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Rescuing Responsibility – and Freedom. A Compatibilist Treatment
Abstract
Curran F. Douglass ABSTRACT: This paper confronts two questions: How is it possible to be free if causal determinism is true?; and relatedly, How then is the practice of holding persons responsible for their actions to be justified? On offer here is a compatibilist account of freedom, tying it to control; the relation – argued …Links
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Rescuing Responsibility – and Freedom.Curran F. Douglass - 2020 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 7 (1):9-27.
Hegel’s Treatment of the Free Will Problem.Robert Donoghue - 2021 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 8 (2):155-174.
Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will.Robert Kane - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):229-246.
Freedom of the Will and Moral Responsibility.Hilary Margaret Bok - 1991 - Dissertation, Harvard University
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References found in this work
Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.
Free will as involving determination and inconceivable without it.R. E. Hobart - 1934 - Mind 43 (169):1-27.
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