Abstract
The ancient question of what a good life consists in is currently the focus of intense debate. There are two aspects to this debate: the first concerns how the concept of a good life is to be understood; the second concerns what kinds of life fall within the extension of this concept. In this paper, I will attend only to the first, conceptual aspect and not to the second, substantive aspect. More precisely, I will address the preliminary, underlying question of how to understand what it is in general for something to be good for someone, from which an understanding of the more particular concept of a good life may be derived.
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Notes
We sometimes talk of what is good for things other than persons − for example, of what is good, not for Alfred, but for his lawn mower or his apple tree (cf. Thomson (1997), p. 276). I will not be concerned with any such goodness-for here.
Cf. Hurka (1987), p. 73.
Cf. Thomson (1992), p. 97.
Cf. Hurka (1987), p. 72.
Cf. Moore (1903), pp. 98–99 ((1993), p. 150).
I will not be concerned with the distinction between what words mean and what people mean by the use of words. For simplicity, I will assume (too liberally) that any use of words is correct, so that words always mean what people mean by them.
The term “good simpliciter,” though common, is not particularly apt, since it may suggest what Thomson (2001), p. 19, calls “just plain, pure good[ness].” This is not what I mean by “good simpliciter.” All that I mean is that sort of impersonal goodness, i.e., a sort of goodness that is not a kind of goodness-for, that preoccupied Moore. (Even this remark may need to be qualified. See n. 21 below and the passage to which it is appended.) Note, further, that it is controversial whether the sort of impersonal goodness that preoccupied Moore must in every case supervene on and only on its bearers’ intrinsic properties. I will nonetheless continue to use the term “intrinsic goodness” and related terms, as Moore does, to refer to the sort of value in question. In so doing, I do not intend to be taking a stand on the supervenience thesis in question.
Darwall (2002), p. 11. Of course, this argument is hardly conclusive, since someone who is inclined to accept a naturalistic account of goodness-for might either dispute the claim that, under the circumstances, the disagreement about whether x is good for P is in fact coherent or hold that it is coherent but insist that the disagreement concerns only those non-normative facts other than the fact that x is good for P. I won’t pursue this question here.
In saying that Q’s happiness is impersonally good, I do not of course mean to deny that it might also be (personally) good for Q, but only that it is (personally) good for P. My denying that Q’s happiness is good for P may seem to commit me to a position on the sort of substantive questions that, in my opening paragraph, I said I would leave aside. However, I don’t want to insist that the denial is correct, but only that it is plausible. I take it that the analysis of a concept should be compatible with all plausible accounts of what falls within the extension of that concept.
Cf. Ewing (1948), p. 152.
Cf. Hurka (1987), p. 71.
More cautiously: I think that (9*) is probably acceptable, if we should be buck-passers about goodness-for. I’m not sure that we should be. There is some attraction to saying that P has a prudential reason to favor x because x is good for him. Such a priority of goodness-for over prudential reasons would vitiate (9*). Even so, it might still be true that, necessarily, x is good for P iff P has a prudential reason to favor x.
There may be moral reasons to favor something, x, even if x is not intrinsically good, or at least reasons to favor x that are independent of the fact that x is intrinsically good. Cf. Ross (1930)/(2002), p. 27, on prima facie duties that do not fall under the general duty to promote intrinsic value. Another issue here is the “wrong kind of reason” problem. Cf. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004).
Cf. n. 20 above.
This question is addressed in Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007), pp. 431ff. At one point (p. 433), Rønnow-Rasmussen entertains the idea that the reason in question may not be a moral one, but he makes no suggestion regarding what kind of non-moral reason may be at stake.
Darwall (2002), passim. Darwall’s particular version of the analysis is this (p. 8): “[W]hat it is for something to be good for someone just is for it to be something one should desire for him for his sake, that is, insofar as one cares for him.” It’s hard to know just what “insofar as” should be taken to mean here. It cannot be equivalent to the “if” of the material conditional, since then the failure to care for P would suffice for everything’s being good for P. Perhaps what is intended is the “if” of the strict conditional.
If a good life is taken to be one that is absolutely good, rather than merely relatively good, for the person whose life it is, then we must of course understand the pertinent notion of benefit in absolute, non-comparative terms (that is, in terms of a contribution to positive welfare) and not in merely relative, comparative terms (that is, in terms of an improvement in welfare).
I am here using “state” broadly, to cover occurrences of all sorts, even those that might best be construed as events or processes.
Cf. Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007), pp. 414, 415.
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks for helpful comments from Jonathan Dancy and also from members of the audience at the ECAP workshop on values in Krakow in August, 2008, including Johan Brännmark, Yuval Eylon, Christoph Lumer, Jonas Olson, Christian Piller, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Andrew Reisner, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, and Howard Sobel.
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Zimmerman, M.J. Understanding What’s Good for Us. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 429–439 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9184-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9184-4