How do humans want causes to combine their effects? The role of analytically-defined causal invariance for generalizable causal knowledge

Cognition 230 (C):105303 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,867

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Causal powers.Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):27-59.
Laws, Causes, and Invariance.James Woodward - 2013 - In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Screening-Off and Causal Incompleteness: A No-Go Theorem.Elliott Sober & Mike Steel - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):513-550.
Measuring Causes Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition.Nancy Cartwright - 2000 - London School of Economics, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-11-21

Downloads
7 (#1,404,117)

6 months
2 (#1,445,852)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations