Agent-based accounts of scientific representation all agree that the representational relationship is constituted by the actions of scientists. Despite this agreement, there are several differences in how agent-based accounts describe scientific representation. In this essay, I argue that these differences do not undercut the compatibility between the accounts. I make my argument by examining the nature of human agency and demonstrating that scientific, representational actions are multiply describable. I then argue that the differences between the accounts are valuable because they (...) help to bring different parts of the representational practices of science into greater focus. (shrink)

Previously, I (Boesch 2017) described a notion called “representational licensing”—the set of activities of scientific practice by which scientists establish the intended representational use of a vehicle. In this essay, I expand and develop this concept of representational licensing. I begin by showing how the concept is of value for both pragmatic and substantive approaches to scientific representation. Then, through the examination of a case study of the Mississippi River Basin Model, I point out and explain some of the activities (...) of representational licensing that help to establish the representational nature of this model. Throughout the exploration of the case study, I pause to identify some important lessons which apply more generally about the nature of representational licensing in science. (shrink)