Abstract
To understand Nietzsche’s pedagogy of self-overcoming and to determine its true import for contemporary education, it is necessary to understand Nietzsche’s view of the self that is to be overcome. Nevertheless, previous interpretations of self-overcoming in the journals of the philosophy of education have lacked serious engagement with the Nietzschean self. I devote the first part of this paper to redressing this neglect and arguing for a view of the Nietzschean self as an assemblage of ontologically basic affects which have been guided and modulated by the incorporation of perspectives. This interpretation has important consequences for self-overcoming, for it constrains the individual’s conscious agency to operations on perspectives. In light of this view I then advance a competing conception of self-overcoming and discuss some of the shortcomings of antecedent interpretations. Although previous interpreters have done their part to exhaust the characteristic actions of self-overcoming, I argue that they have either exaggerated the deleteriousness of social influence in the formation of the authentic individual, or else ignore it altogether. In the final part I reconsider the debate over the democratic or aristocratic nature of Nietzsche’s pedagogy of self-overcoming. Interestingly, self-overcoming cannot be labeled strictly as either, and out of this ambiguity grows the role of the school as an agent of cultural transformation.
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Notes
In his article from 2010, Jonas (2010) does mention the debate over the ontological status of the Nietzschean self and offers a brief schematization of the various positions represented therein (pp. 47–48). However, he does not take sides on the debate. Instead Jonas grants the self the seemingly uncontroversial abilities to say words, learn new words and perform the actions which are implied by these words, in order to avoid the need for any further analysis (p. 48). As I argue later however, the mere act of using ‘words’ necessarily involves the actuation of consciousness which Nietzsche believes to be inherently perspectival. The individual cannot directly “moderate and master [her] passions,” (ibid.) as Jonas would have us believe, only the perspectives that guide these passions. Though ultimately incomplete, Jonas’ contribution to the debate was nevertheless an important one, for it implicitly acknowledged the neglect in the philosophy of education literature to engage with the Nietzschean self and prompted this study.
For ease of reference, I will use the standard acronyms for Nietzsche’s texts: A (The Antichrist), BGE (Beyond Good and Evil), D (Daybreak), FE (On the Future of our Educational Institutions), GM (On the Genealogy of Morals), GS (The Gay Science), HH (Human, All Too Human), HL (On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life), SE (Schopenhauer as Educator), TI (Twilight of the Idols), WS (The Wanderer and his Shadow), and Z (Thus Spoke Zarathustra).
The experimental hue of this passage should be noted. Much of Nietzsche’s later discussion of the self featured in his published works strikes a similarly hypothetical tone. This is most obvious in sections 12 and 36 of Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche’s explicit presentations of the self and the ontological structure of the world thus take on the character of working hypotheses rather than foundational premises of a metaphysical system. However, Nietzsche would not have us place his hypotheses on par with, say, Cartesian atomism. “[T]he conscience of method,” Nietzsche writes, necessitates our view of the world as a “life of the drives” (BGE, 36; see Leiter 2002, for a discussion of Nietzsche’s naturalistic commitment to a scientific method of inquiry). In contrast, his notes from this period adopt a more sure-footed tone, discussing the metaphysical properties of affects and the affective structure of perspectives (see Cox 1999, pp. 127–128). I take this contrast to indicate a hesitancy with his reductive theory of subjectivity in light of his rejection of materialism. For further discussion of Nietzsche’s experimentalism, see Kaufmann (1974, pp. 198–227).
For a nuanced discussion of Nietzsche’s indebtedness to and divergence from the German materialists of the 19th century, see Leiter (2006, pp. 306–311).
Following Cox’s terminology, I will henceforth refer to occurrences of “affects”, “drives”, “passions”, “instincts”, “desires”, “powers”, “forces”, and “impulses” in Nietzsche’s text simply as “affects” (Cox 1999, p. 127). As Cox explains in the paragraph that follows, “[t]hese affects are as close as one comes to a ‘bottom floor’ in Nietzsche’s multi-leveled theory of subjectivity” (ibid.).
I am indebted to Mark Jonas for this astute observation.
It should be noted that social cooperation, for Nietzsche, emerges as a relationship between stronger and weaker natures rather than as one between reciprocating equals, established by social contract. See GM II:17.
More precisely we might say that pre-conscious man needed a “higher-order representation.” Drawing from current philosophy of mind, Riccardi (forthcoming) argues that a mental state M becomes conscious “when it is ‘indexed’ by a higher-order representation (HOR) of some kind which signalizes to one that one is in M” (p. 6). The particular HOR that Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche is a higher-order thought (HOT) as evidenced by the fact that Nietzsche ties the emergence of consciousness with the ability to “‘know’ what he thought” (GS, 354). Thus, it is this HOT that evolved out of man’s predicament.
Kaufmann translates verallgemeinerte as “made common” in this passage, ignoring that the root of the word—allgemein—can also mean “general” or “universal”. The prefix ver in this context transforms the adjective allgemein into an active verb, carrying the meaning “to make”. Thus the verb verallgemeinern means “to make general” in the same way that the verb verspäten—with the root spät (late)—means “to make late.” In neglecting this consideration, Kaufmann slights the point Nietzsche has just made that language generalizes the rich detail of experience. The noun form of the word verallgemeinern—Verallgemeinerung—takes on central importance in Beyond Good and Evil. In much the same way that language is described here as a “making general” of one set of communicative signs, Nietzsche describes all reductionist metaphysics as a “making general” of one set of purportedly explanatory perspectives. See BGE, 9.
How Nietzsche conceptualizes the psychological and physiological processes at play in internalizing perspectives is still very much an open question in general scholarship on Nietzsche. For a sample of the multitude interpretations of the process and its import for Nietzsche’s views on free will and autonomy, see Gemes and May (2011). Obviously, the answer would have important consequences for Nietzsche’s educational theory, for any pedagogical measure seeking to change the behavior of students would have to ensure its content was being internalized in the robust way Nietzsche conceives it. In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche broadly outlines which measures are likely to succeed. He writes, “The only critique of a philosophy [read: set of perspectives] that is possible and that proves something, namely trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities: all that has been taught is a critique of words by means of other words” (8). Thus, if we intend to internalize a perspective that we encounter in social discourse, we have to be prepared to adjust our lives so as to live in accordance with it. That is, we must incorporate the perspective into our way of acting in the world (e.g. HL, “Foreword,”; D, 22, 116, 197). As I argue in the next section, Nietzsche would have us experiment with only those perspectives which are likely to empower us as individuals within in a noble culture.
For further textual examples of “false” perspectives, see WS, 350; TI, “Morality,” 5, “Skirmishes,” 7; A, 24. These passages, I believe, vindicate the interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism as a type of pragmatic realism. See Leiter (1994) and Jonas and Nakazawa (2008) for an insightful development of this interpretation. For further examples of Nietzsche’s critique of asceticism, see HH, I, 56, HH, I, 139; GS, 47; TI, “Socrates,” 11, “Morality,” 1, “Skirmishes,” 40; GM, III.
Nietzsche uses the term, ‘second nature,’ several times throughout his corpus, yet it does not carry the same meaning each time. For example, in HL, 3 and GS, 290, Nietzsche employs the term in a more metaphorical sense: the second nature results after overcoming the cultural values and inherited proclivities with which the individual has been endowed. This process of overcoming will be discussed in the section following the next. Second nature in the sense Nietzsche captures in Daybreak, however, refers to the psychological level at which perspectives are internalized into the psychological and physiological make-up of the individual.
I do not mean to imply that social life provides the only source of perspectives which inform the experience of the individual. Nietzsche argues that the activities of our affects can, at times, manifest themselves into the consciousness of the individual. In the passage containing the ‘seeing analogy’ from On the Genealogy of Morals, this is most apparent: “[T]the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be” (GM, III, 12). Thus, for Nietzsche, affects can present themselves to the conscious mind in the form of various perspectives which aid in filling out our view of reality. See Riccardi (forthcoming, pp. 15–17).
Although Jonas and Hillesheim differ substantially on their understanding of the goal of self-overcoming (Jonas: self-mastery, Hillesheim: self-creation), their interpretations of how it is to be carried out are quite similar. For Hillesheim the individual is to pit her internal affects against one another in constructive competition in order to transform “even the most ‘evil’ contestant or ingredient…into a good” (p. 173). This competition, the internal agon, is the means by which the individual self-overcomes. For Jonas ‘reason’ is this means: it organizes the formless energy of the inchoate affects so that the individual can increase her power and become master over herself. Thus Jonas’ account goes one important step further than Hillesheim’s in defining the element of the self which Nietzsche believes will guide the internal agon of the affects to constructive, rather than destructive ends.
Obviously, perspectival sublimation necessitates some form of self-knowledge in order that the individual may become aware of her “affective energy.” We cannot be completely ignorant of our first nature affects, as Nietzsche seems to suggest in D, 109; we must feel the presence of our affects in some way. As mentioned in note 13, Nietzsche does later account for perspectives which originate from the conscious manifestations of affects. Although these perspectives may give us hints as to what lies beneath our conscious second nature, our self-knowledge remains perspectival and fallible. Humans give notoriously poor reports of the causal antecedents of their behavior, and Nietzsche argues that this is because consciousness is not designed to give such accounts.
For an insightful exegesis of the three metamorphoses in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, see Gordon (1980) p. 182–187.
I understand “values” to be a particular type of perspective, namely a perspective on how well a particular mode of action increases power. Thus a value is a perspective on perspectives.
I understand the “denial” [Verneinung] of a value or perspective to be a willful act performed by the individual to render the influence of that value or perspective inoperative on her constituent affects (see D, “Foreword,” 5). The concept of denial often accompanies that of creation. See HH, I, 24; D, Preface, 5; GS, 295; Z, I, “Metamorphoses;” and GM, II, 12.
Compare GS, 295, where Nietzsche states, “Most intolerable, to be sure, and the terrible par excellence would be for me a life entirely devoid of habits, a life that would demand perpetual improvisation. That would be my exile and my Siberia.”
See Jonas (2013, pp. 684–686) for an extensive analysis of A, 57 as support for democratic sublimation within Nietzsche’s noble culture.
See Jonas (2013, pp. 679–688) for an extensive analysis of GM, I, 11.
Although Nietzsche employs the term “enslavement” here, he patently does not mean the physical subordination of one human being to another. Though such a scenario would certainly be an expression of power for the master, Nietzsche believes that higher orders of power can be attained when this “enslavement” is turned inward and sublimated into self-mastery. Furthermore, as I have just argued, construing Nietzsche’s order of rank as a type of systematic political enslavement outright ignores his observation that such a system would breed ressentiment in its members and self-destruct. For these two reasons, Jenkins’ (1982) reading of GS, 377 (and Nietzsche in general) as endorsing a brutally elitist political regime is absolutely incorrect. See also Jonas’ (2013) article, in which he conclusively repudiates the “Machiavellian” elitist interpretation of Nietzsche’s political philosophy.
Jonas (2013) makes a similar point in relation to mass education rather than equal rights. See also FE, 4th Lecture; Z, II, “Tarantulas”; and especially GM, I, 11.
By ‘school’ I mean, simply, the place where educators [Erzieher] educate [erziehen or bilden]. In TI, 5–7, Nietzsche expresses supreme discontent with the 19th century German educational system, where he saw the cultivation of true education [Bildung] reduced to the preparation for state employment and left to trained teachers [Gymnasiallehrer] and learned scholars [Universitätsgelehrten]. Education, according to Nietzsche, must be considered its own end [selbst Zweck] and, for this, requires true educators [Erzieher] (TI, 5). Obviously the Nietzschean school would look very different from the school with which we are familiar. For a nuanced discussion of the Nietzschean educational ‘system,’ see Jonas (2013).
Later in Human, all too Human, Nietzsche suggests that irony can be used as a “pedagogic tool” (HH, I, 372) for this type of training. Thus, again, Nietzsche is not prescribing any sort of physical brutality. Mintz (2004) offers an extended analysis of the passage as well.
See Higgins (2011) for an in-depth discussion of instrumentalization in contemporary public education.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Mark Jonas for his generous support throughout the writing of this article and his insightful comments on a previous draft.
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Yacek, D.W. Going to School with Friedrich Nietzsche: The Self in Service of Noble Culture. Stud Philos Educ 33, 391–411 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-013-9394-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-013-9394-z