Of Temporary Coalitions in Terms of Concurrent Game Models, Announcements, and Temporal Projection

In Natasha Alechina, Andreas Herzig & Fei Liang (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction: 9th International Workshop, LORI 2023, Jinan, China, October 26–29, 2023, Proceedings. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 126-134 (2023)
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Abstract

We use Concurrent Game Models (CGM) in which simple conditional promises are assigned the role of negotiation steps aiming to represent the formation of temporary coalitions and their agendas. By transforming these extended CGMs into equivalent CGMs with incomplete information, established methods for rational synthesis become enabled. The interpretation of promises is compatible with that of announcements as in dynamic epistemic logics. To accommodate requirements on plays that are written wrt the runs of the original model, we use temporal projection that hides negotiation steps.

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