Abstract

The period of very high foreclosure rates sets the 2007–8 financial meltdown apart from similar banking crises fueled by asset price booms. Why did the 2007–8 meltdown lead to a prolonged foreclosure crisis? Through a theoretical perspective built on Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, Polanyi’s ideas about adverse consequences of commodity fiction, financialization of homes, and institutional coupling, I argue that commodifying houses as financial assets exposed mortgage loan holders to price fluctuations originating in capital markets and elevated their risk of default. I show how increased exposure to price fluctuations followed from the tight coupling between U.S. housing and capital markets, a coupling that resulted directly from the rising preponderance of securitization in U.S. housing finance. I provide further evidence from countries where housing finance was tightly coupled with capital markets to countries where housing finance did not rely dominantly on capital markets.