Problems for a quantificational theory of complex demonstratives

Philosophical Studies 140 (3):335 - 358 (2008)
Abstract
This paper presents a number of objections to Jeffrey King's quantificational theory of complex demonstratives. Some of these objections have to do with modality, whereas others concern attitude ascriptions. Various possible replies are considered. The debate between quantificational theorists and direct reference theorists over complex demonstratives is compared with recent debates concerning definite descriptions
Keywords Complex demonstratives  Quantification  Direct reference  Semantics  Pragmatics  Modality  Attitude ascriptions  Definite descriptions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9149-1
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
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Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language.Jon Barwise & Robin Cooper - 1981 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (2):159--219.

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Citations of this work BETA
Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics.Lynsey Wolter - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):451-468.
Essentialist arguments against descriptivism.Michael McGlone - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):443-462.

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