Abstract

In this study I aim for an understanding of the problem of Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that the skeptical thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible is one 'side' of a paradox, the other 'side' being that we do know about the world around us. I defend that view by defending the skeptical 'side' of the paradox, assuming that we enter a study of skepticism firmly committed to the non-skeptical 'side'. ;I present an understanding of the skeptical philosopher as occupying a relatively 'objective' or critical point of view from which to reflect on our perceptual and epistemic character and I defend the legitimacy of that point of view against objections raised by F. Dretske , W. V. Quine , D. Davidson, and T. Clarke. I argue that reflections from that 'objective' point of view would remain true to the requirements embodied in those of our normal epistemic practices that determine what it means to assess beliefs and knowledge claims. And I defend the 'objective' character of those reflections against the charge that they presuppose an incorrect conception of the content of beliefs or a particularly philosophical conception of perception that would 'separate' them from ordinary beliefs. To the contrary, I find that those reflections would presuppose the broad conception of our cognitive character that underlies everyday thinking as well. ;I conclude that skepticism would seem to follow from a line of inquiry that frees itself only from the nonskeptical presuppositions that would dictate an uncritical response to the questions driving that inquiry. Thus the skeptical philosopher would seem to adopt precisely the sort of 'objective stance' we ordinarily require of rigorous inquiry. ;My account of skepticism would seem to imply that skepticism is true. Yet skepticism is clearly unacceptable. Thus I leave the problem in the form of a paradox. I suggest that the value of skepticism lies not in the negative thesis it would seem to establish, but rather, in the critical self-scrutiny it instigates.