Analytic philosophy has become the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. This book illuminates that tradition through a historical examination of a crucial period in its formation: the rejection of Idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the subsequent development of Russell's thought in the period before the First World War.

Quine was one of the foremost philosophers of the Twentieth century. In this outstanding overview of Quine's philosophy, Peter Hylton shows why Quine is so important and how his philosophical naturalism has been so influential within analytic philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Quine's philosophical background in logic and mathematics and the role of Rudolf Carnap's influence on Quine's thought, he goes on to discuss Quine's famous analytic-synthetic distinction and his arguments concerning the nature of the a priori. He also (...) discusses Quine's philosophy of language and epistemology, his celebrated theory of the indeterminacy of translation and his broader views of ontology and modality. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in Quine, twentieth century philosophy and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does not follow (...) from the logical point that Duhem and Quine made about the role of auxiliary assumptions in hypothesis testing, and that the thesis should be rejected. \\\ [Peter Hylton] Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference-roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer-is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content, is that between a sentence and stimulations of our sensory surfaces; reference, while important, is a derivative notion. Section II shows how this view of reference as derivative makes possible the notorious Quinean doctrine of ontological relativity. Section III raises the issue of realism. It argues that somewhat different notions of realism are in play for Quine and for Russell-for Russell, objects, and our knowledge of objects, play the fundamental role, while for quine objectivity and truth are fundamental, with ontology being derivative. (shrink)

[Elliott Sober] In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does (...) not follow from the logical point that Duhem and Quine made about the role of auxiliary assumptions in hypothesis testing, and that the thesis should be rejected. \\\ [Peter Hylton] Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference-roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer-is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content, is that between a sentence and stimulations of our sensory surfaces; reference, while important, is a derivative notion. Section II shows how this view of reference as derivative makes possible the notorious Quinean doctrine of ontological relativity. Section III raises the issue of realism. It argues that somewhat different notions of realism are in play for Quine and for Russell-for Russell, objects, and our knowledge of objects, play the fundamental role, while for quine objectivity and truth are fundamental, with ontology being derivative. (shrink)

The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The prize-winning Russell scholar Peter Hylton presents here some of his most celebrated essays from the last two decades, all of which strive to recapture and articulate Russell's monumental vision. Relating his work to that of other philosophers, particularly Frege and Wittgenstein, and featuring a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction, the volume will be essential for anyone engaged (...) with the history of twentieth-century ideas. (shrink)

Michael Glanzberg: Quine on Reference and Quantification: This essay reviews Quine's main theses about the nature of reference and quantification, their origins, and their limitations. It presents Quine's view that reference is a derivative semantic notion, along with his proposal to eliminate proper names, and his speculation about how our ability to refer might develop. Turning to quantification, it shows the close connections between quantifiers and regimentation in Quine's work, and discusses his rejection of second‐order logic and quantification into modal (...) contexts, along with the important connection Quine sees between quantification and ontological commitment. (shrink)

The difference between Carnap and Quine over analyticity is usually thought to turn on a disagreement as to whether there is a notion of meaning, or rules of language, which enable us to define that idea. This paper argues that the more important disagreement is epistemological. Quine came to accept a notion of analyticity. That leaves him in a position somewhat like Putnam's in ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’: that there is a notion of analyticity, but that it is of (...) no philosophical importance. But their reasons for thinking analyticity unimportant are quite different: for Putnam it is because all analytic truths are trivial; for Quine, the notion of analyticity itself is unimportant. I contrast Putnam's position with that of Carnap, and also contrast Carnap and Quine. Analyticity only has the force that it has for Carnap because he accepts the Principle of Tolerance, the idea that changes within a language and changes of language are subject to justification in different senses. Quine rejects that idea. That is why he does not take analyticity to be philosophically important or useful. (shrink)

Peter Hylton; XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 269–290, https://do.

Peter Hylton; XV*—Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 269–290, https://do.

Bradley's views are the ones to which Russell and Moore are most directly reacting. The author approaches those views by considering a criticism of the views of Green. This leads to a consideration of Bradley's views about relations and experience and reality. Bradley's views about judgement and truth occupy the second half of the chapter and are considered in the context of Bradley's criticism of the empiricist's views on the same topic.

A general discussion of the problematic relationship between philosophy and its history; an argument against a common view as articulated by Richard Rorty. By contrast with that view, the aim of this book is neither to refute Russell nor simply to appropriate aspects of his thought. It is, rather, to come to terms with his thought in this crucial period as a way of coming to terms with the beginnings of analytic philosophy. For those of us trained within the analytic (...) tradition, this should be a route to an understanding of ourselves and our own philosophical position. (shrink)

Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern of Russell's than before and is dominated by the idea of acquaintance, a presuppositionless relation between the mind and entities outside the mind. In both fields, Russell develops a constructivist method, greatly influenced by logic, which was to (...) have a far‐reaching influence on later analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Discusses Russell's famous 1905 essay, ‘On Denoting’. It places it in the context of his overall philosophical views at the time, and assesses the changes that it brought about in those view.

Concerned with Russell's early work, written when he was still an adherent of the idealist tradition. The author pays particular attention to Russell's 1897 book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Russell argued that geometry was one stage in a ‘dialectic of the sciences’. Each stage would be shown, in Hegelian fashion, to be inadequate if taken by itself, and to lead naturally or inevitably to the next stage.

The focus of this chapter is on the book mentioned in its title. There, Russell combines the metaphysics of Platonic Atomism with the logic of relations, which he developed on the basis of Peano's logic and with logicism. Logicism is deployed as an argument against Idealism; in particular, it is used to defend the idea that the truths of mathematics are absolutely true, not merely relatively true as the Idealists had held. And it is also used to argue that consistent (...) theories of space and time are available. This fact, Russell claims, undermines the Idealist claim that our ordinary knowledge is inconsistent. The chapter also raises some of the problems thrown up by Russell's view, in particular the paradox that bears his name. (shrink)

A discussion of the neo‐Hegelian metaphysics of T. H. Green. In particular, the author emphasizes Green's criticism of empiricism and of his Hegelian reading of Kant, which is opposed to the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding.

Here the concern is with the logic underlying Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica and with the relation of that logic to Russell's underlying metaphysics. The author emphasizes the fact that work is, strictly speaking, a theory of propositional functions, not of classes; sentences containing symbols for classes are defined by means of propositional functions. It is terms of the latter sort of entity that Russell's Paradox must be solved; the theory of types is, strictly speaking, a theory of the stratification (...) of propositional functions. (shrink)

Deals with the initial phase of the reaction, by Moore and Russell, against Idealism. In opposition to that view, they developed an extreme form of realism, which the author calls ‘Platonic Atomism’. The idea of a ‘proposition’ is fundamental for this view. Truth is undefinable, and facts are merely those propositions that happen to be true. Among the most important works here are Moore's ‘Nature of Judgement’ and Russell's 1901 book on Leibniz; the same metaphysical view underlies Moore's Principia Ethica.

This chapter contains sections titled: Analyticity and the a priori Knowledge and the realm of the cognitive Evidence The relation of evidence to knowledge: observation sentences Naturalized epistemology and normativity Realism Metaphysics and regimentation: logic and extensionality Ontology and its relativity Conclusion.