A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

Xingfei Zheng

doi:10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20210501

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A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action

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A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action
Peking University Beijing 100091
Issue 1, Pages: 58-74(2021)
DOI：10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20210501

Full txt

Xingfei Zheng. A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action. [J]. Critical Theory (1):58-74(2021)
DOI：

Xingfei Zheng. A New Kind of Action Explanation and The Life of Complex Action. [J]. Critical Theory (1):58-74(2021) DOI： 10.47297/wspjhcWSP2515-469904.20210501.

摘要

Abstract

Ordinary action explanation formulated as "I am doing A because I am doing B" is explanation of an action in terms of another action-in-progress. According to Michael Thompson

the explained action is a teleological part of the explaining complex action

which is composed of different parts. Thompson's analysis focuses on the part-whole relation between the explained action and the explaining action

thus ignores a possibility: these two actions can be two different parts of a complex action. I shall argue that the interrelation between different parts of a complex action corresponds to a new kind of action explanation of the formulas: "I am doing A because I am doing B" and "I am doing B because I have done A"

where A and B are two different parts of a complex action. This kind of action explanation is associated with the temporal schema of an action-type

for example

X: First

do A; second

do B; then

C; finally

D. This is an attempt to probe into the inner structure of complex action.

关键词

Keywords

Complex actionAction explanationPart-part relationTemporal schema

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