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Zusammenfassung

In his Kurt Gödel Award 2021 essay, “The Philosophical Meaning of the Gödel Universe,” Prof. Kahle takes a fresh look at the philosophical ramifications of Gödel’s cosmology and helps clarify what Gödel’s intentions were and what the significance is of his arguments. I have several reservations, however, concerning Kahle’s discussion which will be discussed in this essay.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    John Dawson (1997, 92).

  2. 2.

    Hao Wang (1996, 88).

  3. 3.

    Solomon Feferman (1986, 13 f.).

  4. 4.

    John S. Bell (1989, 77).

  5. 5.

    Gödel (1946/9-B2, 245–246); brackets added.

  6. 6.

    Hans Reichenbach (1969).

  7. 7.

    Wang (1996, 307).

  8. 8.

    Feferman, op. cit., 14.

  9. 9.

    Manchak (2016, 1053).

  10. 10.

    Comment by the editors: Reinhard Kahle acknowledges this point and suggests that “seemingly” expresses the intended meaning of the German “scheinbar” better than the expression “apparently”. He also points out that his text contains a question mark here (“only apparent?”).

  11. 11.

    Feferman (1998, 159).

  12. 12.

    Hao Wang (1974, 9 f.).

  13. 13.

    Indeed, arguably, even Einstein failed to make that distinction. He remarked, as Gödel did, that in STR, there is no such thing as a nonrelative, global notion of simultaneity, but insisted, nevertheless (contra Gödel), that “the concepts of happening and becoming are indeed not completely suspended, but yet complicated.” (Einstein 1961, 150)

  14. 14.

    Karl Popper (1976, 129–130).

  15. 15.

    Wang (1996, 320).

  16. 16.

    Op. cit., 230.

  17. 17.

    Op. cit., 230; 257–258.

  18. 18.

    Op. cit. 230.

  19. 19.

    Comment by the editors: Reinhard Kahle acknowledges this point. In fact, the English translation might be ambiguous here and he rather meant to express that the argument seems unfounded to him.

  20. 20.

    Carlo Rovelli (1995, 82).

  21. 21.

    Op. cit., 84.

  22. 22.

    Op. cit., 86.

  23. 23.

    Op. cit., 86.

  24. 24.

    Gö95, 258, footnote 28.

  25. 25.

    Steven Savitt (1994, 468).

  26. 26.

    Manchak (2016, 1052).

  27. 27.

    Lawrence Sklar (1984, 106).

  28. 28.

    John Earman (1995,198).

  29. 29.

    Manchak (2016, 1054).

  30. 30.

    Quoted in David Malament (1976, 322).

  31. 31.

    One needs to add this caveat, since it remains a debated issue whether the becoming or lapsing of time is consistent with—even, for some, is a direct consequence of—the STR.

  32. 32.

    Manchak, op. cit., 1053. Manchak reminds us that “even late in his life, Gödel had still not given up on the possibility that we inhabit a Gödel-type model. Indeed, he would remain intensely interested in the collection of all astronomical data relevant to this possibility ...” (1052) Just how interested can be gleaned from the fact that Gödel’s biographer, John Dawson, was astonished to find in Gödel’s Nachlass two notebooks containing detailed calculations concerning the angular orientation of galaxies.

  33. 33.

    We, in turn, must be cautious here. In the context of his writings on relativity, Gödel adopted a realist perspective with regard to space-time. Fundamentally, however, we know that his primary allegiance was to Leibniz, who was an idealist with regard to space and time. Interestingly, however, Gödel’s writings on Kant far exceed his discussions of Leibniz. Indeed, “I have never attained anything definite,” Gödel said, “on the basis of reading Leibniz. Some theological and philosophical results have just been suggested [by his work]. One example is my ontological proof [of the existence of God].” (Wang 1996, 87)

  34. 34.

    Wang (1996, 235); 6; brackets added.

  35. 35.

    A subsection of Chap. 5 in Yourgrau (1999) is entitled, “Gödel’s Theorem and Gödel’s Cosmology: Mathematical Realism versus Temporal Idealism” and Chap. 7 in Yourgrau (2005) is entitled, “The Scandal of Big ‘T’ and Little ‘t’,” where big T is truth, with respect to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and little t is time, with respect to Gödel’s results on relativity.

  36. 36.

    Wang (1996, 83); brackets added.

  37. 37.

    Savitt, op. cit., 469–470.

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Yourgrau, P. (2023). Gödel’s Temporal Idealism: A Reply to Prof. Kahle. In: Passon, O., Benzmüller, C., Falkenburg, B. (eds) On Gödel and the Nonexistence of Time – Gödel und die Nichtexistenz der Zeit. Springer Spektrum, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-67045-3_5

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