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Synopsis and discussion: Philosophy of gauge theory
Abstract
This document records the discussion between participants at the workshop "Philosophy of Gauge Theory," Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 18-19 April 2009.Author Profiles
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Similar books and articles
Gauging What's Real: The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Gauge Theories.Richard Healey - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Are gauge symmetry transformations observable?Katherine Brading & Harvey R. Brown - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):645-665.
Holism and structuralism in U(1) gauge theory.Holger Lyre - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (4):643-670.
Curve it, gauge it, or leave it? Practical underdetermination in gravitational theories.Holger Lyre & Tim Oliver Eynck - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):277-303.
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2009-06-25
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Citations of this work
Why Surplus Structure Is Not Superfluous.Nguyen James, J. Teh Nicholas & Wells Laura - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):665-695.
Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.
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