Towards Self-divided Subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological- Ontological Theory of Intersubjectivity

Liu Zhe

Abstract

Merleau-Ponty articulates the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of “the transcendence in the immanence” that involves a sort of unification of presence and de-presentation of the self, taking place at once. In the Phenomenology of Perception, the early Merleau-Ponty insists on a peculiar form of “lived solipsism” which regards the embodied selfhood of transcendental subjectivity as the ultimate condition for the existence of the other and the intersubjective experience. His later turn to the primary fusion of self and other may well be interpreted as an implicit self-criticism with respect to the non-compromised alterity of the other. In this paper, I will draw on both his Phenomenology of Perception and his Sorbonne lecture “The Child’s Relations with Others” to argue that Merleau- Ponty’s radicalized form of the alterity of the other results in an innovative notion of self-divided subjectivity.

Towards Self-divided Subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological- Ontological Theory of Intersubjectivity

From the book Empathy, Intersubjectivity, and the Social World

Abstract

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