the former part clearly speaks to the fact that pervasive and obvious human psychic unity is not something that should be presumed from the armchair.
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I would like to thank two anoymous referees for this journal for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
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W. Schulz, A. Explaining Human Diversity: the Need to Balance Fit and Complexity. Rev.Phil.Psych. 14, 457–475 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00582-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00582-1