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172. McGiIl Hume Studies. Edited by D. F. Norton, N. Capaldi and W. L. Robison. (San Diego: Austin Hill Press. Pp. 35i 1979.) This is a selection of nineteen papers on Hume from among those presented at a conference held at McGiIl University in 19 76 to commemorate the bicentenary of Hume's death. Most of them are concerned with Book I of the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Three are largely concerned with the Dialogues and have been, in general, superseded by the publication of Gaskin' s Hume's Philosophy of Religion in 19 78. There are no papers focused on Hume's moral philosophy. Surveying the volume as a whole, three general comments are in order. First, it is a valuable contribution to Humean scholarship. Most of these short essays are very competent and will be of use to students in the future. Secondly, one is forced to recognize what a towering figure Kemp Smith is in the entire history of Hume studies. More authors mention him than do not, whether the references are to his article "The Naturalism of Hume" (1905) , his edition of the Dialogues (1935) , or his The Philosophy of David Hume (1941) . Thirdly, the book is admirably produced. The typography is excellent, the margins are wide and the paper and binding are better than one usually encounters nowadays . This reader noticed only one mis-print (p. 45, line 1), apart from an error in the general index. Rather than offer cursory summaries on each paper, it seems appropriate to select the more outstanding contributions which invite discussion. This criterion excludes Gaskin' s "Hume, Atheism, and the 'Interested Obligation' of Morality". He discusses Hume's reply to the contention that there can be no inclination to good moral behaviour save from religious belief in a post mortem system of rewards and punishments. One could, perhaps, cavil with the flac 173. assertion that Hume held we 'directly feel ' the misery or joy of others, for some of his remarks on this point are ambiguous; and also with the use of an inaccurate version of the "Early Memoranda" when the originals are available in Edinburgh. But, written as it is with habitual elegance and lucidity, wit and learning, one can only commend. Norton's thesis in "Hume and His Scottish Critics" is also unlikely to be disputed in the future. Jane Mclntyre's "Is Hume's Self Consistent?" is exceptional in clarity and incisiveness. After a concise account of the self in Book I of the Treatise, she takes up the puzzling passage in the Appendix in which Hume claims inconsistency for two propositions, when, in fact, 2 as Kemp Smith pointed out, the first implies the second . She accepts Kemp Smith's explanation and goes on to show why, for Hume, self-identity presents a more difficult and fundamental problem than the notion of persisting external objects, for unless the first is solved, all beliefs are inexplicable. While one is uneasy about exegeses which say that, in effect, Hume could have resolved his problem if only he had been more intelligent, the version offered here is interesting. The paper would have been even better if it had been less concise. Beck's paper, "A Prussian Hume and A Scottish Kant", will probably be ranked as the most original and important in this collection. Quoting Walsh's remark that Humean imagination is "simply the Kantian understanding in dis3 guise" , he suggests that there is not an abyss separating naturalism and transcendentalism in epistemology . In his own words, "The problem of causation has traditionally been seen as the bone of contention between Hume and Kant. I shall argue that, on the contrary, it is precisely here that a surprising degree of accommodation between them is possible . To this end, I shall first recount Kant's stand on the conception of causality both before and after Hume awoke him from his dogmatic slumber. I shall then show 174. that Kant misunderstood Hume's views in the Treatise but that this misunderstanding was a fruitful one. Finally, I shall try to show that something in fact needed by Hume but not supplied in the Treatise is given by...

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