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BY 4.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter February 15, 2023

Anthropomorphic Motifs in Ancient Greek Ideas on the Origin of the Cosmos

  • Zuzana Zelinová ORCID logo EMAIL logo and František Škvrnda ORCID logo
From the journal Human Affairs

Abstract

In our article, we will focus on an analysis of the relationship between man and the cosmos, set against the backdrop of ancient Greek ideas about the origin of the world. On the one hand, we will deal with the images of the creation of the world provided in Greek mythology and the religious tradition associated with it (in particular Hesiod); on the other hand, we will approach the anthropomorphic elements within the framework of philosophical cosmogonies (Plato’s dialogue, the Timaeus). Our aim is to show that Greek philosophical thought was never able to fully relinquish this anthropomorphism but nonetheless it did move away from a purely mythological tradition (as found in Hesiod and the pre-Socratics) and, in some measure towards a more scientific interpretation of the cosmos (as found in Plato).

1 Introduction: The Cosmos Through Human Eyes

Perhaps the greatest challenge in any learning process is to eliminate the learner’s subjectivity or biases. Modern scientific thinking stresses the need to move away from the anthropocentric conception of the Universe and interpret natural phenomena and objects from the perspective of the unbiased observer. In cosmology, humans and culture act as idiosyncratic elements that cannot be reconciled with the structures and objects of the cosmos being studied. One of the aims of modern science is therefore to eliminate the subjectivity or biased perspective of the knowing subject as much as possible.

One could argue say that there has always been a tendency in philosophy to describe the origin of the world and its phenomena in human terms. The fragments that remain of the work of pre-Socratic thinkers clearly show that cosmologies were characterised in strongly normative ways that fulfilled social, political and ethical functions. According to Anaximander, the world had a precise timespan, after which everything would return to its primordial “boundless” (ἄπειρον) state. For Anaximander boundedness, in the sense of the temporal and spatial differentiation that gives objects and beings their own unique identity, represented a “transgression”, “injustice” (ἀδικία) or digression from the pancosmic order. Therefore, everything that came into being had to pay a “penalty” (δίκη) according to the ordering of time – that is, it had to perish (DK 12 B 1). We find similar anthropomorphic and sociomorphic elements in the fragments of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and many other philosophers, who were convinced that the world and the universe had a final purpose (τέλος). This purpose was knowable through reason, and the aim of philosophy was to disclose its essence and adapt the individual way of life, as well as to reform decaying social, cultural and political institutions. The idea of an all-pervading cosmic order and structure that determines the movements of the planets and stars, the overall organisation of the world, the plant and animal kingdoms, and last but not least, human societies and people’s individual lives, is the most peculiar feature of ancient cosmological thought.

In our article, we will focus on an analysis of the relationship between man and the cosmos, set against the backdrop of ancient Greek ideas about the origin of the world. On the one hand, we will deal with the images of the creation of the world provided in Greek mythology and the religious tradition associated with it (in particular Hesiod); on the other hand, we will approach the anthropomorphic elements within the framework of philosophical cosmogonies (Plato’s dialogue, the Timaeus). Our aim is to show that Greek philosophical thought was never able to fully relinquish this anthropomorphism but nonetheless it did move away from a purely mythological tradition (as found in Hesiod and the pre-Socratics) and, in some measure towards a more scientific interpretation of the cosmos (as found in Plato).

The article is divided into three main parts. In the first part, we focus on the different notions of anthropomorphism in relation to ancient Greek thinking. In the second part, we analyse elements of anthropomorphism in the mythological literary monuments of the ancient Greeks in order to compare them in the third part with the “new” philosophical thinking that countered the previous archaic tradition.

2 Anthropomorphism and the Anthropomorphic in Ancient Greek Thought

Although the word anthropomorphism is etymologically derived from ancient Greek (from ἄνθρωπος and μορφή, man and shape or form), it was not used by or even known to ancient thinkers. In general, we understand anthropomorphism to be an approach that confers human traits, forms, characteristics or actions to external natural forces and mythological beings (Agassi, 1968, pp. 87–91). Anthropomorphism features strongly in language – specifically in language metaphors as well as personifications. Most noticeable, however, is the anthropomorphism in religion. God and divine beings possess human nature and traits. Their actions are based on principles from the human realm. This tendency was characteristic in ancient Greek culture and religion. The Greek gods not only had positive human qualities, but were, so to speak, people with all their earthly vices and negative qualities.[1] As we have already stated, several researchers (Webster, 1954, p. 10 and Komornicka, 2013, p. 213) believe that one cannot talk with any certainty about anthropomorphism in ancient Greek culture – to do so would be anachronistic because such categories were not used at the time (cf. Webster, 1954).

In modern discourse, anthropomorphisation is actually a type of personification. Other types of personification[2] include, for example, animation or spiritualisation, religious-mythological personification and deification (Komornicka, 2013, p. 211). The form of personification used by Greek dramatists is also of interest. Known as pathetic fallacy, it is used to describe the environment, nature, as well as inanimate objects in terms of human experience (Copley, 1937, pp. 194–209). Homer and Hesiod, who laid the foundations of the Greek pantheon (Herodotus, Hist. II. 53. 1), did not distinguish conceptually between the divine and the human. Even the term they used to denote a person differs from that later used by Plato and Aristotle. For the epic poets, man is simply βρότεος, that is, a mortal or mortal being. The main feature distinguishing man from the Homeric gods is his mortality. The proximity between gods and people in Greek thought is evident in the genealogies of the time – historical figures often derived their origins and family tree from gods or important heroes.[3] Man was thus mirrored in the image of gods. Hence it is more accurate to say that in ancient Greek thought the use of personification was specific. Identifying personification in Greek authors, Webster (1954, p. 10) lists three qualities that define “humans”: (a) physical life and movement; (b) spiritual forces and feelings; (c) bodily appearance either in the form of a woman or a man. Webster also states that the contradictory attempt to personify objects and phenomena on the one hand and schematise them on the other was characteristic of the ancient Greeks (Webster, 1953, p. 10). The personification in Homer and the epic poets is wide-ranging – it includes inanimate objects, such as spears and shields that literally desire to kill; natural phenomena, such as the wind, heavens or sea with human traits such as, fate, death and sleep; all these phenomena have human traits and can be directly identified in the gods. In the Iliad, for example, we find that Oceanus, a natural force and anthropomorphic figure of the god-originator of all things, is a single entity (cf. Il. XIV. 200). Komornicka (2013, p. 213) states that according to the Hellenistic theory of personification, the concept of divinity in the human mind developed from ἐνέργειαι and δυνάμεια, in other words, forces. Fire, which helped humanity to survive, was elevated to the status of the god Hephaestus and sexual intercourse to Aphrodite.

These personifications played an important role in the first attempts to explain the origin and organisation of the world. In poetic cosmogonies and cosmologies, personification and anthropomorphisation appear to be key means of explaining several layers of being at once – to know the building material of the cosmos is to know God. In the following part, we will focus on the role of anthropomorphism in the first Greek cosmogonies. We will also draw on Webster’s definition of personification, or anthropomorphisation, while accentuating the specific nature of Greek thinking, in which the human and the divine are not completely separate spheres.

3 Pre-Philosophical Cosmogony, or in the Beginning Was Man

Although Homer’s epics have something to say about the nature of the world,[4] we have to wait until Hesiod’s Theogony for a coherent interpretation of the origin of the world. What role does the ancient form of anthropomorphism, or Webster’s personification, play in this work? We analyse its role from three perspectives: (a) the anthropomorphic perception of the primordial principle – Chaos; (b) the parental couple as a condition for the generation of all being; (c) the anthropomorphic deity as the peak of the entire cosmogonic process. Each of these perspectives captures different aspects of the relationship between humanity and the cosmos in the ancient mythological tradition.

For clarity’s sake, we should state that in Hesiod the theogony – the account of the origins of the gods – is actually a cosmogony, for Hesiod’s primordial deities are cosmic components (Gaia = Earth, Pontos, Okeanos = water, Uranos = air, etc.). Although Theogony tells us about the origins of the gods, the birth of the gods is an allegory for the creation of the world from these cosmic elements. For this reason, some scholars place Hesiod among the pre-Socratics – since he discusses the primordial causes (archai) in poetic language (see Konrádová, 2008, p. 72).

  1. In general, the precedent applies that in Hesiod the world (gods) emerges out of Chaos. The term is vague, though, and subject to academic debate. It can be translated in different ways. According to Luhanová, there is a sort of consensus among researchers on the etymological ties between two sets of meanings – (1) the link with the adjective χαῦνος, which denotes traits such as sparseness, delicacy or softness, and thus captures the lack of a clearly determined and defined shape or solid form; (2) the connection to the verb χάσκω, which means yawning or opening to the depths; in this sense it is used to refer to a wide-open mouth or an animal’s jaw for example, but it is typically used in connection with death in the depths of the sea or the earth. The noun chasma (χάσμα), denoting a deep chasm, is commonly associated with this verb (Luhanová, 2014, pp. 140–141). Kirk, Raven and Schofield favour the second semantic connection, and therefore the interpretation that Hesiod’s use of the term χάος is derived from the root χά, which refers to a gap or opening, i.e. not an empty space but a kind of bounded interval (cf. Kirk et al., 1994, p. 40). Therefore, according to this interpretation, Hesiod’s “in the beginning was Chaos” means that there was a gap between Heaven (Οὐρανός) and Earth (Γαῖα), and the first stage of cosmogony was the separation of Heaven from Earth. West, based on lines 736–45 and 807–14 of Theog., assigns attributes such as dark and misty to Chaos (cf. West, 1983). West’s view is that it is not a completely empty space (since it is full of fog). The prevailing interpretation is that Hesiod’s Chaos is a sort of gap or chasm[5] that formed at the beginning of the world, so it was probably some sort of primordial separation or division of the cosmic elements. It is important to note, however, that Hesiod’s Chaos is also a god[6] – and as a god, chaos is eternal and immortal. This is backed up by a later verse from Theogony, in which Hesiod’s primordial deity is placed in the underworld, in Tartarus (cf. Theog. 814). According to this verse, Chaos could easily have been imprisoned in Tartarus together with the first generation of deities (the Titans) who were imprisoned there by subsequent generations of gods after the Titanomachy. Furthermore, in the context of the poem as a whole, it makes no sense that all the other deities that emerge out of Chaos are both deities and cosmological components, whereas Chaos is not. It is therefore possible that under these circumstances the primordial principle in Hesiod was anthropomorphic in character. We can also observe anthropomorphism in the initial stage of cosmogony, as the separation of Heaven from Earth (in which Chaos represents the gap). According to Luhanová this separation occurs several times in Hesiod’s poem. The first separation could be the already mentioned separation of Earth from Heaven through Chaos in the sense of a gap. The second separation occurs during Cronus’s castration of Uranus,[7] and there is a third definitive separation of Earth from Heaven during Zeus’s reign, when he orders Atlas to firmly hold the Earth’s vault, that is, Heaven above the Earth (cf. Luhanová, 2014, pp. 232–233). This aspect of the origin of the world – an interruption in the permanent act of copulation between Gaia and Uranus – leads us to the second aspect, and thus (b) the parental couple as the condition of the generation of all being.

  2. In Hesiod’s cosmogony, Gaia and Uranus are seen as a parental couple, as soulful beings who create the subsequent generations. Despite personifying cosmic components, they have human attributes. Of the three female goddesses (Gaia, Rhea and Hera), it is Gaia that is most associated with the figure of the mother[8] – she, along with Uranus, establishes the strongest genealogical branch (cf. Konrádová, 2008, p. 80). Gaia, as mother, procreates on her own – giving birth to Uranus and Pontos[9] (cf. Theog. 127 and 133). In some cases Hesiod plays with the bodily image of woman–mother. This idea can be found in the description of the origination of Tartarus – emerging together with Gaia in the viscera, or μυχῷ χθονὸς in Greek (Theog. 119). The term μυχός, used in epic Greek to denote the place where the love union takes place, such as the matrimonial bed or even a cave and other places hidden inside the earth, is especially interesting.[10] We can therefore interpret the viscera as meaning the goddess’s sexual organ. Gaia is thus woman–procreator with all that entails. We know that Uranus possessed typical male sexual attributes as well, based on the well-known story of the castration and the genitals subsequently falling into the sea.[11] Despite being considered the bearer of life (γαῖα φερέσβιος), she jeopardises the peace and order of the world precisely because of this productive function (Bonnafé, 1984, p. 211). The most significant event endangering the cosmic order, in Hesiod its establishment is associated with the rule of Zeus, is the birth of the hundred-headed giant Typhon with its hideous voices. Typhon represents akosmia, a state of disorder, in several ways. On the one hand, through the fight between Typhon and Zeus, which represents the tendency to return the emerging the world order back to the original powers, the chthonic gods (Clay, 2003, p. 26). On the other hand, Typhon’s acosmic nature – with his cacophonous voice[12] – represents a sharp contrast to the Muses, who are specifically associated with Zeus and his world order (cf. Goslin, 2010). After Zeus masters Typhon, Gaia feels the effects of the battle and at a certain point is united with Typhon – as the giant returns to his mother’s womb (Theog. 853–868). Gaia thus helps advance the cosmogonic process – either negatively or positively – but specifically through procreation.

  3. As already noted, in Hesiod the Muses play an important role in creating order. They represent anthropomorphic divinity, which is the pinnacle of the cosmogonic process. It is from this anthropomorphic deity that the poet Hesiod receives his wisdom: he is then able to sing about the events taking place at the beginning of the world; he calls on the Muses in the introduction (Theog. 1–2) to allow him to sing of the beginning of the world and in the conclusion he again pays his respects to them before indicating the transition to a different topic (Theog. 965). Hesiod’s Muses symbolise the predestination of the world order heralded by Zeus: Zeus represents both the starting point of the interpretation and the conclusion inevitably reached by that interpretation, that is, the end state of the cosmogonic process, known from the beginning (Luhanová, 2014, p. 51). Zeus’s triumph is certain from the start, and the celebratory singing of the Muses, which reflects and completes the being of the world, begins and ends with Zeus: divine inspiration allows the poet to jump out of the present state and arrive at the very beginning of the cosmogonic process (Luhanová, 2014, p. 52). It is through the man–poet that we learn of the beginning of the world, and that is only possible because the world is the way it is, as the poet knows, because of the cosmogonic fall that leads to its creation.

4 Anima Mundi in Plato’s Dialogue the Timaeus

In several dialogues, Plato likens the universe to a living being, mainly in his later dialogues such as the Philebus,[13]Statesman[14] or Timaeus. The concept of the universe as a living being and its birth features most in the Timaeus, which is key to thinking about the cosmos, and in a sense reconstructs the mythological tradition, while building on pre-Socratic philosophy.[15] In his description of the creation of the world based on his philosophical predecessors, Plato responds to Anaxagoras in particular, who believed that reason (nous), distinguishing things, set the seeds of things in motion and arranged the world without further controlling it (Curd, 2010, pp. 143–145). But in Plato’s conception of the world the universe is an exalted living being, which keeps it in constant motion and order – thus perceived, the cosmos has its own body and soul (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή, cf. Tim. 41d). Although Plato thought the world was a living being, his conception is only marginally related to the poetic–mythological idea of the anthropomorphic creation of the world discussed in the previous sections.

Socrates’s pupil, like Hesiod, speaks of the universe, or world, as a living being (cf. Tim. 30a) or a creature with its own body (cf. e.g. Tim. 31c, 34a), with a father (the Demiurge, or divine craftsman, that is considered the father of the universe, cf. Tim. 28c). However, while the poetic tradition makes reference to anthropomorphic gods with a human body at the beginning of the world (cf. the castration of Uranus or the idea of Gaia’s female genitalia), Plato’s idea of the universe as an animal does not visually resemble the typical human body.

Now for that Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all living creatures the fitting shape will be that which comprises within itself all the shapes there are; wherefore He wrought it into a round, in the shape of a sphere, equidistant in all directions from the centre to the extremities, which of all shapes is the most perfect and the most self-similar, since He deemed that the similar is infinitely fairer than the dissimilar. And on the outside round about, it was all made smooth with great exactness, and that for many reasons. For of eyes it had no need, since outside of it there was nothing visible left over; nor yet of hearing, since neither was there anything audible; nor was there any air surrounding it which called for respiration; nor, again, did it need any organ whereby it might receive the food that entered and evacuate what remained undigested … Hands, too, He thought He ought not to attach unto it uselessly, seeing they were not required either for grasping or for repelling anyone; nor yet feet, nor any instruments of locomotion whatsoever (Tim. 33b–34a).

Plato’s universe is an animal with a body in the shape of a sphere[16] with no sensory or motor system. It is a divine cosmic creature. In Plato’s philosophy that means it is perfect and self-sufficient. One could even say that in certain places the philosopher changes the perspective (the universe as the image of man) so man becomes the image of the universe:

The divine revolutions, which are two, they bound within a sphere-shaped body, in imitation of the spherical form of the All, which body we now call the ‘head’, it being the most divine part and reigning over all the parts within us. To it the gods delivered over the whole of the body they had assembled to be its servant, having formed the notion that it should partake in all the motions which were to be (Tim. 44d).

The human soul is a less perfect reflection of the soul of the world/universe, or anima mundi.[17] It is formed of a mixture just as the soul of the world is, but the mix is slightly inferior rather than pure (Tim. 41d). The first human beings were men, whereas women resulted from the reincarnation of male souls guilty of unreasonable behaviour in a previous life (Tim. 42a–b). Unreasonable behaviour occurs after the soul is connected to the body and the purity of the soul is tested by violent emotions or snares of passion. Plato’s masculine gender preference (Tim. 42a) relates to a passage that – in our view – can be seen as a criticism of Hesiod’s notion of Mother Earth/Gaia, or as the female principle from which all other being is accumulated: “… Wherefore, let us not speak of her that is the Mother and Receptacle of this generated world …” (Tim. 51a). In general, then Plato rejects the idea there is a parental couple at the beginning of the world partly because the female progeny is probably created through the next generation of the original men[18] and partly because of his preference for the term father. He rejects the term mother (μήτηρ), while the Demiurge is the πατήρ of the universe. However, the function of the divine craftsman, the Demiurge or father, is comparable to that of Hesiod’s Muses, as he is the god who watches over the god yet to be (Tim. 34b). As in Hesiod, in Plato there is what is probably an anthropomorphic deity at the beginning of the entire cosmogonic process (referred to as the father, craftsman or creator). The difference is that the Demiurge in Plato[19] does not represent the highest stage of the order established by Zeus, as is the case with Hesiod’s Muses. However, even in Plato’s Critias, the cosmogonic process is completed by the rule of a fully anthropomorphic deity who establishes or restores order: “And Zeus, the God of gods, who reigns by Law, inasmuch as he has the gift of perceiving such things, marked how this righteous race was in evil plight, and desired to inflict punishment upon them, to the end that when chastised they might strike a truer note” (Crit. 121b).

Plato, in agreement with Hesiod, starts from the assumption that the world could not have come into being ex nihilo. Both Greek thinkers believe there was an anthropomorphic divinity at the beginning of the world – for Plato it is the Demiurge, and for Hesiod Chaos, or a married couple that gives birth to subsequent generations of gods and beings. Whereas Hesiod’s organisation of the world is the result of intercourse (in some cases self-fertilisation) between fully anthropomorphic divine beings, in Plato the world is itself a being, but because it is perfect, devoid of human properties and the characteristic parts of the body. There is no distinction between the sexes in the first stages of Plato’s cosmogenesis, primarily because he considers the female sex to be lower ranking and less perfect. At the same time, Plato inverts Hesiod’s perspective – the creation of the world fought by human figures symbolising cosmic components – and sees man and his human soul as a reflection of the beautiful arrangement of the universe.

5 Conclusion

In our study, we approach anthropomorphic motifs in ancient Greek cosmogonic thinking through the prism of Webster’s concept, in which the ancient Greek use of anthropomorphism is seen as personification. This works primarily with the three qualities that define “humans”: (a) physical life and movement; (b) spiritual forces and feelings; (c) physical appearance either in the form of a woman or a man. Are these three qualities represented equally in the poet Hesiod and the philosopher Plato? Hesiod’s primordial deities fulfil all three conditions – there is movement (e.g. the separation of Heaven from Earth), they have spiritual powers and feelings (Hesiod’s gods have all the negative and positive human traits) and, as we have shown, even the least anthropomorphised deities, such as Gaia, have female genitalia, giving them the physical appearance of either a woman or a man. But Plato’s notion of the origin of the world is more complicated than Webster’s. He does not avoid anthropomorphic motifs and refers to the Demiurge as a father and his product-universe as a living creature.

The first of Webster’s three qualities, physical life and movement, most closely resembles Plato’s view. The universe, as presented in the dialogue Timaeus, is a living thing that moves. However, it has no human feelings in the full sense of the word because, in its perfection, it has no negative human qualities or even have sensory organs that could evoke violent desires and thus become the cause of moral decay and lead to the loss of the perfect cosmic arrangement. Plato’s naturalistic thinking is closely linked with his ethical views. Thus, when describing the origin of the world, he rejects the nature and associated morality of Hesiod’s gods, which he sharply criticises in other dialogues. Plato’s world is perfectly shaped as a sphere; it does not have the physical appearance of a man or a woman.

In conclusion, we can state that the differences between Hesiod’s and Plato’s use of anthropomorphic motifs to describe the creation of the cosmos points to a gradual process of moving away from the mythological view of the world. Part of this process involves casting aside the subjectivity, which has been connected with subjectivity exhibited by observers of natural phenomena. Hence we find that ancient cosmological thinking contains an element that is characteristic of modern scientific thinking.


Corresponding author: Zuzana Zelinová, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava, Gondova 2, 811 02Bratislava, Slovakia, E-mail:

Funding source: Slovak Research and Development Agency under contract no. APVV-18-0103, Paradigmatic Changes in the Understanding of Universe and Man from Philosophical, Theological, and Physical Perspectives

  1. Research funding: This research was funded by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under contract no. APVV-18-0103: Paradigmatic Changes in the Understanding of Universe and Man from Philosophical, Theological, and Physical Perspectives.

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Received: 2022-11-21
Revised: 2023-01-04
Accepted: 2023-01-10
Published Online: 2023-02-15
Published in Print: 2023-06-27

© 2023 the author(s), published by De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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