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Refutational Strategies in Mencius’s Argumentative Discourse on Human Nature

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Abstract

Mencius, a prominent Confucian philosopher in the Warring States period (c. 453 BC–221 BC) of ancient China, is well-known for his argumentative skills, including his refutational skills used to maintain his own standpoints. This paper attempts to reveal how Mencius refuted his opponents argumentatively and strategically on the issue of human nature. To this end, the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation is adopted to first reconstruct Mencius’s argumentative discourse on human nature according to the four stages in critical discussion—the confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stages. Under the ancient Chinese historical and cultural context, Mencius’s argumentative discourse about human nature was developed in three critical discussions, between Mencius the protagonist, and his explicit interlocutors and implicit adversaries who held different views on human nature—the antagonists. The discussions were undertaken around three single mixed differences of opinion concerning three propositions, with resolution of the first difference of opinion serving as a starting point of the second, and the resolution of the second as a starting point of the third. Then based on the reconstruction, the paper elaborates the refutational strategies that Mencius employed in various stages, such as dissociation, reductio ad absurdum based on refutational analogy, and conciliation. It further points out that the employment of these strategies is strategic maneuvering undertaken by Mencius in an attempt to realize both dialectical and rhetorical aims.

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Notes

  1. The most notable schools of thought in the Warring States period include Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism and Taoism. Mencius has been reputed as such a strong and devoted defender of Confucianism that people of the later ages address him respectfully as “the second sage”, only after Confucius.

  2. Different translation versions of Mencius (translations either from ancient Chinese to English or from ancient Chinese to modern Chinese) adopt different catalogue numbers for its contents. James Legge (Mencius 2010) and Yang Bojun (2017) in their translations divide the work into fourteen books, with each book containing a number of passages, like Book 1.1 (Passage One in Book One Emperor Hui of Liang), Book 2.1 (Passage One in Book Two Emperor Hui of Liang), and so on. David Hinton (Mencius 2015) divides the work into fourteen chapters, like “Chapter 1 Emperor Hui of Liang Book One” and “Chapter 2 Emperor Hui of Liang Book Two”. Lau Din Cheuk (Mencius 2004) and Irene Bloom (Mencius 2009) arrange Mencius into seven books, with two parts in each book sharing the same title. For instance, Book 6A1 refers to the first passage in Part A of Book VI Gaozi, while Book 6B1 refers to the first passage in Part B of Book VI Gaozi. As Lau’s and Bloom’s catalogue numbering is clear and convenient to be quoted, their way for the contents arrangement of Mencius is adopted here.

  3. Taking functional equivalence (Waard and Nida 1986) as the translation criterion, namely, equivalence between function in the source text in the source culture and function in the target text in the target culture, most of the English versions of the quotes from the work Mencius are taken from Irene Bloom’s translation (Mencius 2009), with only one exception in Book 6A3, as will be explained later.

  4. The earliest and the most important introduction about Mencius is well acknowledged to be made by Sima Qian (c. 135 or 145 BC–c. 86 BC), a Chinese historian of the early Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220). Sima Qian is reputed as the father of Chinese historiography for his Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji in Pinyin), a Jizhuanti-style (history represented in a series of biographies) general history from the Yellow Emperor (a legendary Chinese sovereign, whose traditional reign dates are calculated to be 2697–2597 BC or 2698–2598 BC) to his time. According to the Biography of Mencius and Xunzi recorded in Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian, Mencius, after travelling for many years to promote his ethical and political ideals in the then warring states, came back to his hometown with his disciples Wan Zhang and Gongsun Chou. Together they compiled the work Mencius, which recorded Mencius’s words and conversations with others. Since the first authoritative annotation of Mencius made by Zhao Qi (AD 108–AD 201) of Eastern Han Dynasty, there are numerous other annotations and research work on Mencius. Up to now, if not everyone, at least most annotators and researchers agree that there exists consistency in Mencius’s ideas and argumentations (Chen 2018, p. 9).

  5. It is interesting to note that in the argumentative discussions between Mencius and his explicit antagonists such as Gaozi (once a disciple of Mencius) in Books 6A1-6A4 and Gongduzi in Book 6A6, the discussions always end with the silence of the other party, thus leaving an impression that it is Mencius who managed to silence them with argumentation. Besides, judging from the same-topic-related discussions in the work Mencius, including discussions about human nature, we can also see that some discussions can only be started with concessions on the part of the antagonists of accepting the protagonist’s successful defense for a standpoint concerning a previous difference of opinion, as will be elaborated in the following sessions.

  6. According to the three most authoritative annotators of Mencius - Zhao Qi (108–201 AD) of the Eastern Han dynasty, Zhu Xi (1130–1200 AD) of the Song dynasty (Zhu 2013) and Jiao Xun (1763–1820 AD) of the Qing dynasty (Jiao 2017), Gaozi, surnamed with Gao and with the given name of Buhai, was once a disciple of Mencius. He disagreed on Mencius’s thoughts about human nature. It is said that he later turned to Micius, whose ideas were attacked hard by Mencius. Note that the name of Gaozi may appear in different spellings, like Lau Din Cheuk (Mencius 2004, pp. 122–125) spelling it as “Kao Tzu”, David Hinton (Mencius 2015, pp. 144–146) as “Master Kao”, and James Legge (Mencius 2010, pp. 206–211) as “the philosopher Gao”.

  7. Yü or Da Yü (c. 2200–2100 BC), was the founder of the Xia dynasty (c. 2070–1600 BC), the first dynasty in traditional Chinese history. He, along with Yao (c. 2356–2255 BC) and Shun (c. 2294–2184 BC), was worshipped as one of the three ideal emperors by Confucius and his followers.

  8. Different from the previous quotes taken from Irene Bloom’s translation (Mencius 2009), Book 6A3 is taken from Lau Din Cheuk’s translation. The reason is that Lau’s (Mencius 2004, p. 123) translation of “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’” expresses Gaozi’s original meaning “生之谓性” more clearly than Irene Bloom’s version of “Life is what is called nature” (Mencius 2009, pp. 121–122).

  9. See Footnote No. 7.

  10. Irene Bloom used the word “rightness” in her translation (Mencius 2009), but considering conformity with the word use in Xiong Minghui and Yan Linqiong (2018), “righteousness” is preferred here. Similar cases appear in the following quotes taken from Irene Bloom’s translation, in which words between brackets will be adopted in the later analysis for conformity of use. Therefore, hereafter, for similar cases, no more notes will be given.

  11. See Footnote No. 7.

  12. Instead of the translation of “Way”, the more widely-accepted wording now is “Dao”, referring to the general principles. Therefore, in the later sections, “Dao” will be employed.

  13. Views on human nature in the Warring States period were diverse, as will be seen in Book 6A6, where Gongduzi quoted the different views on human nature prevailing in the times.

  14. King Wen of Zhou dynasty (1152 BC–1056 BC) was greatly respected for his honorable governance. After his death, his son King Wu of Zhou dynasty followed his wishes, crushed the tyrannical King Zhou of Shang dynasty in c. 1046 BC, and created the imperial Zhou dynasty as the first king of Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC–256 BC). Nevertheless, King Wen of Zhou is regarded as the founder of Zhou dynasty. Note that hereafter Zhou corresponds to the Chinese character “周”, while the italicized Zhou corresponds to the Chinese character “纣”.

  15. King Li of Zhou was the tenth king of Zhou dynasty, reigning from 877 BC to 841 BC. He was such a corrupt and decadent king as to force many peasants and soldiers into revolt. King You of Zhou was the twelfth king of Zhou dynasty and the last one of the Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC–771 BC), reigning from 781 BC to 771 BC. He was infamous in the Chinese history for his squandering his feudal lords’ respect and humiliating them just to make his favorite concubine laugh.

  16. Xiang was said to be Shun’s half-brother. He was mean, selfish and brutal, and together with their father Gusou, treated Shun so terribly as to almost kill Shun.

  17. Gusou, Shun’s father, was said to be blind and treated Shun badly. Nevertheless, Shun was still a filial son to his father.

  18. Zhou, namely, King Zhou of Shang (reigning from 1075 BC–1046 BC), the last king of Shang dynasty, was a tyrannical ruler in ancient China.

  19. Qi, the Viscount of Wei, was the brother of King Zhou of Shang. He was a loyal official and tried to advise King Zhou of Shang to change his tyrannical ruling, but was rebuked by King Zhou of Shang.

  20. Prince Bigan, was the uncle of King Zhou of Shang. He was reputed as a sage in his time and tried all means to remonstrate with King Zhou of Shang. Tragically, his heart was ripped out by King Zhou of Shang in the end.

  21. In Book 7A15, to have respect for elders is included into the scope of righteousness, while here and in Book 2A6, it says that the mind of shame and dislike is (the sprout of) righteousness while the mind of respect and reverence is (the sprout of) propriety. We need to understand Mencius’s conceptions of humaneness and righteousness in two senses. In the narrow sense, (the sprout of) humaneness is the feeling of pity and commiseration, and the sprout of righteousness is the feeling of shame and dislike. In the broad sense, humaneness contains the corresponding part of humaneness in the narrow sense as well as the feeling of approving and disapproving (intelligence), and righteousness includes the corresponding part of righteousness in the narrow sense together with the feeling of respectfulness and reverence (propriety).

  22. Book of Songs or Book of Odes, one of the Five Classics (with the other four being Book of Documents, Book of Rites, Book of Changes or I Ching, and Spring and Autumn Annals) of ancient Chinese literature, is an anthology of ancient Chinese poetry.

  23. See Footnote No. 21.

  24. Longzi was known as a philosopher in ancient China.

  25. Yiya was known as a minion of Duke Huan of Qi in the Spring and Autumn period (about 771 BC–476 BC) in ancient China. He knew very well how to cook to please the palates of Duke Huan of Qi.

  26. Music Master Kuang was a musician during the Spring and Autumn period in ancient China.

  27. Zidu was a senior official with good look in the state of Zheng in the Spring and Autumn period.

  28. In Book 7A15, Mencius explicitly defined “to have respect for elders” as a kind of righteousness. Righteousness is more generally interpreted as being appropriate, especially to conventions and practical situations (Kong 2018, p. 746). So here “order” is synonymous with “righteousness”.

  29. Ox Mountain refers to a mountain located in the southeast of the state of Qi in the Spring and Autumn period.

  30. Mencius argued for the inclination to goodness inherent in human nature on the one hand, but he also observed the importance of nursing and developing such inclination to goodness in one’s growth and daily life. The debate of nature versus nurture has been an age-old topic (Cherry 2018). Over 2500 years ago, the Chinese philosopher Mencius already provided us with one possible interaction between nature and nurture.

  31. The original Chinese sentence in Book 4B19 of the work Mencius are “舜明于庶物, 察于人伦, 由仁义行, 非行仁义也”. For the contrastive pair of expressions “由仁义行” and “行仁义”, there are various English translations. For example, as is quoted here, Irene Bloom (Mencius 2009, p. 89) translated them as “Humaneness and rightness (righteousness) were the source of his actions; he did not just perform acts of humaneness and rightness (righteousness).” Lau Din Cheuk (Mencius 2004, p. 91) translated them as “He (Shun) followed the path of morality. He did not just put morality into practice”, whereas James Legge’s translation (Mencius 2010, p. 152) is “He (Shun) walked along the path of benevolence and righteousness; he did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness.” In no matter which version of the English translations, the original contrastive meanings are all retained. Therefore, even through the English translations of Mencius’s words, we can still see that Mencius’s strategic maneuvering in the dimension of “presentational devices” is employed here.

  32. Mohist Canons collects a set of brief statements about a variety of philosophical, reasoning and other topics by members of the Mohist School, one of the most reputable schools in the era of “Hundred Schools of Thought” of the Warring States period.

  33. The book of Chuang Tzu is authored by Zhuang Zhou (also addressed as Zhuangzi or Master Zhuang), an influential Chinese philosopher who lived around the 4th century BC during the Warring States period. Chuang Tzu collects anecdotes and fables and is one of the foundational texts of Daoism (or Taoism in the Wade-Giles system), another one of the most notable schools in the era of “Hundred Schools of Thought” of the Warring States period.

  34. Gongsun Long (c. 325–250 BC) was a member of the School of Names (also called Logicians) of ancient Chinese philosophy, which is also one of the most notable schools in the era of “Hundred Schools of Thought” of the Warring States period. He advocated peaceful means of resolving disputes other than wars. His essays - originally fourteen but only six extant - are collected into the anthology Gongsun Longzi.

  35. In Book 7A15, to have respect for elders is included into the scope of righteousness, while here and in Book 2A6, it says that the mind of shame and dislike is (the sprout of) righteousness while the mind of respect and reverence is (the sprout of) propriety. We need to understand Mencius’s conceptions of humaneness and righteousness in two senses. In the narrow sense, (the sprout of) humaneness is the mind of pity and compassion, and the sprout of righteousness is the mind of shame and dislike. In the broad sense, humaneness contains the corresponding part in the narrow sense as well as the mind of approving and disapproving (intelligence), and righteousness includes the corresponding part in the narrow sense together with the mind of respect and reverence (propriety).

  36. Yü or Da Yü (c. 2200–2100 BC), was the founder of the Xia dynasty (c. 2070–1600 BC), the first dynasty in traditional Chinese history. He, along with Yao (c. 2356–2255 BC) and Shun (c. 2294–2184 BC), was worshipped as one of the three ideal emperors by Confucius and his followers.

  37. Instead of the translation of “Way”, the more widely-accepted wording now is “Dao”, referring to the general principles. Therefore, in the later sections, “Dao” will be employed.

  38. See footnote No. 2.

  39. Irene Bloom uses the word “rightness” here in his translation (Mencius 2009), but considering conformity with the word use in Xiong Minghui and Yan Linqiong (2018), “righteousness” is preferred here. Similar situations appear in the following quotes taken from Irene Bloom’s translation, in which words in the brackets will be adopted in the latter analysis for conformity in use. Therefore, hereinafter, for similar cases, no more notes will be given.

  40. See footnote No. 2.

  41. Different from the previous quotes taken from Irene Bloom’s translation (Mencius 2009), Book 6A3 is taken from Lau Din Cheuk’s translation (Mencius 2004, p. 123). The reason is that Lau’s translation of “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’” expresses Gaozi’s original meaning“生之谓性”more clearly than Irene Bloom’s version of “Life is what is called nature” (2009, pp. 121–122).

  42. King Wen of Zhou (1152 BC–1056 BC) was greatly respected for his honorable governance. After his death, his son King Wu of Zhou followed his wishes, crushed the tyrannical King Zhou of Shang dynasty in c. 1046 BC, and created the imperial Zhou dynasty as the first king of Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC–256 BC). Nevertheless, King Wen of Zhou is regarded as the founder of Zhou dynasty.

  43. King Li of Zhou was the tenth king of Zhou dynasty, reigning from 877 BC to 841 BC. He was such a corrupt and decadent king as to force many peasants and soldiers into revolt. King You of Zhou was the twelfth king of Zhou dynasty and the last one of the Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC–771 BC), reigning from 781 BC to 771 BC. He was infamous in the Chinese history for his squandering his feudal lords’ respect and humiliating them just to make his favorite concubine laugh.

  44. Xiang was said to be Shun’s half-brother. He was mean, selfish and brutal, and together with their father Gusou, treated Shun so terribly as to almost kill Shun.

  45. Gusou, Shun’s father, was said to be blind and treated Shun badly. Nevertheless, Shun was still a filial son to his father.

  46. Zhou, namely, King Zhou of Shang (reigning from 1075 BC–1046 BC), the last king of Shang dynasty, was a tyrannical ruler in ancient China.

  47. Qi, the Viscount of Wei, was the brother of King Zhou of Shang. He was a loyal official and tried to advise King Zhou of Shang to change his tyrannical ruling, but was rebuked by King Zhou of Shang.

  48. Prince Bigan, was the uncle of King Zhou of Shang. He was reputed as a sage in his time and tried all means to remonstrate with King Zhou of Shang. Tragically, his heart was ripped out by King Zhou of Shang in the end.

  49. In Book 7A15, to have respect for elders is included into the scope of righteousness, while here and in Book 2A6, it says that the mind of shame and dislike is (the sprout of) righteousness while the mind of respect and reverence is (the sprout of) propriety. We need to understand Mencius’s conceptions of humaneness and righteousness in two senses. In the narrow sense, (the sprout of) humaneness is the mind of pity and compassion, and the sprout of righteousness is the mind of shame and dislike. In the broad sense, humaneness contains the corresponding part in the narrow sense as well as the mind of approving and disapproving (intelligence), and righteousness includes the corresponding part in the narrow sense together with the mind of respect and reverence (propriety).

  50. Longzi was only known as a philosopher in ancient China.

  51. Yiya was known as a minion of Duke Huan of Qi in the Spring and Autumn period (about 771 BC–476 BC) in ancient China. He knew very well how to cook to please the palates of Duke Huan of Qi.

  52. Music Master Kuang was a musician during the Spring and Autumn period in ancient China.

  53. Zidu was a senior official with good look in the state of Zheng in the Spring and Autumn period.

  54. In Book 7A15, Mencius explicitly defines “to have respect for elders” as a kind of righteousness. Righteousness is more generally interpreted as being appropriate, especially to conventions and practical situations (Kong 2018, p. 746). So here “order” is synonymous with “righteousness”.

  55. Ox Mountain refers to a mountain located in the southeast of the state of Qi in the Spring and Autumn period.

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Acknowledgements

The study is supported by International Program for PhD Candidates of Sun Yat-sen University, and funded by Jiangsu Province Projects for Philosophy and Social Sciences in Higher Educational Institutions (Grant No. 2017SJB1076), Argumentation Studies in Ancient China (Grant No. 17GZGX23), and China National Social Sciences Foundation Project (Grant No. 19AZX017). Sincere thanks are also given to anonymous reviewers and especially to A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, without whose meticulous and constructive comments and suggestions, this paper can never have been improved for publication.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, 135 Xingang West Road, Guangzhou, 510275, People’s Republic of China

    Lin-qiong Yan & Ming‑hui Xiong

  2. School of Foreign Languages, Jiangsu University, 301 Xuefu Road, Zhenjiang, 212013, People’s Republic of China

    Lin-qiong Yan

  3. Institute of Reasoning, Argumentation and Communication, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, 555 Liutai Avenue, Chengdu, 611130, People’s Republic of China

    Ming‑hui Xiong

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Appendix 1: Chinese-English Versions of Mencius’s Argumentative Discourse on Human Nature

Appendix 1: Chinese-English Versions of Mencius’s Argumentative Discourse on Human Nature

  • 第二篇《公孙丑章句上》(第6节) Book 2A6 (Passage Six, Part A of Book II Gongsun Chou)

  • 第三篇《滕文公章句上》(第1节) Book 3A1 (Passage One, Part A of Book III Duke Wen of Teng)

  • 第四篇《离娄章句下》(第19节) Book 4B19 (Passage Nineteen, Part B of Book IV Lilou)

  • 第四篇《离娄章句下》(第26节) Book 4B26 (Passage Twenty-six, Part B of Book Lilou)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第1节) Book 6A1 (Passage One, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第2节) Book 6A2 (Passage Two, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第3节) Book 6A3 (Passage Three, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第4节) Book 6A4 (Passage Four, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第6节) Book 6A6 (Passage Six, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第7节) Book 6A7 (Passage Seven, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第8节) Book 6A8 (Passage Eight, Part A of Book VI Gaozi)

  • 第七篇《尽心章句上》(第15节) Book 7A15 (Passage Fifteen, Part A of Book VII Jin Xin)

  • 第七篇《尽心章句上》(第16节) Book 7A16 (Passage Sixteen, Part A of Book VII Jin Xin)

  • 第二篇《公孙丑章句上》(第6节)

孟子曰: “人皆有不忍人之心。先王有不忍人之心, 斯有不忍人之政矣。以不忍人之心, 行不忍人之政, 治天下可运之掌上。

所以谓人皆有不忍人之心者, 今人乍见孺子将入于井, 皆有怵惕恻隐之心。非所以内交于孺子之父母也, 非所以要誉于乡党朋友也, 非恶其声而然也。由是观之, 无恻隐之心, 非人也; 无羞恶之心, 非人也;无辞让之心, 非人也; 无是非之心, 非人也。恻隐之心, 仁之端也;羞恶之心, 义之端也; 辞让之心, 礼之端也; 是非之心, 智之端也。人之有是四端也, 犹其有四体也。有是四端而自谓不能者, 自贼者也; 谓其君不能者,贼其君者也。

凡有四端于我者, 知皆扩而充之矣, 若火之始然, 泉之始达。苟能充之, 足以保四海; 苟不充之, 不足以事父母。”

  • Book 2A6 (Passage Six, Part A of Book II Gongsun Chou )

Mencius said, “All human beings have a mind that cannot bear to see the sufferings of others.…

Here is why I say that all human beings have a mind that commiserates with others. Now, if anyone were suddenly to see a child about to fall into a well, his mind would be filled with alarm, distress, pity, and compassion. That he would react accordingly is not because he would hope to use the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the child’s parents, nor because he would seek commendation from neighbors and friends, nor because he would hate the adverse reputation [that could come from not reacting accordingly]. From this it may be seen that one who lacks a mind that feels pity and compassion (or commiseration) would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels shame and aversion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels modesty and compliance would not be human; and one who lacks a mind that knows right and wrong would not be human.

The mind’s feeling of pity and compassion (or commiseration) is the sprout of humaneness [ren 仁]; the mind’s feeling of shame and aversion (or shame and dislike) is the sprout of rightness (or righteousness) [yi 义]; the mind’s feeling of modesty and compliance (or reverence and respect) is the sprout of propriety [li 礼]Footnote 35; and the mind’s sense of right and wrong (or approving and disapproving) is the sprout of wisdom (or intelligence) [zhi 智]. Human beings have these four sprouts just as they have four limbs. …”(Mencius 2009, pp. 35–36)

  • 第三篇《滕文公章句上》(第1节)

滕文公为世子, 将之楚,过宋而见孟子。孟子道性善, 言必称尧舜。

世子自楚反, 复见孟子。孟子曰: “世子疑吾言乎? 夫道一而已矣。……”

  • Book 3A1 (Passage One, Part A of Book III Duke Wen of Teng )

Duke Wen of Teng, Shizi (crown prince) on his way to (the kingdom of) Chu, passed by (the kingdom of) Song in order to see Mencius. Mencius spoke about human nature being good, constantly commending YaoFootnote 36 and Shun. When Shizi (crown prince) was returning from (the kingdom of) Chu, he again went to see Mencius. Mencius said, “Do you doubt my words? The WayFootnote 37 is one and one only. …” (Mencius 2009, p. 49)

  • 第四篇《离娄章句下》(第19节)

孟子曰: “人之所以异于禽兽者几希, 庶民去之, 君子存之。舜明于庶物, 察于人伦, 由仁义行, 非行仁义也。”

  • Book 4B19 (Passage Nineteen,Part B of Book IV Lilou )

Mencius said, “That wherein human beings differ from the birds and beasts is but slight. The majority of people relinquish this, while the noble person retains it. ShunFootnote 38 was clear about the multitude of things and observant of human relationships. Humaneness and rightness (righteousness)Footnote 39 were the source of his actions; he did not just perform acts of humaneness and rightness (righteousness).” (Mencius 2009, p. 89)

  • 第四篇《离娄章句下》(第26节)

孟子曰: “天下之言性也, 则故而已矣。故者以利为本。所恶于智者, 为其凿也。如智者若禹之行水也,则无恶于智矣。禹之行水也, 行其所无事也。如智者亦行其所无事, 则智亦大矣。天之高也, 星辰之远也, 苟求其故, 千岁之日至, 可坐而致也。”

  • Book 4B26 (Passage Twenty-six, Part B of Book Lilou )

Mencius said, “Those in the world who speak about human nature only consider its original state and take its original state to be fundamentally self-interested. What I dislike in the wise is their habit of boring their way through. If the wise resembled YüFootnote 40 in his directing the flow of the waters, there would be nothing to dislike in their wisdom. The way Yü directed the waters was by directing them in a way that was unforced. If the wise would also direct thoughts in a way that was unforced, then their wisdom would also be great indeed. Heaven is high and the stars are far away. Yet if we seek out how they were formerly, we can calculate a solstice for a thousand years from now without rising from our seats.” (Mencius 2009, pp. 91–92)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第1节)

告子曰: “性,犹杞柳也; 义, 犹桮桊也。以人性为仁义, 犹以杞柳为桮桊。”

孟子曰: “子能顺杞柳之性而以为桮桊乎? 将戕贼杞柳而后以为桮桊也?如将戕贼杞柳而以为桮桊, 则亦将戕贼人以为仁义与?率天下之人而祸仁义者, 必子之言夫!”

  • Book 6A1 (Passage One, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Gaozi said, “Human nature is like the willow tree; rightness (or righteousness) is like cups and bowls. To make humaneness and rightness out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow tree.”

Mencius said, “Are you able to make cups and bowls while following the nature of the willow tree? You must do violence to the willow tree before you can make cups and bowls. If you must do violence to the willow tree in order to make cups and bowls, must you also do violence to human beings in order to bring forth humaneness and rightness? The effect of your words will be to cause everyone in the world to think of humaneness and rightness as misfortunes.” (Mencius 2009, p. 121)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第2节)

告子曰: “性犹湍水也, 决诸东方则东流, 决诸西方则西流。人性之无分于善不善也, 犹水之无分于东西也。”

孟子曰: “水信无分于东西。无分于上下乎? 人性之善也,犹水之就下也。人无有不善,水无有不下。今夫水, 搏而跃之, 可使过颡;激而行之, 可使在山。是岂水之性哉?其势则然也。人之可使为不善, 其性亦犹是也。”

  • Book 6A2 (Passage Two, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Gaozi said, “Human nature is like swirling water. Open a passage for it in the east, and it will flow east; open a passage for it in the west, and it will flow west. Human nature does not distinguish between good and not-good any more than water distinguishes between east and west.”

Mencius said, “It is true that water does not distinguish between east and west, but does it fail to distinguish between up and down? The goodness of human nature is like the downward course of water. There is no human being lacking in the tendency to do good, just as there is no water lacking in the tendency to flow downward. Now, by striking water and splashing it, you may cause it to go over your head, and by damming and channeling it, you can force it to flow uphill. But is this the nature of water? It is force that makes this happen. While people can be made to do what is not good, what happens to their nature is like this.” (Mencius 2009, p. 121)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第3节)

告子曰: “生之谓性。”

孟子曰: “生之谓性也, 犹白之谓白与?” 曰:“然。”

“白羽之白也, 犹白雪之白; 白雪之白, 犹白玉之白与?” 曰:“然。”“然则犬之性, 犹牛之性; 牛之性, 犹人之性与?”

  • Book 6A3 (Passage Three, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Gaozi said, “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’.”

“That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’.” said Mencius, “Is it the same as white is what is meant by ‘white’?” “Yes.” “Is the whiteness of white feathers the same as the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?” “Yes.” “In that case, is the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?” (Mencius 2004, p. 123)Footnote 41

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第4节)

告子曰: “食色, 性也。仁, 内也, 非外也; 义, 外也, 非内也。”

孟子曰: “何以谓仁内义外也?”

(告子) 曰: “彼长而我长之, 非有长于我也; 犹彼白而我白之, 从其白于外也, 故谓之外也。”

(孟子) 曰: “异于白马之白也, 无以异于白人之白也; 不识长马之长也, 无以异于长人之长与?且谓长者义乎? 长之者义乎?”

(告子) 曰: “吾弟则爱之, 秦人之弟则不爱也, 是以我为悦者也, 故谓之内。长楚人之长, 亦长吾之长, 是以长为悦者也, 故谓之外也。”

(孟子) 曰: “耆秦人之炙, 无以异于耆吾炙。夫物则亦有然者也,然则耆炙亦有外与?”

  • Book 6A4 (Passage Four, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Gaozi said, “The appetites for food and sex are human nature. Humaneness is internal rather than external; rightness (or righteousness) is external rather than internal.”

Mencius said, “Why do you say that humaneness is internal while rightness (or righteousness) is external?”

Gaozi said, “One who is older than I, I treat as an elder. This is not because there is in me some sense of respect due to elders. It is like something being white and my recognizing it as white; I am responding to the whiteness, which is external. Therefore, I call rightness (or righteousness) external.”

Mencius said, “There is no difference between the whiteness of a white horse and the whiteness of a white man. But is there no difference between the age of an old horse and the age of an old man? What is it that we speak of as rightness (or righteousness)—the man’s being old or my regarding him with the respect due to one who is old?”

Gaozi said, “Here is my younger brother; I love him. There is the younger brother of a man from (the kingdom of) Qin; him I do not love. The feeling derives from me, and therefore I describe it as internal. I treat an elder from (the kingdom of) Chu as old, just as I treat our own elders as old. The feeling derives from their age, and therefore I call it external.”

Mencius said, “Our fondness for the roast meat provided by a man of (the kingdom) Qin is no different from our fondness for the roast meat provided by one of our own people. Since this is also the case with a material thing, will you say that our fondness for roast meat is external as well?” (Mencius 2009, p. 122)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第6节)

公都子曰: “告子曰: ‘性无善无不善也。’或曰: ‘性可以为善, 可以为不善; 是故文武兴, 则民好善; 幽厉兴, 则民好暴。’或曰: ‘有性善, 有性不善; 是故以尧为君而有象, 以瞽瞍为父而有舜; 以纣为兄之子且以为君, 而有微子启、王子比干。’今曰‘性善’, 然则彼皆非与?”

孟子曰: “乃若其情,则可以为善矣, 乃所谓善也。若夫为不善, 非才之罪也。恻隐之心, 人皆有之;羞恶之心, 人皆有之;恭敬之心, 人皆有之; 是非之心, 人皆有之。恻隐之心, 仁也; 羞恶之心, 义也;恭敬之心, 礼也; 是非之心, 智也。仁义礼 智, 非由外铄我也, 我固有之也, 弗思耳矣。故曰: ‘求则得之, 舍则失之。’或相倍蓰而无算者, 不能尽其才者也。诗曰: ‘天生蒸民, 有物有则。民之秉夷, 好是懿德。’孔子曰:‘为此诗者, 其知道乎!故有物必有则, 民之秉夷也, 故好是懿德。’”

  • Book 6A6 (Passage Six, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Gongduzi said, “Gaozi said that human nature is neither good nor not-good. Others say that human nature can be made to be good or not-good, which is why, during the reigns of Kings Wen and Wu (of Zhou dynasty),Footnote 42 the people were inclined to goodness, whereas under the reigns of (Kings) You and (of Zhou dynasty),Footnote 43 the people were inclined to violence. Still others say that (human nature is inborn) the natures of some are good and the natures of others are not good, which is why when Yao was the ruler, there could be Xiang,Footnote 44 while with a father like Gusou,Footnote 45 there could be Shun, and with ZhouFootnote 46 as the son of their older brother as well as their ruler, there could be Qi, the Viscount of Wei,Footnote 47 and Prince Bigan.Footnote 48 Now, you say human nature is good. Does this mean that these others are all wrong?”

Mencius said, “One’s natural tendencies enable one to do good; this is what I mean by human nature being good. When one does what is not good, it is not the fault of one’s native capacities. The mind of pity and commiseration is possessed by all human beings; the mind of shame and dislike is possessed by all human beings; the mind of respectfulness (or respect) and reverence is possessed by all human beings, and the mind that knows right and wrong (or approving and disapproving) is possessed by all human beings. The mind of pity and commiseration is humaneness; the mind of shame and dislike is rightness (or righteousness); the mind of respectfulness (or respect) and reverence is propriety,Footnote 49 and the mind that knows right and wrong (or approving and disapproving) is wisdom (or intelligence). Humaneness, rightness (or righteousness), propriety and wisdom (or intelligence) are not infused into us from without. We definitely possess them. It is just that we do not think about it, that is all. Therefore, it is said, ‘Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it.’ That some differ from others by as much as twice, or five times, or an incalculable order of multitude is because there are those who are unable fully to develop their (native) capacities.

The ode (or The Book of Songs) says, ‘Heaven, in giving birth to humankind, created for each thing its own rule; the people’s common disposition, is to love this admirable Virtue.’ Confucius said, ‘How well the one who made this ode knew the Dao! Therefore, for each thing, there must be a rule, and people’s common disposition is therefore to love this admirable Virtue.’” (Mencius 2009, pp. 123–124)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第7节)

孟子曰: “富岁, 子弟多赖; 凶岁, 子弟多暴, 非天之降才尔殊也, 其所以陷溺其心者然也。

今夫麰麦, 播种而耰之, 其地同,树之时又同, 浡然而生, 至于日至之时, 皆熟矣。虽有不同, 则地有肥硗, 雨露之养, 人事之不齐也。故凡同类者, 举相似也, 何独至于人而疑之?圣人与我同类者。故龙子曰: ‘不知足而为屦, 我知其不为蒉也。’屦之相似, 天下之足同也。

口之于味, 有同耆也。易牙先得我口之所耆者也。如使口之于味也, 其性与人殊, 若犬马之与我不同类也, 则天下何耆皆从易牙之于味也?至于味, 天下期于易牙, 是天下之口相似也。惟耳亦然。至于声, 天下期于师旷, 是天下之耳相似也。惟目亦然。至于子都,天下莫不知其姣也。不知子都之姣者, 无目者也。故曰: 口之于味也,有同耆焉; 耳之于声也, 有同听焉;目之于色也, 有同美焉。至于心, 独无所同然乎?心之所同然者何也?谓理也, 义也。圣人先得我心之所同然耳。故理义之悦我心, 犹刍豢之悦我口。

  • Book 6A7 (Passage Seven, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Mencius said, “In years of abundance, most of the young people have the wherewithal to be good, while in years of adversity, most of them become violent. This is not a matter of a difference in the native capacities sent down by Heaven but rather of what overwhelms their minds.

Now, let barley be sown and covered with earth; the ground being the same, and the time of planting also the same, it grows rapidly, and in due course of time, it all ripens. Though there may be differences in the yield, this is because the fertility of the soil, the nourishment of the rain and the dew, and the human effort invested are not the same.

Things of the same kind are thus like one another. Why is it that we should doubt this only when it comes to human beings? The sage and we are the same in kind. So LongziFootnote 50 said, ‘If someone makes shoes without knowing the size of a person’s feet, I know that he will not make baskets.’ That shoes are similar is because everyone in the world has feet that are alike. And when it comes to taste, all mouths are alike in their preferences. YiyaFootnote 51 was first to apprehend what all mouths prefer. If, with regard to the way mouths are disposed to tastes, human nature differed from person to person, as is the case with dogs and horses differing from us in kind, why should it be that everyone in the world follows Yiya in matters of taste? The fact that everyone in the world takes Yiya as the standard in matters of taste is because we all have mouths that are similar. It is likewise with our ears: when it comes to sounds, everyone in the world takes Music Master KuangFootnote 52 as the standard because the ears of everyone in the world are similar. And so likewise with our eyes: when it comes to Zidu,Footnote 53 there is no one in the world who fails to recognize his beauty because one who failed to recognize the beauty of Zidu would have to be without eyes. Therefore, I say mouths find savor in the same flavors; ears find satisfaction in the same sounds; eyes find pleasure in the same beauty. When it comes to our minds, could they alone have nothing in common? And what is it that our minds have in common? It is order and rightness (or righteousness).Footnote 54 The sage is just the first to apprehend what our minds have in common. Thus, order and rightness (or righteousness) please our minds in the same way that meat pleases our mouths.” (Mencius 2009, pp. 125–126)

  • 第六篇《告子章句上》(第8节)

孟子曰: “牛山之木尝美矣, 以其郊于大国也, 斧斤伐之, 可以为美乎?是其日夜之所息, 雨露之所润, 非无萌櫱之生焉, 牛羊又从而牧之, 是以若彼濯濯也。人见其濯濯也, 以为未尝有材焉, 此岂山之性也哉?

虽存乎人者, 岂无仁义之心哉?其所以放其良心者, 亦犹斧斤之于木也, 旦旦而伐之, 可以为美乎?其日夜之所息, 平旦之气, 其好恶与人相近也者几希, 则其旦昼之所为, 有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆, 则其夜气不足以存; 夜气不足以存, 则其违禽兽不远矣。人见其禽兽也,而以为未尝有才焉者, 是岂人之情也哉?

故苟得其养, 无物不长; 苟失其养, 无物不消。孔子曰: ‘操则存, 舍则亡; 出入无时, 莫知其乡。’惟心之谓与?”

  • Book 6A8 (Passage Eight, Part A of Book VI Gaozi )

Mencius said, “The trees on the Ox MountainFootnote 55 once beautiful. But being situated on the outskirts of a large state, the trees were cut down by axes. Could they remain beautiful? Given the air of the day and the night, and the moisture of the rain and the dew, they did not fail to put forth new buds and shoots, but then cattle and sheep came along to graze upon them. This accounts for the barren appearance of the mountain. Seeing this barrenness, people suppose that the mountain was never wooded. But how could this be the nature of the mountain? So, it is also with what is preserved in a human being: could it be that anyone should lack the mind of humaneness and rightness (or righteousness)? If one lets go his proper goodness of mind, this is like taking axes to trees; being cut down day after day, can (one’s mind) remain beautiful? Given the rest that one gets in the day and the night, and the effect of the calm morning qi, one’s likes and dislikes will still resemble those of other people, but barely so. And then one can become fettered and destroyed by what one does during the day; if this fettering occurs repeatedly, the effect of the night qi will no longer be enough to allow one to preserve his mind, and he will be at scant remove from the animals. Seeing this, one might suppose that he never had the capacity for goodness. But can this be a human being’s natural tendency? …” (Mencius 2009, p. 126)

  • 第七篇《尽心章句上》(第15节)

孟子曰: “人之所不学而能者,其良能也; 所不虑而知者,其良知也。孩提之童, 无不知爱其亲者; 及其长也, 无不知敬其兄也。亲亲, 仁也; 敬长, 义也。无他, 达之天下也。”

  • Book 7A15 (Passage Fifteen, Part A of Book VII Jin Xin )

Mencius said, “What people are able to do without having learned it is an expression of original, good ability. What they know without having to think about it is an expression of original, good knowledge. There are no young children who do not know enough to love their parents, and there are none who, as they grow older, do not know enough to respect their older brothers. To be affectionate toward those close to one—this is humaneness. To have respect for elders—this is rightness (or righteousness). All that remains is to extend these to the entire world.” (Mencius 2009, p. 147)

  • 第七篇《尽心章句上》(第16节)

孟子曰: “舜之居深山之中, 与木石居, 与鹿豕游,其所以异于深山之野人者几希。及其闻一善言, 见一善行, 若决江河, 沛然莫之能御也。”

  • Book 7A16 (Passage Sixteen, Part A of Book VII Jin Xin )

Mencius said, “When Shun was living deep in the mountains, dwelling together with trees and rocks and wandering together with deer and swine, the difference between him and the rustic people who dwelled deep in the mountains was quite small. But when he heard a single good word or observed a single good action, it was like a river in flood or a spring flowing forth—nothing could contain it.” (Mencius 2009, p. 147)

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Yan, Lq., Ming‑hui, X. Refutational Strategies in Mencius’s Argumentative Discourse on Human Nature. Argumentation 33, 541–578 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-019-09495-x

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