Abstract
The fundamental objective of Skepticism, as well as Stoicism and Epicureanism is rooted in practicality. This is the reason why it appears peculiar that Phyrronism is blamed for leading to an incapacity of action (apraxia). In this sense, Diogenes Laertius tells us about Pyrrhon, that he never tried to avoid barriers and dangers, because his Skepticism didn’t allow him to regard them as harmful or harmless. He sometimes escaped injury only by the courageous intervention of his students. But this is obviously only a caricature that does not do justice to Pyrrhonism. According to this view, Pyrrhonians are supposed to engage in no activity because doing otherwise would be self-contradictory. The accusation of apraxia can be raised in regard of action, which I comprehend in a Hegelian sense as a moral activity. In this essay, I will try to explicate whether it is justified to accuse Pyrrhonism of being incapable of action. In this context, I will investigate whether this assumed incapability of action will lead to incapability of action in a moral sense. In my opinion, the first accusation is easy to refute, the second, less. The second accusation will be dealt with in the second part of my essay.
