Abstract

This paper provides a critical discussion of Robert Audi’s thoughts concerning the role of religious reasons within public political debates in modern western societies. The paper departs from an introduction to Audi’s conception of political philosophy that he characterizes as liberal, rights-based and rationalistic. Based on these general observations, Audi’s important principle of secular rationale is introduced and discussed. The principle claims that coercive laws and public policies have to be based on adequate secular reasons. Within this paper, five challenges to Audi’s central principle are identified and explicated: First, the principle might pose an unfair burden on religious citizens who have to find appropriate secular equivalents to their religious convictions. Second, the distinction between secular and religious reasons might be problematic in itself. Third, the principle of secular rationale might be interpreted as a principle of public deliberation as well as a principle of individual conduct and good, virtuous citizenship – and the principle’s plausibility might depend on the differences between these interpretations. Fourth, in some cases, the principle might thwart incentives to secure the inclusiveness and honesty of public political discourses. Fifth, there might be an internal challenge, as the principle seems to be in conflict with some thoughts defended by Audi within his philosophy of religion. The paper concludes with a tentative modification of Audi’s principle that tries to avoid some of the mentioned difficulties.