Abstract

This essay explores the role of the German expression Weltanschauung in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Two philosophical contexts are distinguished in which the term occurs in his writings: a) the classical pragmatist’s discussion of what constitutes Pragmatism and b) the discussion of the systematic place of a »scientific philosophy«, both in terms of its relation to other sciences and in distinction from everyday beliefs. Thus, on the one hand, the essay compares Peirce’s version of pragmatism with the views of other, more subjectivist pragmatists, who used the term »Weltanschauung« to denote their philosophical enterprises: William James and F. C. S. Schiller. On the other hand, Peirce’s ideal of scientific philosophy, particularly of scientific metaphysics, is contrasted with ›non-scientific metaphysics‹ – or how Peirce calls it: Weltanschauung. The essay also shows how his conception of scientific philosophy differs from Wilhelm Wundt’s idea that philosophy should provide a »Weltanschauung« based on the special sciences.