Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal

  • Published:
Review of Philosophy and Psychology Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This paper addresses some of these critical responses, and distinguishes—in the process—substantive disagreements from terminological issues and other issues that are symptomatic of different research agendas. It does so by focusing specifically upon some objections made by Pierre Jacob. These epitomize the kinds of concerns that are being raised about PP at the moment, and thus facilitate a reply on behalf of PP that also applies more generally.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Our respective accounts of empathy, for example, are quite different (cf. Gallagher 2011).

  2. Slightly different versions of the account can for instance be found in de Vignemont and Singer 2006, and de Vignemont and Jacob 2010/under review.

  3. It is a slight irony that the example considered by Jacob was actually described by me as a case that more obviously exemplified sympathy than empathy (Zahavi 2008, 516). So in his attempt to show that the example involves a form of interpersonal similarity, Jacob is doing his best to undermine his own classification.

  4. For the uninitiated, a trocar is a surgical instrument with a sharply pointed and often three-sided end which is used within a cannula, and designed to be inserted into a vein, artery, bone marrow or body cavity.

  5. Just to avoid misunderstandings, when claiming that social perception is as direct as the perceptual experience of inanimate objects, the claim is not that interpersonal understanding ought to be modeled on our understanding of inanimate objects. The point is not that social perception is simply a subclass of object-perception. The claim is rather that it is a distinct form of intentionality that is as direct as object-perception.

  6. In addition, one might also opt for a disjunctive account of behavior. As Overgaard puts it, “On this account, the difference between the person who genuinely vents her anger and the person feigning anger is not that in the former case, there is the angry behaviour plus a feeling of anger, while in the latter case, there is only the behaviour (or rather, that plus an intention to deceive, say). Rather, even if the two behaviours are movement-for-movement indistinguishable to an outside spectator, they are different kinds of processes. In the one case, the visible behaviour is a person’s coming to grips with the world as infuriating; in the other it is not” (Overgaard 2012).

  7. That is also why I would object to a recent claim by Newen and Schlicht, namely that the central assertion of the Interaction-Theory defended by Gallagher and Zahavi is that in most cases—and this would include even complex mental states—we directly perceive what other people are up to (2010, 236). This is not my view. I am not denying that others can at times be very hard to figure out; I am denying that the very recognition of others as minded beings is a very challenging task, one that involves a leap from observable behavior to unobservable mental states.

  8. It would at this point have been natural to consider and discuss Gallese’s notion of embodied simulation. This is so, not only because it seeks to offer a very basic and low-level account of action and emotion understanding that relies on mirror-resonance mechanisms, and because it has recently been subjected to an influential criticism by Jacob (2008), but also because Gallese explicitly and repeatedly claims that his own account is in line with, and a further development of, the account of interpersonal understanding found in Stein, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Gallese 2001, 2003, 2005). If this were correct, it would obviously challenge the suggestion that PP constitutes a real alternative to ST. However, since I am addressing this question in a separate publication, I will not pursue it further here (cf. Zahavi 2011).

  9. Whereas it makes good sense to characterize different types of sub-personal information processing as simpler or more complex, it is harder to see an obvious application of the concept of “direct” in that domain, since all the processes will involve various degrees of mediation.

  10. It is also intriguing that Jacob in presenting his own case writes that there is nearly universal consensus “that most, if not all, of another’s psychological states and experiences are unobservable” (Jacob 2011: § 1). Why this slight hesitation on his behalf? If he is prepared to accept that a few mental states might be observable, would he then also be prepared to accept that there might some cases where direct social perception is possible?

References

  • Avramides, A. 2001. Other minds. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, M.R., and P.M.S. Hacker. 2003. Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassam, Q. 2007. The possibility of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Currie, G. 2008. Some ways to understand people. Philosophical Explorations 11: 211–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. 2001. Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • de Vignemont, F. 2010. Knowing other people’s mental states as it they were one’s own. In Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science, ed. D. Schmicking and S. Gallagher, 283–299. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • de Vignemont, F., and P. Jacob (2010/under review). What is it like to feel another’s pain?

  • de Vignemont, F., and T. Singer. 2006. The empathic brain: how, when and why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10: 435–441.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epley, N., and A. Waytz. 2009. Mind perception. In The handbook of social psychology, ed. S.T. Fiske, D.T. Gilbert, and G. Lindsay, 498–541. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs, T., and H. De Jaegher. 2009. Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(4): 465–486.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. 2005. How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition 17: 535–543.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. 2011. Empathy, simulation, and narrative. Science in context, in press.

  • Gallagher, S., and D. Zahavi. 2008. The phenomenological mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V. 2001. The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 33–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V. 2003. The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London, B 358: 517–528.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V. 2005. Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(1): 23–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallese, V., C. Keysers, and G. Rizzolatti. 2004. A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(9): 396–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A.I. 1995. Interpretation psychologized. In Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate, ed. M. Davies and T. Stone, 74–99. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A.I. 2006. Simulating minds. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gurwitsch, A. 1979. Human encounters in the social world. Trans. F. Kersten. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

  • Hatfield, E., R.L. Rapson, and Y.-C. Le. 2009. Emotional contagion and empathy. In The social neuroscience of empathy, ed. J. Decety and W. Ickes, 19–30. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herschbach, M. 2008. Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11: 223–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. 1962. Phänomenologische psychologie. Husserliana 9. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

  • Husserl, E. 1999. Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

  • Jacob, P. 2008. What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language 23(2): 190–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, P. 2011. The direct-perception model of empathy: a critique. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0065-0.

  • Jeannerod, M., and E. Pacherie. 2004. Agency, simulation, and self-identification. Mind and Language 19(2): 113–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laird, J.D. 2007. Feelings: The perception of self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lipps, T. 1907. Das Wissen von fremden Ichen. Psychologische Untersuchungen 1: 694–722.

    Google Scholar 

  • Malle, B.F. 2005. Three puzzles of mindreading. In Other minds: How humans bridge the divide between self and others, ed. B.F. Malle and S.D. Hodges, 26–43. New York: Guildford.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCulloch, G. 2003. The life of the mind: An essay on phenomenological externalism. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • McNeill, W. E. S. 2011. On seeing that someone is angry. European Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.1111/j.14680378.2010.00421.x.

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. 1963. The structure of behavior. Trans. A.L. Fisher. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964. The primacy of perception. Trans. W. Cobb. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. 2002. Phenomenology of perception. Trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge.

  • Mitchell, J.P. 2008. Contributions of functional neuroimaging to the study of social cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science 17(2): 142–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Newen, A., and T. Schlicht. 2009. Understanding other minds: A criticism of Goldman’s simulation theory and an outline of the person model theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79(1): 209–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niedenthal, P.M. 2007. Embodying emotion. Science 316(5827): 1002–1005.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Onishi, K.H., and R. Baillargeon. 2005. Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science 308(5719): 255–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Overgaard, S. 2005. Rethinking other minds: Wittgenstein and Lévinas on expression. Inquiry 48(3): 249–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Overgaard, S. 2007. Wittgenstein and other minds: Rethinking subjectivity and intersubjectivity with Wittgenstein, Levinas, and Husserl. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Overgaard, S. 2012. Other people. In Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, ed. D. Zahavi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press.

  • Ratcliffe, M. 2007. Rethinking commonsense psychology. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rudd, A. 2003. Expressing the world: Skepticism, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. Chicago: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheler, M. 1954. The nature of sympathy. Trans. P. Heath. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

  • Schutz, A. 1967. Phenomenology of the social world. Trans. G. Walsh & F. Lehnert. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  • Sinigaglia, C. 2008. Mirror neurons: This is the question. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15(10–11): 70–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. 2010. Seeing other people. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXXI(3): 731–748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spaulding, S. 2010. Embodied cognition and mindreading. Mind & Language 25(1): 119–140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stich, S., and S. Nichols. 1995. Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? In Folk psychology: The theory of mind debate, ed. M. Davies and T. Stone, 123–158. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stout, R. 2010. Seeing the anger in someone’s face. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84: 29–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, E. 2001. Empathy and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 1–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldenfels, B. 1980. Der Spielraum des Verhaltens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 1996. Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2001. Beyond empathy. Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 151–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2002. Intersubjectivity in Sartre’s Being and nothingness. Alter 10: 265–281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2005. Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2007. Expression and empathy. In Folk psychology re-assessed, ed. D.D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe, 25–40. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2008. Simulation, projection and empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17: 514–522.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2010. Empathy, embodiment and interpersonal understanding: From Lipps to Schutz. Inquiry 53(3): 285–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. 2011. Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese. In Life, subjectivity and art. Essays in honor of Rudolf Bernet, eds. R. Breeur and U. Melle. Dordrecht: Springer, in press.

  • Zahavi, D., and S. Gallagher. 2008. The (in) visibility of others: a reply to Herschbach. Philosophical Explorations 11(3): 237–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D., and S. Overgaard. 2012. Empathy without isomorphism: A phenomenological account. In Empathy: from bench to bedside, ed. J. Decety. Cambridge: MIT Press. In press.

Download references

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Galen Strawson, Pierre Jacob, Shaun Gallagher and an anonymous referee for helpful comments to an earlier version of this text.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, DK-2300, Copenhagen S, Denmark

    Dan Zahavi

Authors
  1. Dan Zahavi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dan Zahavi.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Zahavi, D. Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 541–558 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0070-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation