Abstract
In this article, we explore the micro-foundations of elite politics by focusing on changes in network structures that emerge from informal conversations. Empirically, we offer a novel “situational conflict” explanation to account for the puzzle of why reformist leaders were periodically ousted during China’s reform era (1977–1992), emphasizing the unexpected power collision that catalyzed the violent crackdown on the Tiananmen movement in 1989. To do so, we employ network analysis and narrative to utilize an original dataset of elite conversations and primary sources that have only recently been made available. We find that ideological cleavage and manipulative brokerage produced each conflict to varying degrees but were contingent on the relational structure arising from elite conversational interactions. Furthermore, the actual unfolding of those conflicts often resulted from key actors’ discrepant understandings of the changing relationships via ongoing interactions at vital moments, such as during the Tiananmen movement. Integrating micro-sociological theories and network analysis, our work has methodological and theoretical implications for unpacking the black box of elite politics and its role in macro-historical change.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
All Chinese politicians in this article are indicated by family name, followed by their given name.
This echoes the reflection of Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang’s secretary: “He [Deng] went back and forth like a pendulum. Sometimes he favored the reforms, sometimes he asserted the Four Principles of Socialism. He was both a sincere supporter of the reforms and a determined defender of the things we had to reform” (Lim, 2014:162).
For example, a “Simmelian” broker caught between the conflicting demands of two adversarial but internally cohesive groups may face suspicion about their loyalties from both sides and be harmed by the brokerage role (Krackhardt, 1999).
From a more structural view, Bourdieu (2014:112-113) notably reached a similar conclusion when commenting on “network analysis” in the US: he believed “that interactions are very important, that they are often the only way in which we are able to grasp things, and that it is only by way of interactions that structures reveal themselves.
Following Gould and Fernandez, we define coordinator as an agent who coordinates members of the same group, itinerant as an outside intermediary who connects two members of another group, and gatekeeper/representative as a fellow party member that connects outsiders. Our purpose is to materialize these existing brokerage types, quantitatively and qualitatively, in the study of elite politics.
As Broćić and Silver note (2021:93–94, 97–99), social network analysis and symbolic interactionism, though both stemmed from Simmel, have become two divergent subfields with little overlaps, because they adopt contrasting social ontologies and, probably more importantly, employ different kinds of data and methods.
This kind of conversation record is not new or unique to China. In imperial China, the daily activities of emperors were compiled in volumes called Veritable Records after their death. In the Soviet Union, visits to Stalin’s office by party officials were logged in notebooks (Khlevniuk, 2009:66–71). Nevertheless, in both cases only supreme leaders had this privilege, whereas several top leaders in contemporary China received it.
There was also an unofficial, less complete chronicle for Zhao Ziyang during his Beijing years, 1980–1989 (ZZYZNHSNJS, 2005). We did not code it because it contains few records of Zhao’s conversations. There are no publicly available chronicles for two other top leaders: Hua Guofeng (who was ousted and thus did not receive this privilege) and Jiang Zemin (who passed away only recently and whose chronicles will thus be published in a few years). The lack of their data limits our network analysis for the corresponding years.
There are also two chronicles for Marshals Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, who were in their eighties during the reform era and did not participate in many key conversations. They were also far less politically salient. We thus use their records only in the narrative, rather than include these chronicles in the database.
Unedited records of conversations among major actors are arguably the best vehicles for studying the interactional nature of politics (McLean, 2007:26). However, such high-quality data are very unusual, even in democracies. Records of the conversations of Chinese leaders include basic information but not the entire transcripts, thus precluding conversation analysis (Gibson, 2012; Sacks et al., 1974).
For this research, we only included conversation participants from the Chinese Communist Party, state apparatus, and the military and excluded meetings with foreign leaders, private businessmen, scientists, artists, and ordinary citizens.
Other kinds of informal (and often “invisible”) communicative networks are also at work in elite politics. Most notably in the case of 1980s China, princelings (the children of the revolutionary elders) served as messengers for top leaders. However, evidence of such interactions is too fragmented to be integrated into quantitative network analysis. We instead make use of it in our narrative and case study.
Each of these methods will be specified when it is used in the next section.
Period I also began with the arrest of the “Gang of Four” in October 1976: the first major power struggle of the post-Mao era.
Since the conversation companions of the ‘ego’ leaders were often also top leaders, these conversations account for more than 50% of each of these focal leaders’ total conversations with all political elites.
This label corresponds to political strategies for controlling and coopting influential non-CCP groups and elites such as religious society and leaders.
Some conversations included more than one topic and therefore are coded for each.
The value we can ascribe to this importance is limited, however, by the fact that about 40% of the conversation records do not include information about topics.
Military authority alone cannot determine the result of power struggles in China. This is why Marshal Ye Jianying—Hua’s prince regent and the de facto military commander—surrendered his leadership to Deng during the Hua-Deng struggle. It is clear to almost everyone that Ye lacked the civilian power base necessary to continue in the prince regent role unless he turned the party-state into a military dictatorship.
More advanced centrality measures exist, but degree centrality has shown to be a good indicator in many empirical studies, and more advanced centrality measures have been found to follow similar qualitative behavior: for example, we used pagerank as another measure of centrality and found similar patterns (Freeman, 1978). Betweenness does not work here because the top leaders all interacted with each other to some extent in a dynamic communicative network.
It is possible that Deng—a robust actor—deliberately kept “silent” (and thus ambiguous) to maximize his scope of actions during crises such as the Tiananmen movement. To adjudicate the rival explanations, we will offer fine-grained narrative and interpretations of this case.
Conversation intensity measures the number of conversations between two actors compared to what would be expected as random under a weighted configuration model (Newman, 2010). It is positive if two actors interact more often than what would be expected when the conversation network is a random network, and negative if two actors interact less frequently.
According to Zhao Ziyang’s memoir, “Deng then asked [another elder] Bo Yibo to mediate with these elders. It wasn’t easy at first. It was not until July 3 that Chen Yun expressed his consent to Bo Yibo, saying that he would follow the arrangements made by the Party. Once Chen Yun conceded, the others were easier to persuade” (Zhao, 2009:209). Bo’s itinerant role boosted his own power: “he continued to overreach. He often asked the Director of Organization [Song Ping] to report to him” (Zhao, 2009:212).
We apply the Louvain method to calculate the maximal modularity of the corresponding communities in each period. Formally, modularity is defined as \(\frac{1}{2M}{\sum }\left({A}_{ij}-{d}_{i}{d}_{j}/2M\right)\sigma \left({c}_{i}, {c}_{j}\right)\) where \({c}_{i}\) (\({c}_{j}\)) is the community to which actor i (j) belongs and \(\sigma \left({c}_{i}, {c}_{j}\right)=1\) if \({c}_{i}={c}_{j}\); otherwise, \(\sigma \left({c}_{i}, {c}_{j}\right)=0\). \({d}_{i}\) (\({d}_{j}\)) is the sum of the edge weights attached to actor i (j). M is the sum of all edge weights in the graph.
Notably, centrality and modularity are complementary rather than completely independent measures of the network. As the conversation network became more modularized (i.e., showed high modularity), it was rarer to have highly connected actors linking communities.
Due to his ouster, Hua Guofeng’s full conversational records have not been compiled for publication.
Chen Yun had far fewer conversations than Deng and the lowest normalized degree centrality (≈0.05), mainly because he did not return to the power center until December 1978 and was hospitalized for several months until March 1980 (CYZ, 2005:1593, 1601–5). Therefore, there is a discrepancy between network analysis and narrative, or between Chen’s nominal power and real power.
Zhao preferred a moderate, realistic strategy, while Hu advocated a radical reform policy, which annoyed Zhao in 1982–1983. In a letter to Deng and Chen in May 1984, Zhao implied that this was a major issue (ZZYWJ, 2016, vol. 2:406–407). This letter has been regarded by both Hu’s allies and rivals as Zhao’s ambush of Hu Yaobang (Ruan, 1992:188–189; Wu, 1995:210; Deng, 2006; Lu, 2019:993).
In 1986, students began to protest in mid-December. College students demonstrated on Tiananmen Square on January 1st and 2nd, 1987. General Secretary Hu Yaobang submitted a resignation letter on January 2.
For example, four of Li’s nine letters to Jiang underscored the significance of ideological “purity.”.
At that time, both Deng and Chen were in Shanghai, but they did not meet, signaling their estrangement.
The unexpected loser in this power struggle was Yang Shangkun, Deng’s right-hand man. Deng removed the Yang brothers and their associates to consolidate Jiang’s authority and his own position in the army (Baum, 1994:369–70). According to the published records, Deng and Yang never had another private conversation afterwards. Yang lost his power once he was no longer Deng’s gatekeeper/representative.
We chose the two also because, among top leaders, only Zhao and Li offered detailed narratives about the major events of the Tiananmen movement in their autobiographies or diaries.
Later the same day, Li Peng also received a phone call from Chen Yun’s secretary on behalf of Chen (Li, 2010:84).
For example, Zhao Ziyang’s Chief of Staff Bao Tong offered his interpretation in an interview: “Deng used the students as a tool to oust his designated successor. … the gradual escalation of tensions between the Communist leadership and the students may not have been due to mishandling by a divide party, but part of a deliberate strategy [of Deng]” (Lim, 2014:172).
For example, Zhao’s major associate, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, later considered Zhao’s visit to North Korea a “grave and deadly mistake” (Lu, 2019:1170–71).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Zhao and his adviser Bao Tong knew of the students’ plan to hunger strike on May 12th and acquiesced to it (Lu, 2019:1219).
Two months later Gorbachev also told the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, that he “thought that there was some deep meaning behind this” remark (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 2010).
References
Bao, T. (2012). Bao Tong Answers 100 Questions from Zhang Weiguo. The Bao Tong Collection (Bao Tong Wenji). The 21st Century Foundation.
Baum, R. (1994). Burying Mao: Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton University Press.
Bearman, P. (1993). Relations into rhetorics: Local elite social structure in Norfolk, England, 1540–1640. Rutgers University Press.
Bearman, P., & Parigi, P. (2004). Cloning headless frogs and other important matters: Conversation topics and network structure. Social Forces, 83(2), 535–557.
Bothner, M. S., Smith, E. B., & White, H. C. (2010). A model of robust positions in social networks. American Journal of Sociology, 116(3), 943–992.
Bourdieu, P. (2004). From the king’s house to the reason of state: A model of the genesis of the bureaucratic field. Constellations, 11(1), 16–36.
Bourdieu, P. (2014). On the state: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989-1992. Polity Press.
Bro, N. (2023). The structure of political conflict. The Oligarchs and the Bourgeoisie in the Chilean Congress, 1834–1894. Theory and Society, 52(3), 353-386.
Broćić, M., & Silver, D. (2021). The influence of Simmel on American sociology since 1975. Annual Review of Sociology, 47, 87–108.
Brook, T. (1998). Quelling the people: The military suppression of the beijing democracy movement. Stanford University Press.
Brown, J. (2021). June fourth: The Tiananmen protests and Beijing massacre of 1989. Cambridge University Press.
Brownlee, J. (2007). Hereditary succession in modern autocracies. World Politics, 59(4), 595–628.
Burt, R. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Harvard University Press.
Burt, R. S. (2002). Bridge decay. Social Networks, 24(4), 333–363.
Chan, A. L., & Nathan, A. J. (2004). The Tiananmen papers revisited. The China Quarterly, 177, 190–214.
Chen, Y. (2013). The memoirs of Chen Yizi (Chen Yizi Huiyi Lu). New Century Press.
Chen, X. (2016). The history of the 1989 Tiananmen square protests (Bajiu Minyun Shi) (Vol. 3). CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Chung, Y.-L. (2019). The ousting of general secretary Hu Yaobang. China Review, 19(1), 89–122.
Collins, R. (1981). On the microfoundations of macrosociology. American Journal of Sociology, 86(5), 984–1014.
CXTQS. (2012). Conversations with Chen Xitong (Chen Xitong Qinshu), edited by Yao Jianfu. New Century Press.
CYNP. (2012). The Chronicle of Chen Yun (Chen Yun Nianpu). Central Party Literature Press.
CYZ. (2005). The biography of Chen Yun (Chen Yun Zhuan), edited by Jin Chongji and Chen Qun. Central Party Literature Press.
Deng, X. (1993). Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan) (Vol. 3). The People’s Press.
Deng, L. (2006). The recollection of Deng Liqun: Twelve years (Deng Liqun Zishu: Shier Ge Chunqiu, 1975–1987). Dafeng Press.
Dittmer, L., & Yu-Shan, Wu. (1995). The modernization of factionalism in Chinese politics. World Politics, 47(4), 467–494.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Harper & Row.
Du, D. (2010). Du Daozheng diaries: What else did Zhao Ziyang say? (Du Daozheng Riji: Zhao Ziyang hai shuoguo shenme). Tiandi Books.
DXPNP. (2004). The Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1997 (Deng Xiaoping Nianpu, 1975-1997), edited by Len Rong. Central Party Literature Press.
Elias, N. (1982). The Civilizing Process, translated by Edmund Jephcott, vol 2. Blackwell.
Elias, N. (1983). The court society. Blackwell.
Emirbayer, M., & Goodwin, J. (1994). Network analysis, culture, and the problem of agency. American Journal of Sociology, 99(6), 1411–1454.
Erikson, E. (2013). Formalist and relationalist theory in social network analysis. Sociological Theory, 31(3), 219–242.
Erikson, E., & Occhiuto, N. (2017). Social networks and macrosocial change. Annual Review of Sociology, 43(1), 229–248.
Ermakoff, I. (2015). The structure of contingency. American Journal of Sociology, 121(1), 64–125.
Fang, W. (2004). Moving forward amid storms: The chronicles of China’s development and reform, 1977–1989 (Zai Fenglang Zhong Qianjin: Zhongguo Fazhan yu Gaige Biannian Jishi, 1977–1989), 12 volumes. Unpublished source.
Fewsmith, J. (1994). Dilemmas of reform in China: Political conflict and economic debate. ME Sharpe.
Fine, G. A., & Kleinman, S. (1983). Network and meaning: An interactionist approach to structure. Symbolic Interaction, 6(1), 97–110.
Freeman, L. C. (1978). Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification. Social Networks, 1(3), 215–239.
Fuhse, J. (2022). Social networks of meaning and communication. Oxford University Press.
Gewirtz, J. (2022). Never turn back: China and the forbidden history of the 1980s. Harvard University Press.
Gibson, D. R. (2005). Taking turns and talking ties: Networks and conversational interaction. American Journal of Sociology, 110(6), 1562–1597.
Gibson, D. R. (2012). Talk at the brink: Deliberation and decision during the Cuban missile crisis. Princeton University Press.
Goffman, E. (1969). Strategic interaction. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Goffman, E. (1983). The interaction order: American sociological association, 1982 presidential address. American Sociological Review, 48(1), 1–17.
Gould, R. V. (1989). Power and social structure in community elites. Social Forces, 68(2), 531–552.
Gould, R. V. (2003). Collision of wills: How ambiguity about social rank breeds conflict. University of Chicago Press.
Gould, R. V., & Fernandez, R. M. (1989). Structures of mediation: A formal approach to brokerage in transaction networks. Sociological Methodology, 19, 89–126.
Guo, X. (2019). The politics of the core leader in China: Culture, institution, legitimacy, and power. Cambridge University Press.
Hall, P. M. (1972). A symbolic interactionist analysis of politics. Sociological Inquiry, 42(3–4), 35–75.
Hillmann, H. (2008). Mediation in multiple networks: Elite mobilization before the English civil war. American Sociological Review, 73(3), 426–454.
Hinde, R. (1976). Interactions, relationships and social structure. Man, 11, 1–17.
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. (1995). Excerpts from Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Zhao Ziyang, May 16, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i Reformy, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti), 441–445. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119290
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. (1999). National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 18 May 1989, May 18, 1989, Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency. Document #0000258715. Contributed by Mark Kramer. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209589
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. (2010). Excerpts from the Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi, July 15, 1989, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Moscow: Ves’ Mir, pp. 255–264. Translated by Sergey Radchenko http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119291
Huang, J. (2000). Factionalism in Chinese communist politics. Cambridge University Press.
HYBNPZLCB. (2005). Materials for a chronological record of Hu Yao Bang life (Hu Yaobang Nianpu Ziliao Changbian), edited by Zheng Zhongbing. Shidai Guoji Press Inc.
HYBSXNP. (2007). A chronicle of Hu Yaobang’s thoughts (Hu Yaobang Sixiang Nianpu). Tidetime Publishing Limited.
Khlevniuk, O. V. (2009). Master of the house: Stalin and his inner circle. Yale University Press.
Knoke, D. (1994). Political networks: The structural perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Krackhardt, D. (1999). The ties that torture: Simmelian Tie analysis in organizations. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 16(1), 183–210.
Kuhn, R. L. (2004). Man who changed China: The life and legacy of Jiang Zemin. Crown Publishers.
Lachmann, R. (1997). Agents of revolution: Elite conflicts and mass mobilization from the Medici to Yeltsin. In J. Foran (Ed.), Theorizing revolutions. Routledge.
Lachmann, R. (2000). Capitalists in spite of themselves: Elite conflict and economic transitions in early modern Europe. Oxford University Press.
Leifer, E. M. (1983). Robust action: Generating joint outcomes in social relationships. Unpublished PhD dissertation. Harvard University.
Leifer, E. M. (1988). Interaction preludes to role setting: Exploratory local action. American Journal of Sociology, 53(6), 865–878.
Li, P. (2007). Li Peng’s diaries on economy: Market and regulation (Li Peng Jingji Riji: Shichang yu Diaokong). Xinhua Press.
Li, P. (2010). The critical moment: Li Peng diaries (Li Peng Liusi Riji). Aoya Press.
Li, R. (2019). Li Rui papers. Hoover Institution Library & Archives.
Lim, L. (2014). The people’s republic of amnesia: Tiananmen revisited. Oxford University Press.
Li-Ogawa, H. (2022). Hua Guofeng and China’s transformation in the early years of the Post-Mao era. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 11(1), 124-142.
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Free Press.
Lu, C. (2006). Diaries on the June fourth movement (Liusi Neibu Riji). Excellent Culture Press.
Lu, Y. (2019). A biography of Zhao Ziyang: The life of an aborted reformer (Zhao Ziyang Zhuan: Yige Shibai Gaige Jia de Yisheng). INK Literary Monthly Publishing Co., Ltd.
LXNNP. (2011). The chronicle of Li Xiannian (Li Xiannian Nianpu). Central Party Literature Press.
Markoff, J. (1997). Peasants help destroy an old regime and defy a new one: Some lessons from (and for) the study of social movements. American Journal of Sociology, 102(4), 1113–1142.
Marx, K. (1978). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx-Engels reader (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton & Company.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge University Press.
McLean, P. D. (2004). Widening access while tightening control: Office-holding, marriages, and elite consolidation in early modern Poland. Theory and Society, 33(2), 167–212.
McLean, P. D. (2007). The art of the network: Strategic interaction and patronage in renaissance Florence. Duke University Press.
McLean, P. D. (2011). Patrimonialism, elite networks, and reform in late eighteenth century Poland. Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science, 636, 88–110.
Mische, A. (2011). Relational sociology, culture, and agency. In J. Scott & J. Peter (Eds.), The Sage handbook of social network analysis (pp. 80–97). Sage.
Mizruchi, M. S., & Potts, B. B. (1998). Centrality and power revisited: Actor success in group decision making. Social Networks, 20(4), 353–387.
Moody, J. (2004). The structure of a social science collaboration network: Disciplinary cohesion from 1963 to 1999. American Sociological Review, 69(2), 213–238.
Nathan, A. J., & Tsai, K. S. (1995). Factionalism: A new institutionalist restatement. China Journal, 34, 157–192.
Naughton, B. (1995). Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform 1978–1993. Cambridge University Press.
Newman, M. (2006). Modularity and community structure in networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 103(23), 8577–8696.
Newman, M. (2010). Networks: An introduction. Oxford University Press.
Obstfeld, D., Borgatti, S. P., & Davis, J. (2014). Brokerage as a process: Decoupling third party action from social network structure. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 40, 135–159.
Padgett, J. F. (2012). The politics of communist economic reform: Soviet Union and China. In J. F. Padgett & W. W. Powell (Eds.), The emergence of organizations and markets (pp. 271–315). Princeton University Press.
Padgett, J. F., & Ansell, C. (1993). Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), 1259–1319.
Padgett, J. F., & McLean, P. D. (2006). Organizational invention and elite transformation: The Birth of partnership systems in renaissance Florence. American Journal of Sociology, 111(5), 1463–1568.
Padgett, J. F. (2011). Triangulating on Causal Process. Pp. 466–70, in James H. Fowler, Michael T. Heaney, David W. Nickerson, John F. Padgett, and Betsy Sinclair, “Causality in Political Networks.” American Politics Research, 39, 437–80.
Pantsov, A. V., & Levine, S. I. (2015). Deng Xiaoping: A revolutionary life. Oxford University Press.
Parigi, P., & Bergemann, P. (2016). Strange bedfellows: Informal relationships and political preference formation within boardinghouses, 1825–1841. American Journal of Sociology, 122(2), 501–531.
Pfaff, S. (2006). Exit-voice dynamics and the collapse of East Germany. Duke University Press.
PZNP. (2012). The chronicle of Peng Zhen (Peng Zhen Nianpu). Central Party Literature Press.
Quintane, E., & Carnabuci, G. (2016). How do brokers broker? Tertius Gaudens, Tertius Iungens, and the temporality of structural holes. Organization Science, 27(6), 1343–1360.
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50, 696–735.
Schoots, J., et al. (2020). Conflict and revolt in the name of unity: Florentine factions in the Consulte e Pratiche on the Cusp of the Ciompi Revolt. Poetics, 78, 101386.
Sewell, W. H., Jr. (1996). Historical events as transformations of structures: Inventing revolution at the Bastille. Theory and Society, 25(6), 841–881.
Shirk, S. L. (1993). The political logic of economic reform in China. University of California Press.
Simmel, G. (1950). The sociology of Georg Simmel. Free Press.
Slez, A., & Martin, J. L. (2007). Political action and party formation in the United States Constitutional Convention. American Sociological Review, 72(1), 42–67.
Spiro, E. S., Acton, R. M., & Butts, C. T. (2013). Extended structures of mediation: Re-examining brokerage in dynamic networks. Social Networks, 35(1), 130–143.
Stovel, K., & Shaw, L. (2012). Brokerage. Annual Review of Sociology, 38, 139–158.
Su, Y. (2023). Deadly decision in Beijing: Succession politics, protest repression, and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. Cambridge University Press.
Tavory, I., & Fine, G. A. (2020). Disruption and the theory of the interaction order. Theory and Society, 49(3), 365–385.
Teiwes, F. C., & Sun, W. (2007). The end of the Maoist era: Chinese politics during the twilight of the cultural revolution, 1972–1976. ME Sharpe.
Teiwes, F. C., & Sun, W. (2016). Paradoxes of Post-Mao rural reform: Initial steps toward a new Chinese countryside, 1976–1981. Routledge.
The Last Secret. (2019). The last secret: The final documents from the June fourth crackdown (Zuihou de Mimi: Zhonggong Shisan Jie Sizhong Quanhui Liusi Jielun Wendang). New Century Press.
Tilly, C. (1995). To explain political processes. American Journal of Sociology, 100(6), 1594–1610.
Torigian, J. (2022). Prestige, manipulation, and coercion: Elite power struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao. Yale University Press.
Tsou, T. (1995). Chinese politics at the top: Factionalism or informal politics? Balance-of-power politics or a game to win all? The China Journal, 34, 95–156.
Vogel, E. F. (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China. Harvard University Press.
Weber, M. (1958). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Oxford University Press.
Weber, I. M. (2021). How China escaped shock therapy: The market reform debate. Routledge.
Wu, J. (1995). The Ten-Year Road: The Days with Hu Yaobang (Shinian de Lu: He Hu Yaobang Xianchu de Rizi). Jingbao Wenhua Qiye Inc.
Wu, G. (2015). China’s party congress: Power, legitimacy, and institutional manipulation. Cambridge University Press.
Wu, W. (2013). The frontstage and backstage of China’s political reform in the 1980s (Zhongguo Bashi Niandai Zhengzhi Gaige de Taiqian Muhou). Xinshiji Press.
Wu, R. (2019). A full record of the June fourth incident (Liusi Shijian Quancheng Shilu). Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi.
Xiao, D. (2019). The pathbreaking battle: The economic reform in China, 1978-1992 (Tanlu Zhiyi: 1978-1992 nian de Zhongguo Jingji Gaige). Sheke Wenxian Chubanshe.
Xu, J. (1993). Xu Jiatun’s recollection of the Hong Kong Years (Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyilu). Linking Publishing.
Xu, X. (2013). Belonging before believing: Group ethos and bloc recruitment in the making of Chinese communism. American Sociological Review, 78(5), 773–796.
XXQNP. (2016). The chronicle of Xu Xiangqian (Xu Xiangqian Nianpu). Jiefangjun Press.
Yang, J. (2004). The political conflicts during China’s reform Era (Zhongguo Gaige Niandai de Zhengzhi Douzheng). Excellent Culture Press.
YJYNP. (2007). The Chronicle of Ye Jianying (Ye Jianying Nianpu, 1897-1986), edited by Zhou Jixian. Central Party Literature Press.
Zhang, Y. (2021). Why elites rebel: Elite insurrections during the Taiping civil war in China. American Journal of Sociology, 127(1), 60–101.
Zhang, L. (2001). The Tiananmen Papers. Edited by Andrew J. Nathan, and Perry Link. Little, Brown and Company.
Zhang, W. (2009). The Big Bang of History: A Full Record of the June Fourth Incident (Lishi de Dabaozha: Liusi Shijian Quanjing Shilu). Tiandi Books.
Zhao, D. (2001). The power of Tiananmen: State-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement. University of Chicago Press.
Zhao, Z. (2009). Prisoner of the state: The secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang. Simon & Schuster.
Zong, F. (2007). Zhao Ziyang: Captive conversations (Zhao Ziyang Ruanjin zhong de Tanhua). Open Books.
ZZYWJ. (2016). Collected Works of Zhao Ziyang, 1980–1989 (Zhao Ziyang Wenji, 1980–1989), 4 volumes. Chinese University Press.
ZZYZNHSNJS. (2005). A record of Zhao Ziyang’s ten years at Zhongnanhai (Zhao Ziyang Zhongnanhai Shinian Jishi), edited by Zhang Xianyang and Shi Yijun. Manuscript, Harvard Yenching Library.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for the valuable insights provided by the anonymous reviewers and the editors of Theory and Society. We also thank Adam Auerbach, Elisabeth Clemens, Keith Darden, Shizheng Feng, Marco Garrido, Randall Henning, Yue Hou, Hofung Hung, Shilin Jia, Miles Kahler, Richard Lachmann, Aliza Luft, John Levi Martin, John Padgett, Simone Polillo, Benjamin Rohr, Cathy Schneider, Simon Shachter, Adam Slez, Yang Su, Jordan Tama, Matthew Taylor, Juan Wang, Yingyao Wang, Yan Xu, Joe Young, Han Zhang, Yongjun Zhang, Dingxin Zhao, Xueguang Zhou, and Yuhao Zhuang, who have commented on early drafts of our article. In addition, we have received helpful feedback when we presented our paper at the Social Science History Association Annual Meeting, the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, and workshops at the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Chicago, George Washington University, the University of Virginia, Duke Kunshan University, and American University.
Funding
This research was sponsored by Dean’s Summer Research Awards from the School of International Service in American University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Zhang, Y., Shi, F. The micro-foundations of elite politics: conversation networks and elite conflict during China’s reform era. Theor Soc 53, 193–237 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-023-09530-7
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-023-09530-7