Abstract
“Sophisticated” theories of welfare face two potentially devastating criticisms. They are based upon two claims: that theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants and that even if a theory of welfare is intended to apply only to adults, we might still have sufficient reason to reject it because it implies an implausible divergence between adult and neonatal welfare. It has been argued we ought reject sophisticated theories of welfare because they have significantly counterintuitive implications about neonatal welfare and because they imply an implausible divergence between the welfare of adults and that of newborns. I argue against both claims.
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Notes
Lin (2016). All references to Lin are from this article.
Desire Subjectivism (i.e. desire-satisfaction theories of welfare) is the most common form of subjectivism about welfare and, understandably, has received the most scrutiny.
Lin, 6.
As many Aristotelian Eudaimonist theories of welfare do.
This might be the kind that is relevant for, say, hedonist theories of welfare.
By inquiring whether an individual is realizing her values in her life. There are several ways in which one might understand valuing, any of which will support my arguments. Typical candidates share the idea that it is more psychologically complex and sophisticated than mere desires. So, for example, you might value x just if: you desire to desire it, you have a pro-attitude toward it with which you identify over a long period of time, it doesn’t conflict with your other attitudes about its object, you are disposed to approve of it, or you are disposed to treat it as giving you reasons to act in certain ways. See: Lewis (1989); Raibley (2010); Hubin (1996, 2003).
For an extended argument for why this is the case see Yelle (2014).
See: Dorsey (2015).
See Rosati 1996, p. 322–324.
Internalism about prudential value is not, however, without its detractors. Sarch, for example, maintains that while Rosati’s arguments in favor of internalism are some of the most thoroughly worked out in the literature, they fail. While Sarch’s arguments against internalism pose a serious challenge to it, his argument against Rosati’s “argument from autonomy” – the argument he finds to be the most viable – is his weakest. In particular, the case he offers against it – focusing on “Mark”, a troubled young man who is constituted such that he enjoys torturing animals - faces a dilemma. Either Mark’s impulses to torture animals are all-things-considered (but not intrinsically) bad for him, say, because they frustrate this desire in the long run (if, for example, he is thrown in jail). This, however, is a conclusion that a “preferentist” theory, e.g. a desire-satisfaction or value-realization, can agree with. Or, Sarch is begging the question against preferentist theories of welfare by simply assuming that they cannot be true. Sarch is assuming that Mark’s desires/values are intrinsically prudentially defective – an assertion he doesn’t argue for. Since either strategy is theoretically fraught, I believe we have no reason to discount Rosati’s argument from autonomy and the conception of internalism about prudential value based upon it – a conception my own argument draws upon. See: Sarch (2010).
Railton maintains “it does seem to me to capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him.” Railton (2004). My italics.
See Frankfurt (1988b).
Considering this contention - that for those parts of our existence in which we do not have the capacities constitutive of personhood our welfare ought to be considered qua human - one might wonder what this implies about individuals who have lost these capacities, e.g. individuals with severe dementia. Because these individuals lack the capacities constitutive of personhood I maintain that their welfare ought to be considered qua human (according to which perhaps something like hedonism might be the correct theory of welfare). Wouldn’t this imply though that dementia patients might not be doing that badly – e.g. they may be experiencing a higher proportion of pleasure over pain? Yes, but the story is more complicated. In particular, while we have the capacities constitutive of personhood we might (righty) fear future dementia because once we are afflicted with it we will no longer value those things which are currently so central to our lives. Accordingly, a dementia diagnosis is something which we might justifiably dread. That being said, when we are confronted with an individual who is suffering from dementia, we might be saddened for the preceding reasons but can still appreciate the fact that we are confronted with an individual whose welfare ought to be considered qua human and who, consequently, may not be that badly off.
According to which the perhaps hedonism or something like Kraut’s “Developmentalism”, or a similarly “Aristotelian” approach, is the correct theory of welfare for human beings who lack certain sophisticated capacities and cannot value things or have welfare beliefs, See: Kraut (2009).
Lin, 1–2.
Lin is careful to note the W could be either the actual world or a possible world because “for any world, a theory of welfare should tell us what (if anything) is basically good for you there” (Lin, 3).
Lin focuses on “Same World” Judgment and Value Subjectivism in order to focus on the theoretical problems facing these theories on their own merits, thereby eschewing additional problems faced by theories which “idealize” individuals’ desires, judgments, etc., such as those noted by Rosati (1995, 2009).
Lin, 4.
Nor does it value anything.
Lin, 5.
Lin provides a compelling argument for thinking that this type of response would not be successful (Lin, 5).
Or that dimension of our welfare that we have in virtue of belonging to the kind “persons”.
Or that dimension of our welfare that we have in virtue of belonging to the kind “human being”.
For an example of this Lin imagines an adult who did not have welfare beliefs when she was a newborn and asks “Why would some fact about her welfare beliefs be the explanation of anything’s being basically good for her now, even though no such fact explains why anything was basically good for her when she was a newborn?…Why would a test that everything that was basically good for her previously failed to pass be something that anything that is basically good for her must now pass?” (Lin, 5).
One could also say that there is a new kind to which she belongs or a new dimension according to which one can (and ought to) consider her welfare.
Lin, 6.
Say, because the right theory of human welfare is some sort of Aristotelian view.
Importantly, this is the case even if such an activity is not good for her qua human.
Well, at least two perspectives. One could also consider her welfare according to whether: her desires are being satisfied, she is perfecting her distinctively human capacities, she is experiencing a higher proportion of pleasure over pain, etc. Which perspective we should take ought to be dictated by certain pragmatic and theoretical considerations.
When her welfare could only be considered qua human.
Rawls’ “grass counter” might be a good example of this. Rawls (2005).
I.e. she experiences a great deal of pleasure and little pain.
Lin, 7.
How “thick” (i.e. sophisticated) or “thin” one’s conception of valuing is depends upon how thick or thin one’s conception of autonomy is. There is a further question, which unfortunately I do not have space to address here, of how “thick” one’s conception of valuing must be in order for a value-based theory of welfare to be normatively authoritative.
As I’ve attempted to show, a theory of welfare which focuses on our welfare qua person and captures the subjective intuition, avoids worries about alienation, etc., is better able to provide individuals with reason to follows its dictates better than an approach that considers our welfare qua human. This ensures that these theories will be normatively adequate and authoritative - that individuals to whom the theory applies have reason to follow its dictates.
See especially p. 2–4
In order to be action guiding a theory of welfare ought to recognize this and only posit goods that “fit” an individual by, for example, being something that she values or cares about.
This approach has the pragmatic benefit of allowing a theory of welfare to avoid alienation worries. For instance, if a person has the capacity to value some putative good but does not, chooses not to, does not exercise the ability to, or would not enter into this relationship if she had the opportunity to do so, then it seems wrong to maintain that this putative good “fits” her in any sort of way. Further, once an individual human gains the capacity to value things - one she possesses the capacities constitutive of personhood - the explanation of why certain things are good for her is that she values them.
It’s important to note that an individual’s evaluative makeup is not necessarily equivalent to her evaluative judgments. This is because there are many things (e.g. heightened emotional states, stress, etc.) that might prevent a person from endorsing the value of something that she otherwise stably identifies with.
This approach also helps to ensure than one’s theory of welfare will not be autonomy-violating or elitist.
Again, for a compelling account of “human flourishing” see: Kraut (2009).
See Yelle (2014).
I would like to thank Bradford Cokelet, Eden Lin, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments.
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Yelle, B. In Defense of Sophisticated Theories of Welfare. Philosophia 44, 1409–1418 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9776-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9776-x