Pollution in the Garden of the Argentine Republic: Building State Capacity to Escape from Chaotic Regulation

Politics and Society 41 (4):527-560 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Environmental regulation in middle-income and developing countries is often viewed with high degrees of pessimism. Although many countries have adopted protective laws, violations are widespread and institutions are weak. This paper analyzes the puzzle of shifting patterns of environmental regulation in Argentina, a country with widespread institutional weakness. Most regulators in Argentina take a firefighting approach, acting only when skirmishes emerge between communities and firms. Amidst regulatory chaos, improvements in the environmental performance of firms are few, and noncompliance remains the norm. However, in the province of Tucumán, the pattern of regulation shifted, and officials began to systematically enforce regulations. This paper traces shifts in patterns of enforcement back to broad pressures that provoked industry and environmentalists to support increases in the internal and external components of state regulatory capacity. The analysis uncovers political dynamics that can contribute to strengthening the institutions necessary for sustainable development.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,774

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance.Kevin Kolben - 2011 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 12 (2):403-437.
The over‐reliance on self‐regulation in CSR policy.David Williamson Gary Lynch‐Wood - 2009 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 18 (1):52-65.
The over-reliance on self-regulation in CSR policy.Gary Lynch-Wood, David Williamson & Wyn Jenkins - 2008 - Business Ethics: A European Review 18 (1):52-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-11-25

Downloads
11 (#351,772)

6 months
10 (#1,198,792)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations