Skip to main content
Log in

Relational selves, personal autonomy and oppression

  • Discussion
  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Addelson, Kathryn Pyne: 1994.Moral Passages, New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baier, Annette. 1985. Cartesian Persons. In herPostures of the Mind: Essays on Minds and Morals, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartky, Sandra. 1979. On Psychological Oppression. InPhilosophy and Women, eds. S. Bishop and M. Weinzweig. Belmont: Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benn, Stanley. 1976. Freedom, Autonomy and the Concept of a Person. InProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66: 109–30.

  • Butler, Judith. 1990.Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity, New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Card, Claudia. 1990. Caring and Evil,Hypatia 5: 101–08.

    Google Scholar 

  • Code, Lorraine. 1987. Second Persons. InScience, Morality, and Feminist Theory, eds. M. Hanen and K. Nielsen, Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dillon, Robin. 1994. Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect,Hypatia 7: 52–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dillon, Robin. 1997. Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political,Ethics 107: 226–249.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, Gerald. 1981. The Concept of Autonomy. InScience And Ethics, ed. R. Haller, New York: Rodopi Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinberg, Joel. 1980.Rights, Justice, And The Bounds Of Liberty, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinberg, Joel. 1989. Autonomy. InThe Inner Citadel, ed. J. Christman, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Marilyn. 1986. Autonomy and the Split-level Self,Southern Journal of Philosophy 24: 19–35.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Marilyn. 1989. Self-Rule in a Social Context: Autonomy from a Feminist Perspective. InFreedom, Equality, and Social Change, eds. J. Sterba and C. Peden. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, Marilyn. 1993.What Are Friends For? Ithaca: Comell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gatens, Moira. 1966.Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan, Carol. 1982.In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grimshaw, Jean. 1988.Feminist Philosophers: Women's Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Held, Virginia. 1987. Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View. InScience, Morality, and Feminist Theory, eds. M. Hanen and K. Nielsen, Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Held, Virginia. 1993.Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyers, Diana. 1989.Self, Society, and Personal Choice, New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noddings, Nel. 1984.Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noddings, Nel. 1990. A Response,Hypatia 5: 120–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noddings, Nel. 1993. Ethics from the Standpoint of Women. InWomen and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy, ed. M. Pearsall, Belmont: Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rich, Adrienne. 1986. Split at the Root: An Essay on Jewish Identity. InBlood, Bread, and Poetry, New York: W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thalberg, Irving. 1978. Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8: 211–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tormey, Judith. 1976. Exploitation, Oppression and Self-sacrifice. InWomen And Philosophy, eds. C. Gould and M. Wartofsky. New York: Pedigree Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walker, Margret Urban. 1998.Moral Understandings, New York & London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, Gary. 1989. Free Agency. InThe Inner Citadel, ed., J. Christman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitbeck, Caroline. 1989. A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology. InWomen, Knowledge and Reality, eds. A. Gary and M. Pearsall, London: Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958.Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolgast, Elizabeth. 1999. Personal Identity,Philosophical Investigations 22: 297–311.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, Robert. 1980. Autonomy and the “Inner Self”,American Philosophical Quarterly 17: 35–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, Robert. 1986.Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative And Positive Liberty, London: Croom Helm.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Zutlevics, T.L. Relational selves, personal autonomy and oppression. Philosophia 29, 423–436 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379922

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379922

Keywords

Navigation