Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Anscombe, E. (1959): Intention, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackburn, S. (1985): ‘Supervenience Revisited’, in Essays on Quasi-realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brink, D. (1989): Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. (1992): A Neurocomputational Perspective, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1980): Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon: Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1982a): Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon: Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1982b): ‘Paradoxes of Irrationality’, in J. Hopkins and R. Wollheim (eds.), PhilosophicalEssays on Freud, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (1959): ‘Truth’, in Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, F. (1988): ‘Epistemic Obligations’, Philosophical Perspectives, 2.

  • Fine, K. (1994): ‘Essence and Modality’, Philosophical Perspectives 8.

  • Fodor, J. (1989): ‘Making Mind Matter More’, Philosophical Topics.

  • Fodor, J. (1991): ‘Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanation’, Mind.

  • Goldman, A. (1980): ‘The Internalist Conception of Justification’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy.

  • Goldman, A. (1986): Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Govier, T. (1972): ‘Variations on Force and Vivacity in Hume’, Philosophical Quarterly.

  • Heal, J. (1987–88): ‘The Disinterested Search For Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

  • Humberstone, L. (1992): ‘Direction of Fit’, Mind.

  • Hume, D. (1888): Treatise on Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. (1985): ‘Review of Sydney Shoemaker's Identity, Cause, and Mind’, Philosophical Review.

  • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Twersky, A. (1982): Judgement Under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (1984): ‘Concepts of Supervenience’, in his Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (1988): ‘What is Naturalized Epistemology?’, in Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. (1986): ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy.

  • Kripke, S. (1982):Wiittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1972): ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

  • Lewis, D. (1983): ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’, in Philosophical Papers, vol 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (1981): Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. (1981): Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J. (1985): ‘Functionalism and Anomalous Monism’, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1984): Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1986): ‘Thought Without Laws’, Philosophical Review. (Reprinted in Millikan 1993.)

  • Millikan, R. (1993): White Queen Psychology, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1974): ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Philosophical Review.

  • Nisbett R. and Ross, L. (1980): Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick, R. (1980): Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Platts, M. (1979): Ways of Meaning, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1983): ‘Why Reason Cannot be Naturalized’, in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W.V.O. (1969): ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Railton, P. (1986): ‘Moral Realism’, Philosophical Review.

  • Schueler, F. (1991): ‘Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit’, Mind.

  • Searle, J. (1964): 'How to Derive an ‘Ought’ From an ‘Is’', Philosophical Review.

  • Searle, J. (1984): Minds, Brains and Science, Harmonsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sher, G. (1987): ‘Why the Past Matters’, in Desert, Cambridge, MA: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1984a): ‘Conceptual Connections and Other Minds’, in Identity, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1984b): ‘Some Varieties of Functionalism’, in Identity, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, M. (1994): The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, P. and Jones, O.R. (1986): Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. (1987): Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennis Stampe (1987): ‘The Autonomy of Desire’, Philosophical Review.

  • Stich, S. (1989): The Fragmentation of Reason, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sturgeon, N. (1984): ‘Moral Explanations’, reprinted in Geoff Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tagore, R. (1991): Selected Short Stories, Harmonsworth: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, D. (1992): ‘The Guise of the Good’, Nous.

  • Zangwill, N. (1996a): ‘Moral Supervenience’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy.

  • Zangwill, N. (1996b): ‘Good Old Supervenience: Mental Causation on the Cheap’, Synthese.

  • Zangwill, N. (1997): ‘Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental,’ Journal of Philosophical Research.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK

    Nick Zangwill

Authors
  1. Nick Zangwill
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Zangwill, N. Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 91, 173–203 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004252526870

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004252526870

Search

Navigation